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1.1 Census-taking and EU enlargement in the Western Balkans 
The prospect of enlargement provides the European Union (EU) with a pow-
erful tool to promote peace and stability beyond the territory of its member 
states. The possibility of joining the EU enables the Union to transform these 
countries into functioning member states by imposing preconditions. This was 
rather successful in Central and Eastern Europe (Vachudova, 2005), leading 
ultimately to the 2004 enlargement round when ten countries joined the EU, 
followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; Croatia joined in 2013 as the first 
of the Western Balkan countries. The EU extended its membership perspec-
tive to all seven countries of the Western Balkan region1 in 2000, but they 
have been more reluctant to accept the conditions set by the EU and are 
moving at different speeds towards accession. While Croatia is already a 
member state, Kosovo and Bosnia are still considered as potential candi-
dates. Montenegro and Serbia have started membership negotiations, while 
Albania and Macedonia remain candidate countries that have not yet 
started negotiations.  
Within the context of EU enlargement, the academic debate has focused 
on the transformative power of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Grabbe, 2006) and has established models for the effective transfer of EU 
rules in enlargement countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). These 
models, however, do not fully explain the enlargement processes in the 
Western Balkans and scholars have turned to the normative and strategic 
dimensions of EU external power (Noutcheva, 2009, 2012) as well as to the 
EU’s approach of building functional states in the course of integrating them 
(Bieber, 2011; Denti, 2014; Keil, 2013a). Recently also the domestic circum-
stances that affect the influence of the EU in the enlargement process have 
gained attention, for example the concept of limited statehood which is the 
lack of structures to constrain human action and execute EU rules (Elbasani, 
2013a, p. 6).  
Even though the EU has a strong influence on its enlargement countries 
and have the same conditions to comply with, the Western Balkan countries 
show considerable differences in compliance. This is especially the case 
when looking at the population and housing censuses in the 2010 census 
round.2 Whereas in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro the census processes 
were not very problematic and have been described as only marginally 
contested,3 the Albanian census is partially contested by the ethnic minori-
                                                        
1 The Western Balkan region includes Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. 
2 The 2010 census round includes all censuses collected between 2005 and 2014 (United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2013). Within the EU, the reference year for the census was 2011 (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008). 
3 In Montenegro the census was marginally contested by the ethnic communities over lines of 
ethnic, religious and linguistic differences (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 13). In Serbia the complex 
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ties present in the country (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013); in Kosovo the census was 
boycotted in some municipalities (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013); and in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) it was postponed twice before being con-
ducted in October 2013, and the results were not published until June 2016. 
Finally, the census in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (hereafter 
Macedonia) was aborted after a couple of days of enumeration 
(Daskalovski, 2013). These differences in census outcomes have led also to a 
variation in compliance with the EU census regulations, which are part of the 
18th chapter of the acquis communautaire, the full body of EU rules and 
norms which consists of 35 chapters in total (European Commission, 2014b). 
The aspect of compliance with EU conditions has been the focus of Euro-
peanisation researchers (Noutcheva, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2005; 
Steunenberg & Dimitrova, 2007). While some authors have analysed the 
compliance behaviour of future member states in more general terms, oth-
ers have looked at the compliance behaviour of accession countries by 
analysing specific criteria of EU enlargement (Glüpker, 2013; Mendelski, 2013; 
Strelkov, 2016). However, such studies relate more to the Copenhagen Crite-
ria, the political criteria of the EU, rather than the chapters of the acquis 
communautaire, which tend to be regarded as more technical (Anastasakis, 
2008). To address this gap in the literature this thesis analyses the compliance 
of three of the Western Balkans countries (Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia) 
with one particular aspect of the more ‘technical’ acquis, the population 
and housing census (hereafter census).  
This thesis will analyse the 2010 census processes as part of EU enlarge-
ment in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. These countries have a relatively 
similar history as they were all part of former Yugoslavia, which conducted its 
last complete census shortly before dissolution in 1991. Besides this, all of 
these countries are enlargement countries, albeit at different stages, and 
they present very different cases of census-taking. In addition, these cases 
show that although the EU promotes enlargement as a tool for stability and 
spreading peace, the accession condition of census-taking can also in-
crease domestic tensions. In general, the collection of population data is a 
tremendously complicated undertaking. 
Although sometimes seen as an outdated concept, a population census 
is crucial in modern society. Census data forms the backbone for vital na-
tional statistics such as GDP per capita, and provides the state with infor-
mation on its population and living standards. On average population cen-
suses are collected every ten years, and involve a census law and the prep-
aration of the census, as well as the collection, processing, publication and 
                                                                                                                                       
relationship between the Serb majority and the Albanian and Bosniak minority led to minor con-
testations (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 16). In Croatia the census data has been accepted overall, 
but because of the wording of the questionnaires the results are marginally contested by the Serb 
minority (Pavelic, 2012).  
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dissemination of the population data. The collection of population data is 
very expensive and labour intensive (Schulte Nordholt, 2014, p. 9), but this 
data is needed to distribute subsidies and to make policy decisions. Census-
es can be problematic even in established democracies. For example in 
Germany the 2011 census showed that the total population was 1.5 million 
less than expected, which in the end led to a decrease in subsidies for mu-
nicipalities and cities where the number of inhabitants was lower than antic-
ipated (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013).4 Thus it can be expected 
that in the post-war societies of the Western Balkans censuses will be an even 
more delicate matter.  
Within the framework of Europeanisation there is scant research on cen-
sus-taking (Keil, 2015; Keil & Perry, 2015). Recently more attention has been 
paid to the censuses in the Western Balkan region, but this research focuses 
foremost on the construction of national identity through the census catego-
ries (Bieber, 2015) or on the aspect of ethnicity (Daskalovski, 2013; Visoka & 
Gjevori, 2013). The politics of numbers behind the population count have 
also been described as an important aspect (Daskalovski, 2013; Keil & Perry, 
2015), and even though censuses form part of the ‘technical’ acquis, schol-
ars agree that they are not technical, but in fact highly political (Keil, 2015; 
Nobles, 2000; Perry, 2013; Vrgova, 2015). 
Politicisation is inherent to census-taking, as population data is linked to 
important decisions over the distribution of public funds and can be used for 
the allocation of institutional quotas for various societal (ethnic/linguistic) 
groups (Everaers, 2015). Especially in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual societies 
census-taking is often highly politicised (Kertzer & Arel, 2002b; Leibler & 
Breslau, 2005; Urla, 1993). This is also the case in the Western Balkans (Bieber, 
2015), where the strong focus on identity-related census questions, such as 
ethnicity, language and religion, can hinder the collection of reliable popu-
lation data, as was for example the case with the aborted census in Mace-
donia (Daskalovski, 2013; Vrgova, 2015). 
The quality of the data collection process has a direct impact on the reli-
ability of the census and hence the decision-making connected to it. In or-
der to harmonise census data within the Union, the EU has official rules on 
how censuses should be collected (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union, 2008). Even though (potential) EU candidate countries do 
not yet have a legal obligation to follow EU rules, they are strongly advised to 
do so, because it shows their level of preparedness for accession. 
                                                        
4 Due to protests based on the fear of invasion of personal privacy, Germany stopped collecting 
census data after 1987 (in West Germany population numbers have been based on municipality 
registers, and in the former East Germany the last population data is from 1990). Population data 
was thus based on estimates until in 2011 census data was again collected (Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, 2013).  
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The main puzzle of this research is the variation in compliance with the EU 
census regulations. Even though these countries have the same conditions to 
comply with they show a variation when it comes to the censuses.  
1.2 Research question(s) 
The main research question of this thesis is: What accounts for the variation in 
compliance with the EU census regulations in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedo-
nia? 
The second and third chapter of this thesis will outline the theory behind 
Europeanisation and the methodology used in this thesis. These are followed 
by three empirical chapters. Chapter 2 will outline the theoretical back-
ground of Europeanisation, as well as the operationalisation of compliance 
with the EU census regulations. Chapter 3 outlines the overall methodology 
of this thesis. The empirical chapters include sub-questions to answer the 
overall question and engage with the theoretical concept of Europeanisa-
tion. Broadly defined this concept looks at ‘[p]rocesses of a) construction, b) 
diffusion, and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles and “ways of doing things”’ (Radaelli, 2006, p. 59). 
Since this concept is so broad, this thesis will research three angles of Euro-
peanisation (see chapter 2 for a more elaborate explanation). The first an-
gle, examined in Chapter 4, will set the stage for compliance with the EU 
census regulations and makes use of the concept of Europeanisation by 
assessing the explicit and implicit adherence to the EU census regulations by 
analysing census laws and methodologies of the case countries. This will pro-
vide an overview of whether and to what extent the EU conditions are 
adopted by the case countries. The other empirical chapters (Chapters 5 
and 6) will assess Europeanisation as the direct influence of the EU on the 
census processes in order to show the effect of the EU on its accession coun-
tries. Chapter 5 engages with the second angle of Europeanisation by identi-
fying two of its mechanisms—conditionality (based on the logic of rational 
choice) and legitimacy (based on the logic of appropriateness)—to analyse 
the strategies the EU employs to influence developments in the enlargement 
countries. Chapter 6 also analyses the influence of the EU on the domestic 
process, however by focusing on its power as external actor, the third angle 
of Europeanisation. These angles are important, because they provide an 
overall picture of the Europeanisation processes in the case countries.  
Chapter 4 analyses the first sub-question of the thesis by asking whether 
we can speak of Europeanisation of census-taking, in the absence of con-
crete rules on collecting ethno-cultural data. Although the Western Balkans 
have a post-war history and the aspect of collecting data on ethno-cultural 
data is regarded as sensitive, all Western Balkans countries collect data on 
Introduction 
19 
ethnicity, language and religion. In all case countries the census outcomes 
are connected to minority and/or language rights, and therefore the census 
has to collect data on ethno-cultural characteristics, which has led to differ-
ent levels of contestation. Since the collection of data on ethno-cultural 
characteristics is not part of the EU requirements, this chapter analyses data 
from a survey conducted among census experts, in order to assess the gen-
eral practice and implicit compliance of collecting ethno-cultural data.  
The fifth chapter goes deeper into the analysis of the Europeanisation of 
census-taking by looking at two Europeanisation mechanisms: conditionality, 
which is based on the rational-choice calculation of the EU (dis)incentives, 
and legitimacy, which analyses whether the EU regulations are accepted or 
contested based on the perception of appropriateness. As part of the en-
largement process the EU supports its future member states financially, but 
also with technical knowledge. With regard to the censuses, for example, the 
Statistical Office of the EU, Eurostat, has set up Technical Cooperation Meet-
ings and in some countries the census processes are observed by Interna-
tional Monitoring Observation (IMO) missions. The EU has high stakes in the 
Western Balkan region and is therefore eager to develop a reliable statistical 
system in its potential future member states (Bieber, 2015, p. 11). The second 
sub-question is thus: Which of the Europeanisation mechanisms (conditionali-
ty or legitimacy) is more likely to explain compliance with the EU census 
regulations in the case countries? 
Besides the influence of the EU, domestic aspects are also important 
when looking at census-taking processes. Based on the empirical evidence 
collected in the in-depth interviews it will be shown that the behaviour of 
local politicians and the National Statistical Institutes is crucial in census pro-
cesses. As well as structural limitations, such as limited state capacity—which 
has been identified as one of the main obstacles for EU accession (Elbasani, 
2013a)—Chapter 6 will also analyse the agency of domestic and external 
actors. The third sub-question is thus: How important are state capacity and 
domestic and external actors for compliance with the EU census regulations 
in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia?  
Table 1 presents an overview of the overall research question, as well as 
the sub-questions addressed in the respective chapters.  
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Table 1: Overview of research question and sub-questions  
 Research question and sub-questions  
Overall research design What accounts for the variation in compliance with the EU 
census regulations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? 
Chapter 4: Counting for what 
purpose? The paradox of including 
ethnic and cultural questions in the 
censuses of Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Macedonia 
Sub-question 1: Can we speak of Europeanisation of 
census-taking, in the absence of concrete rules on 
collecting ethno-cultural data?  
Chapter 5: ‘When counting counts’: 
Europeanisation of census-taking in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia 
Sub-question 2: Which of the Europeanisation mechanisms 
(conditionality or legitimacy) is more likely to explain 
compliance with the EU census regulations in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia?  
Chapter 6: Census-taking in the 
Western Balkans: A matter of state 
capacity or the influence of 
domestic and external actors? 
Sub-question 3: How important are state capacity and 
domestic and external actors for compliance with the EU 
census regulations in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia? 
 
The main argument of this thesis unfolds in three steps. First, censuses are 
always political processes. With regard to the collection of ethno-cultural 
data there is no coherent EU approach as they are no binding regulations. 
Therefore it is basically not possible to speak of compliance with the EU cen-
sus regulations when it comes to the collection of ethno-cultural data. How-
ever, if rights and representation are linked to the census outcomes, the do-
mestic context needs to be taken into account as this can politicise and 
seriously hinder census processes. Second, the analysis shows that with re-
gard to the domestic influence of the EU on census processes, both Europe-
anisation mechanisms matter, but as the effectiveness of conditionality and 
legitimacy differs by case country, it is not possible to explain their effective-
ness in a one-size-fits-all Europeanisation model for the Western Balkans. And 
third, the structural aspect of state capacity cannot fully explain the vari-
ance in compliance with the EU census regulations, but domestic actors 
have an important role in compliance processes with the EU regulations, as 
depending on the census outcomes they can potentially gain or lose power 
and/or rights and therefore respectively hinder or facilitate the census pro-
cesses. Depending on the resources available, EU pressure and rewards can 
overcome domestic disputes surrounding the census. Overall, this thesis will 
show that domestic influences should not be underestimated in Europeanisa-
tion research. The next sections present the content of the thesis and its 
methodology in more detail.  
1.3 Europeanisation 
The second chapter outlines the concept of Europeanisation and its back-
ground. Europeanisation originates from neo-functionalism and liberal-
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intergovernmentalism. The political integration of Europe is a result of eco-
nomic spillovers, according to neo-functionalism (Haas, 1958). Liberal-
intergovernmentalism challenged this perception and regards states and 
elites as the drivers of integration (Moravcsik, 2005). Europeanisation has 
managed to go beyond the debate between neo-functionalism and liberal-
intergovernmentalism by widening the research spectrum and including the 
impact of the EU on institutions and policies in domestic systems (Graziano & 
Vink, 2013, p. 36).  
In this thesis, Europeanisation is used for analysing EU enlargement and 
census-taking in the Western Balkans. In order to do so, this chapter makes a 
distinction between internal and external Europeanisation, which respective-
ly is the influence of the EU on its members and non-members. Based on the 
definitions from Radaelli (2006) and Elbasani (2013), this thesis defines Euro-
peanisation as the influence of the EU on its enlargement countries.  
This thesis contributes to analysing the effect of Europeanisation on com-
pliance with the acquis communautaire. In particular one aspect of the 18th 
chapter on statistics: the population census. Chapter two outlines the specif-
ic aspects countries need to comply with when it comes to census-taking: 
the EU census regulations. In addition, this chapter explains the three phases 
of compliance with the EU census regulations: non-compliance, partial 
compliance and full compliance. This chapter also displays in more detail 
how the different angles of Europeanisation—the explicit and implicit com-
pliance with the EU census regulations, the direct influence of the EU and the 
influence of the domestic aspects—are used in this thesis to analyse census 
processes in the three case countries (Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia).  
1.4 Methodology 
The third chapter of this thesis will outline the overall research design of the 
project. The main research strategy is based on comparative case study 
research (George & Bennett, 2005), and in order to analyse the cases quali-
tative as well as quantitative data has been collected. The case countries 
were chosen based on the method of ‘crucial cases’ (Blatter & Haverland, 
2012, pp. 176–177; George & Bennett, 2005). The selection of ‘crucial cases’ 
is based on the likelihood that a case will confirm a certain theory, also 
called most-likely cases and least-likely cases (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 
176). The case selection is thus based on expected variance in compliance 
with the EU census regulations. Figure 1 shows an overview of the status of EU 
enlargement and the census outcomes of all the Western Balkan countries. 
Except for Albania all of these countries were part of the former Yugoslavia, 
which collected its last population census shortly before its dissolution in 1991. 
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After the Yugoslav wars (1991-2001), which resulted in the violent dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia, issues of ethnicity and geographic belonging developed 
into tools for ethnic bargaining over borders, rights and political representa-
tion (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 6). Population data was seen as a means to 
increase or decrease power and rights of certain population groups and as 
a result census-taking is highly political. For these reasons, the censuses in 
Macedonia have been highly politicised (Friedman, 2002) and Bosnia did 
not have a census until 2013 (Perry, 2013). 
When this project started in June 2013, it was expected that based on the 
track record of the countries compliance with EU requirements that Croatia 
would be fully compliant. Considering the approach towards the EU, Mace-
donia was considered as partially compliant and Bosnia as non-compliant. 
At the start of this research project, the outcome of all the census processes 
was not yet clear, as Bosnia’s census took place only in October 2013 and 
publication of the census outcomes came only after a long delay in June 
2016. This however made for a very interesting and least-likely case. Mace-
donia was chosen because it was the only census that was aborted and 
therefore also presented a least-likely case. Taking into account that Mace-
donia was well on its way with implementing EU policies and nonetheless 
failed to collect population data makes for another interesting case. Croa-
tia, by contrast, received its EU membership the same year this project start-
ed and completed its 2011 census, and thus was chosen as most-likely case 
for this study. In addition, these countries also represent the different stages 
of EU enlargement.  
These cases are analysed using a mixed methods research design. The 
use of mixed methods designs is increasingly popular. For this research the 
additional coverage mixed methods model (Morgan, 2014) was chosen as it 
contributes to a more coherent understanding of the same phenomena by 
using qualitative as well as quantitative methods. In order to understand the 
census-taking processes in the case countries, in-depth interviews were con-
ducted with representatives of the National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) of the 
case countries, as well as the European Commission (for example at DG Es-
tat (Eurostat) and DG NEAR) and International Census Consultants. In addi-
tion, official documents from the EU and (for example) the NSIs, as well as 
newspaper articles have been used for contextualisation. Finally, 75 census 
experts were asked to fill in a survey, based on the Delphi method with sur-
vey data being collected in two rounds (with a response rate of 69% [n=52] 
in the first round and 50% [n=38] in the second round). Collecting the data in 
more than one round allowed for more interaction with and response from 
the census experts. The survey data provides important insights into the cen-
sus-taking processes in the EU and Europe.  
 
Introduction 
23 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the status of EU enlargement and the census outcomes 
 
The data collection and analysis method for this project is based on one 
coherent research design, as this makes it possible to analyse the phenome-
non of census-taking both from the broader perspective, using the explora-
tory survey data, and according to the particularities of the case countries, 
using the explanatory in-depth interviews. In order to provide an overview of 
the different angles of Europeanisation, each of the separate chapters em-
ploys the most relevant methodological approach(es). The fourth chapter 
analyses the inclusion of ethno-cultural data by using the overall research 
approach as it combines the results of the survey with an analysis of the cen-
sus practices of collecting ethno-cultural data by comparing the census 
methodologies and questionnaires of the case countries. The fifth and sixth 
chapters of this thesis use primarily qualitative data. The fifth chapter is based 
on the in-depth interviews, but also uses official documents and newspaper 
articles for contextualisation. The research design of this chapter is congru-
ence analysis, which allows the researcher to compare and contrast differ-
ent theories (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). The sixth chapter uses interview da-
ta, and official documents and newspaper articles for contextualisation, but 
also makes use of the World Bank Governance Indicators for its comparison 
of state capacity. The conclusion brings all these separate findings together.  
1.5 The paradox of collecting ethno-cultural data in censuses 
The fourth chapter of this thesis will deal with the paradox of including ethno-
cultural questions in the census within the case countries, but also the Euro-
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pean perspective on this matter. The paradox of counting ethnic and cul-
tural data reveals itself especially when population numbers are linked to 
numerical thresholds and minority rights. When you are not counted you 
officially do not exist; however if you are counted this ultimately can lead to 
either positive or negative discrimination (Nobles, 2000). Whereas within the 
census regulations of the European Union (European Parliament & Council of 
the European Union, 2008) there are no concrete rules on how to collect 
sensitive data on ethno-cultural characteristics (Simon, 2011), in the census 
round of 2010 all Western Balkan countries asked for this data (Eurostat, 
2014). This chapter will answer the first sub-question, which asks whether, in 
the absence of concrete rules on how to collect ethno-cultural data, it is 
possible to speak of Europeanisation of census-taking.  
In the Western Balkans, censuses were already being conducted under 
Ottoman and Habsburg rule (Shaw, 1978) and they became relatively regu-
lar in socialist Yugoslavia. The last census of Yugoslavia was conducted in 
1991, but in the same year the country also dissolved and violent conflicts 
broke out. After these conflicts, issues of ethnicity and geographic belonging 
developed into tools for ethnic bargaining over borders, rights and political 
representation (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 6). The population census is an 
essential tool for ethnic groups to (re)assure legitimacy and supremacy (Vi-
soka & Gjevori, 2013). So when the census questionnaire includes questions 
on ethnic and cultural belonging, such as ethnicity, language and religion, it 
not only provides an overview of the demographic, social and economic 
characteristics of a country’s population (Valente, 2010), it also creates an 
opportunity for individuals to identify as being part of this population 
(Ruppert, 2007). When categories are created for ethnicity, language and 
religion, people start identifying with these categories and therewith also 
legitimise them. In the end, they are forced to recognise themselves in these 
census categories (Ruppert, 2007), as being part of a societal group, and 
eventually as being part of the state. This can also lead to conflicts (Urla, 
1993) and debates about the categories (Yanow, 2003). Since the relation-
ship between the census and identities is connected to claims over territory 
and the power over people with other identities or ethnic and cultural char-
acteristics, census-taking is highly political (Kertzer & Arel, 2002a, p. 36).  
Until the dissolution of the country in 1991, identity questions in Yugoslavi-
an censuses were common and were based on self-identification; they in-
cluded open answer questions for national identity, language and religion 
(Bieber, 2015, p. 10). In the Western Balkans, collecting ethnic and cultural 
data is therefore seen as normal, but this is not required by the EU and within 
the EU there are no concrete regulations or coherent practices on how to 
collect this data. As there are no rules, it is not possible to speak of explicit 
compliance with the EU census regulations. By analysing survey data col-
lected among census experts, this chapter also assesses implicit compliance, 
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but also here census practices and expert opinions diverge. Where rights are 
linked to census outcomes, this can make the census processes highly politi-
cal. For example, in Croatia minority rights are linked to the census results 
(Petričušić, 2002). In Bosnia the population data of 1991 is linked to the Day-
ton Peace Agreement, which divides the political system among the three 
constituent ethnic groups (Bosniak, Croat and Serb) (Armakolas & 
Maksimovic, 2014; Bieber, 2004). In Macedonia, the census is linked to the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement which stopped the armed conflict between 
ethnic Albanians and Macedonians in 2001, and according to which minori-
ties making up more than 20% of the population receive language rights and 
proportional representation in the police and bureaucracy (Brunnbauer, 
2002; Vasilev, 2013). Consequently, some groups in the population stand to 
benefit from the census, whereas other groups tend to lose. This chapter 
argues that censuses are always political processes, and this is especially 
crucial if the domestic circumstances are as complex as in the Western Bal-
kans.  
The paradox of collecting ethno-cultural data and the linkage of rights 
and numerical thresholds to the census outcomes leads to domestic disputes 
and contestations, which are also visible in the analysis provided in Chapters 
5 and 6, as well as in the following sections (1.6 and 1.7).  
1.6 Europeanisation of census-taking in the Western Balkans 
The fifth chapter addresses the effect of the Europeanisation mechanisms of 
conditionality and legitimacy on the census-taking processes in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia (sub-question 2). The term ‘Europeanisation’ is used 
to describe the domestic influence of the EU in the Western Balkans 
(Elbasani, 2013a, p. 5). Earlier research on the aspect of Europeanisation has 
looked into the normative and strategic dimensions of EU external power 
(Noutcheva, 2009, 2012) and ‘EU member state building’, a concept used 
for the EU’s approach of building functional states while integrating them 
(Bieber, 2011; Denti, 2014; Keil, 2013a). Recently more attention has been 
paid to domestic factors that affect Europeanisation in the region, such as 
limited statehood (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a). Domestic factors will be 
addressed in the next section (1.7) and covered in more detail in Chapter 6.  
Within the framework of Europeanisation, census-taking is under-
researched. The EU has high stakes in the stability of the Western Balkan re-
gion and wants to develop reliable statistics in its potential member states 
(Bieber, 2015, p. 11). Even though candidate countries are not legally 
obliged to follow the EU census regulations, it is strongly recommended that 
they do so. They are expected to have the same statistical standards as the 
current EU members (Everaers, 2015, p. 185). All the Western Balkan countries 
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were in the 2010 census round either financially and/or technically supported 
by the European Commission, through for example Eurostat, the statistical 
office of the EU.5  
In order to fully understand the influence of the EU on the census process-
es in the Western Balkans, two mechanisms will be used to assess the Euro-
peanisation of census-taking in the Western Balkans. These are conditionality, 
which looks at the (dis)incentives the EU offers in light of a cost/benefit cal-
culation, and legitimacy, which will be analysed by looking at the implemen-
tation of the EU census rules in addition to the nature of the debates and 
contestations surrounding the censuses. Conditionality can be best under-
stood as a rational choice concept and is based on the logic of conse-
quences. In this thesis it will be used to assess whether EU rewards/pressure 
can outweigh the domestic adoption costs. Legitimacy derives from social 
constructivism and is based on the logic of appropriateness. Here, it is used 
to look into whether domestic actors are more likely to comply with the EU 
census regulations if they accept these as the most (appropriate) legitimate 
course of action. In Central and Eastern Europe, it has been shown that 
conditionality can explain the transfer of EU rules in candidate countries 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). In the Western Balkans, however, 
Noutcheva (2009) has found that the lack of perceived legitimacy of the EU 
rules leads to a difference in compliance with the EU conditions.  
Chapter 5 of this thesis concludes that in Croatia legitimacy was more ef-
fective whereas in Bosnia the EU rewards and pressure were able to tip the 
balance in favour of compliance. In Macedonia noncompliance can be 
explained either by conditionality—since there were no concrete EU re-
wards, the cost/benefit calculation could not outweigh the domestic adop-
tion costs—or by legitimacy, since there was a strong contestation against 
the EU census regulations. Both mechanisms have been effective in the 
three case countries and thus this chapter contributes to the Europeanisation 
literature (Noutcheva, 2009) by stating that conditionality and legitimacy do 
matter. Nonetheless the domestic adoption costs and the contestations also 
show that the domestic aspects should not be underestimated, and this will 
be addressed in more detail in the next section and in Chapter 6.  
1.7 State capacity, domestic and external actors  
State capacity is closely connected to census-taking since statistics have 
always been seen as a description of the state, ‘by and for itself’ 
(Desrosières, 1998, p. 147). Within the EU ‘good quality statistics are a part of 
the basic infrastructure’ (Everaers, 2015, p. 188) and therefore countries aim-
                                                        
5 The official name is Directorate General European Statistics (DG ESTAT) of the European Com-
mission.   
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ing to join the EU need to show that they can collect reliable population 
data. Census-taking is closely connected to state institutions and is ‘an asser-
tion of sovereign authority over people and social relations’ (Curtis, 2001, p. 
36). Research (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a, p. 6) suggests that limited state-
hood—the lack of structures to constrain human action and execute EU 
rules—is one of the main obstacles for the Western Balkans’ compliance with 
EU regulations. In addition to the structural aspect of state capacity, which 
can potentially inhibit the compliance behaviour of accession countries, the 
agency of domestic and external actors will also be assessed. The evidence 
will show that as well as the influence of the EU as external actor, the behav-
iour of domestic actors, for example of local politicians and the National 
Statistical Institutes, can be crucial when analysing census processes. Chap-
ter 6 therefore analyses the importance of state capacity, but also of do-
mestic and external actors, in terms of compliance with the EU census regu-
lations in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia (sub-question 3).  
While comparing state capacity using the data from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators, this chapter finds that state capacity is not able to 
fully explain the variance of the case countries’ compliance with the EU cen-
sus regulations. As in countries with contested statehood, external actors can 
take over authority and fill the gaps left by the local government (Krasner & 
Risse, 2014), this chapter also assesses the agency of actors and their influ-
ence on the census processes. In addition to the EU as an external actor the 
responses of political and other domestic actors, as mentioned in section 1.6, 
will also be taken into account.  
The analysis in this chapter shows that when there are domestic disputes, 
as in the case of Bosnia, the influence of the EU as an external actor is im-
portant. However, if the EU has little leverage and there are domestic dis-
putes, census processes can also be hindered to the extent that they have 
to be aborted, as in Macedonia. The case of Croatia shows that if there are 
almost no domestic disputes, the influence of external actors is not needed 
in order to be compliant with the EU census regulations. This also confirms the 
finding in Chapter 5, where for Croatia the Europeanisation mechanism of 
legitimacy was most important and for Bosnia conditionality was able to tip 
the balance in favour of compliance, but in the case of Macedonia the EU 
could not overcome the domestic contestations. These cases show that 
domestic agency should not be underestimated in census processes.  
1.8 Contributions & relevance 
The contributions of this thesis are twofold. First, this project builds on a mixed 
methods approach, which combines in-depth interview data with an expert 
survey collected in two rounds. This strategy of data collection is innovative 
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and provides us with the domestic perspective as well as the broader Euro-
pean perspective on census-taking.  
Second, by analysing census-taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia in 
the context of EU enlargement, this project will make some important empir-
ical contributions. First, by unpacking the census processes and differences in 
the Western Balkans and the EU it will be shown that a seemingly technical 
aspect of the acquis communautaire is in fact highly political. Second, as 
there is no research yet on the influence of the EU on compliance with the 
specific requirements of the acquis communautaire of enlargement coun-
tries, this research widens the horizon for new pathways in Europeanisation 
research. Third, this research will confirm that the outcomes of categorisation 
practices and the collection of ethno-cultural data in the census question-
naire can have important political consequences, but also seriously hinder 
the collection of population data. Fourth, the analysis of the Europeanisation 
mechanisms will show that conditionality and legitimacy are important when 
looking at the compliance behaviour of enlargement countries. Fifth, the 
analysis in Chapter 6 will show that weak state capacity cannot fully explain 
the variation of the case countries regarding their compliance with the EU 
census regulations, which challenges the claim made by Börzel (2013) and 
Elbasani (2013a) that limited statehood is an obstacle towards EU enlarge-
ment. It will however also highlight that the domestic circumstances and 
actors should not be underestimated when studying censuses and compli-
ance with the EU regulations in the Western Balkans.  
The topic of this thesis is relevant, because census data is crucial for good 
policy and decision-making. Reliable data is of key importance when it 
comes to the appropriate allocation of resources on the municipal, regional, 
national and even the European level. Within the European Union, the use of 
statistical data for policy-making has been described as the ‘cornerstone of 
European society’ (Everaers, 2015, p. 185) and ‘good quality statistics’ as 
part of the basic infrastructure (p. 188). However, the collection of popula-
tion data is costly and although there are alternatives to the traditional pen-
and-paper census used in the Western Balkans, such as the register-based 
census in the Netherlands, in countries without that kind of infrastructure a 
traditional census remains the most viable option.  
Besides these more practical aspects, the political state of the Balkan 
countries needs to be taken into account. The processes of state-building 
and democratisation are still ongoing in these countries. Some countries are 
even described as being captured by elites organised along ethnic-
nationalistic lines (Kraske, 2017). Even though some former Yugoslav coun-
tries are more successful in state-building and are now members of the EU, 
issues of minority rights also remain a matter of concern in Croatia and Slo-
venia (Keil, 2015). The strong focus on identity-related questions in the cen-
suses in the Western Balkans (Keil, 2015), and the connection of the census 
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results to numerical thresholds and minority and language rights, adds an 
extra layer of complexity to the census and Europeanisation processes.  
1.9 Outline of the thesis 
The chapters of this thesis are based on academic articles. For this reason 
there may be some repetition, as each article is able to stand on its own 
without further explanation. In order to fit the overall style of the thesis, the 
articles have been slightly adjusted, for example with regard to the refer-
ence style, and an overall reference list can be found at the end of the text. 
Some of the chapters (4 and 5) have already been published as articles 
(Hoh, 2017a, 2017b). The fifth chapter is currently under review by an aca-
demic journal and it is planned that the third chapter will be submitted to a 
journal in a slightly revised form.  
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Abstract  
This chapter outlines the concept of Europeanisation and how it is used for 
analysing EU enlargement and census-taking in the Western Balkans. Since 
the census is part of the 18th chapter of the acquis communautaire, which 
outlines the rules and regulations countries need to implement in order to 
become an EU member, this is one of the conditions enlargement countries 
need to comply with. This chapter outlines how compliance with the EU cen-
sus regulations is operationalised in this thesis. Next to this, the chapter dis-
plays the different angles on Europeanisation employed in this thesis, which 
address the explicit and implicit compliance with the EU census regulations, 
the direct influence of the EU on the census processes in the case countries 
and the domestic aspects that can affect the influence of the EU. By ad-
dressing these angles, this thesis contributes to a better overall understanding 
of the Europeanisation of acquis compliance, and in particular of the Euro-
peanisation of census-taking in the Western Balkans.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The concept of Europeanisation was originally developed to describe the 
influence of EU integration on its member states (Graziano & Vink, 2013), but 
it has also been used to study EU influence in accession countries (Elbasani, 
2013a). Unlike EU member states, enlargement countries are in an asymmet-
rical relationship with the EU, as they do not have a say with regard to the 
requirements they need to implement in order to become an EU member 
(Grabbe, 2003). Nevertheless, they need to comply with the same require-
ments as EU members. Therefore the concept of Europeanisation is also ap-
propriate to study the impact of the EU in enlargement countries.  
Europeanisation derives from the strands of neo-functionalism, liberal-
intergovernmentalism, and new institutionalism. According to neo-
functionalism the political integration of Europe is a result of economic spillo-
vers (Haas, 1958). Liberal-intergovernmentalism challenged this perception 
as it regards states and elites as the drivers of integration (Moravcsik, 2005). 
Europeanisation has managed to end this debate by widening the research 
spectrum and including the impact of the EU on institutions and policies in 
domestic systems (Graziano & Vink, 2013, p. 36). Vital for understanding the 
background of Europeanisation is new institutionalism, which highlights the 
autonomy of institutions (Bulmer, 2007, p. 51). As will be explained in section 
2.2, new institutionalism analyses Europeanisation from a rational-choice, 
constructivist and historical perspective. These theoretical strands are mostly 
used to explain the effects of the European integration process on its mem-
ber states.  
With regard to EU enlargement, the concept of Europeanisation emerged 
rather late in the process, and started with research on the integration of the 
Central and Eastern European countries as member states (Grabbe, 2006; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a; Vachudova, 2005). When looking at 
the enlargement process of the Western Balkan countries, academic litera-
ture has dealt with the general compliance of accession countries with EU 
demands as well as the influence that such demands have had (Noutcheva, 
2009, 2012; Trauner, 2009). Apart from research focussing on the democratic 
criteria (Elbasani, 2013b; Glüpker, 2013), there is little research which analyses 
the influence of the EU on countries’ compliance with particular require-
ments of enlargement, such as rule of law (Strelkov, 2016). To date, no re-
search has explored the influence of the EU on compliance with the specific 
requirements of the acquis communautaire.  
To differentiate from the influence of the EU on its member states, this the-
sis will use the term external Europeanisation to describe the influence of the 
EU on its non-members, in this case enlargement countries. External Europe-
anisation will be used to analyse the influence of the EU on one specific as-
pect of compliance with the EU acquis, the population and housing census. 
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The acquis includes the whole body of EU law and practices that need to be 
implemented by enlargement countries (Grabbe, 2003, p. 304). The popula-
tion and housing census is part of the 18th chapter on the statistical require-
ments for EU membership. The census is important as it provides an overview 
of a country’s population and living standards and is seen as the backbone 
of national statistics. As evidence-based decision making is important not 
only for states, but also for the EU (Everaers, 2015), the population census is 
an important aspect of the EU requirements. In order to be able to compare 
population data among member and enlargement countries, the data has 
to be harmonised. Therefore the statistical compendium (European 
Commission, 2014c) outlines the requirements of the statistics chapter. For 
the census several EU regulations (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009; European Commission, 2010a, 2010b; European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008) stipulate what kind of 
data has to be collected and transferred.  
The census is an aspect of the acquis that is also indirectly connected 
with the Copenhagen Criteria, the democratic requirements for joining the 
European Union. This is especially relevant with regard to the Western Bal-
kans, as in this region census outcomes are often connected to the propor-
tional representation of population groups with regard to language and 
minority rights, which are essential aspects of the democratic requirements. 
This connection is especially visible in Macedonia, where the Ohrid Agree-
ment clearly outlines that language rights are granted if minorities make up 
more than 20% of the population (Brunnbauer, 2002). Minority rights are thus 
dependent on the outcomes of the census. Compliance with particular as-
pects of the acquis, such as the census, can affect compliance with the 
democratic requirements. By analysing the Europeanisation of census-taking, 
this thesis contributes to the general literature of Europeanisation, and sets 
the stage for a more concrete analysis of the impact of the EU on acquis 
compliance.  
In this thesis external Europeanisation, the influence of the EU on its en-
largement countries, will be used to analyse the variation in census out-
comes in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. This will be done by analysing 
explicit compliance, whether or not the census laws and methodologies of 
these countries are in line with the EU census regulations—but also the implic-
it compliance when it comes to census practices that are not part of the 
regulations, such as the collection of ethno-cultural data. Although the col-
lection of ethno-cultural data is not part of the official requirements, the col-
lection of this data is needed in the Western Balkans to for example ensure 
minority rights. Next to the overall assessment of compliance, this thesis will 
analyse the direct influence of the EU in its enlargement countries from the 
European perspective. This will be done by comparing the effectiveness of 
two Europeanisation mechanisms—conditionality and legitimacy—to see 
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whether the influence of the EU on compliance depends on rational 
cost/benefit incentives and/or countries’ perception of these rules as appro-
priate and legitimate. In addition, it has been shown by Elbasani (2013a) that 
the domestic perspective is often neglected in Europeanisation research. 
Therefore this thesis also assesses whether domestic aspects affect the com-
pliance behaviour of the case countries by comparing their state capacity 
and the influence of domestic actors with the external influence of the EU.  
This chapter will outline the theoretical aspects of Europeanisation and 
the framework of Europeanisation within EU enlargement. In order to do so, 
first the general background of Europeanisation will be described and then 
the developments of this concept within the study of EU enlargement and in 
particular the Western Balkan enlargement. Thereafter the requirements of 
census regulations and the operationalisation of compliance will be speci-
fied. Finally, this chapter will embed the three angles of Europeanisation—
implicit and explicit compliance, the direct influence of the EU and the im-
pact of domestic aspects—in the empirical chapters of this thesis.  
2.2 Europeanisation 
Europeanisation is a concept that predates the European Union, having 
been used to describe earlier integration processes in Europe (Radaelli & 
Pasqiuer, 2007, p. 36). It is nevertheless mostly used to describe the process 
and the impact of the EU on its member states (Börzel, Hofmann, Panke, & 
Sprungk, 2010; Caporaso, 2007), but more recently also on (potential) en-
largement countries (Grabbe, 2003 and section 2.3) and even EU neigh-
bourhood countries (Börzel & Lebanidze, 2017; Gawrich, Melnykovska, & 
Schweickert, 2010). Research on the Europeanisation of the EU neighbour-
hood is slowly finding its way into Europeanisation research, and research on 
external Europeanisation, the effect of the EU and its policies on non-EU 
members, is increasing (see for example: Anastasakis, 2008; Grabbe, 2006; 
Keil, 2013a; Noutcheva, 2012; Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a). Before elaborating on external Euro-
peanisation, this chapter will first outline the theoretical background of Euro-
peanisation and survey its many definitions.  
Initially, the term Europeanisation was invented to answer the question of 
how European integration affects the policy making of states (Caporaso, 
2007, p. 27). Deriving from Comparative Politics and theoretical Policy Analy-
sis (Radaelli, 2006, p. 61), Europeanisation is based on the theoretical strands 
of neo-functionalism, (liberal) intergovernmentalism and new institutionalism. 
Mainly used in the 1950s and 60s, the theory of neo-functionalism predicted 
that through functional spillovers from the economic sector, driven by social 
actors’ self-interest and promotion through supranational elites, (European) 
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political integration would follow (Bourne & Cini, 2006; Graziano & Vink, 2013, 
p. 32). Neo-functionalism builds on the work of Haas (1958), who analysed 
the European political integration using the example of the European Coal 
and Steel Community. The ideas of the neo-functionalists were contested by 
liberal-intergovernmentalists, such as Moravcsik (1993), who argue that while 
there might be spillover in low political areas, there is no spillover when it 
comes to the core of national sovereignty (Bourne & Cini, 2006). According 
to liberal-intergovernmentalists, European integration tends to strengthen the 
state and national governments (Bulmer, 2007, p. 49). This thesis will not re-
produce the debate between neo-functionalism and liberal-
intergovernmentalism, as this has already been done elsewhere (Bourne & 
Cini, 2006; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Graziano & Vink, 2007; Moravcsik, 
2005). The commonalities of these strands, however, are that they focus on 
the states and their influence on Europe, and look at European integration 
and governance from a ‘bottom-up perspective’ (Börzel & Risse, 2000).  
More recently researchers, such as Börzel and Risse (2000, 2003), have 
challenged this ‘bottom-up perspective’ and become interested in the ‘top-
down perspective’, which assesses the process and impact of European 
integration on its member states and enlargement countries. This top-down 
perspective of Europeanisation is mainly influenced by new institutionalism, 
which emphasises the autonomy of political institutions and the importance 
of symbolic action (March & Olsen, 1983).  
Deriving from institutionalism, the process of standardised interaction to 
create social order (Jepperson, 1991, p. 145), new institutionalism has three 
main variants: rational-choice, historical and sociological institutionalism 
(Bulmer, 2007, pp. 49–50). Rational-choice institutionalists see institutions and 
Europeanisation as political opportunity structures, and explore the prefer-
ences of actors with regard to the institutional settings or rules. With regard to 
Europeanisation, this mostly refers to the mechanism of EU conditionality, 
whether or not EU conditions are implemented based on whether the EU 
rewards outweigh the domestic adoption costs. Historical institutionalists are 
concerned with the element of time, in terms of timing and tempo of the 
(European) integration process. By highlighting the interdependence of mul-
tiple causal variables (Steinmo, 2008, p. 166), historical institutionalism sees 
the evolution of institutions as a driving factor of change in governance and 
policy making (Georgescu, 2014). Sociological institutionalists are concerned 
with norms, ideas, discourse and organisational structure of politics, and fo-
cus, among other things, on the behaviour of domestic actors. This is related 
to the mechanism of legitimacy and whether or not EU rules are implement-
ed because this is regarded as the appropriate thing to do.  
New institutionalism is indispensable for understanding the context of Eu-
ropeanisation (Bulmer, 2007, p. 51). The different variants of new institutional-
ism have been used to analyse Europeanisation (see for example: Börzel & 
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Risse, 2003). Inspired by rational-choice and sociological institutionalism, 
chapter 5 of this thesis assesses to what extent and how the EU influences the 
census processes in the case countries. Whereas earlier research on Central 
and Eastern Europe showed that EU conditionality, a rational-choice model, 
can explain patterns of EU rule transfer to candidate countries 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004), this was less the case in the Western 
Balkans. In these countries the lack of perceived legitimacy—a model based 
on sociological institutionalism—of the EU rules led to different outcomes in 
compliance with EU conditions (Noutcheva, 2009). Thus in order to under-
stand the influence of the EU on the census processes in the case countries, 
this chapter will compare the effectiveness of the Europeanisation mecha-
nisms of conditionality, based on rational choice, and legitimacy, based on 
socialisation.  
The existence of different variants of institutionalism might seem to sug-
gest that they are competing. These variants are, however, not mutually 
exclusive and can occur simultaneously and/or in different phases of the 
integration process (Börzel & Risse, 2000). Non-compliance based on rational 
cost-benefit calculations (rational-choice institutionalism) can later on still 
lead to compliance based on the implementation and adaptation of norms 
and ideas (sociological institutionalism) (Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2014, p. 
1261). Before going deeper into the operationalisation of compliance (which 
will be outlined in section 2.4), the various definitions of Europeanisation will 
be outlined.  
Over the last decades, Europeanisation has developed into an estab-
lished academic concept (some examples are: Atanasova & Bache, 2010; 
Börzel, 2013; Börzel & Risse, 2011a; Denti, 2014; Eigmüller, 2013; Elbasani, 
2013a; Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 
2005a; Sedelmeier, 2011; Versluis, 2004). It is, however, used in various con-
texts and with diverging definitions (for an overview of the use of 
Europeanisation, see for example Featherstone, 2003). The debate on the 
boundaries of the concept of Europeanisation was started by Radaelli in 
2000 and is still ongoing (Graziano & Vink, 2013, p. 37). Radaelli uses a rather 
broad definition of Europeanisation:  
[P]rocesses of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and 
‘ways of doing things’. It also consists of shared beliefs and norms that 
are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) dis-
course. (Radaelli, 2006, p. 59)  
Thus, according to Radaelli (2006, p. 59), Europeanisation is about the 
complexity of domestic change, how it is processed, constructed, 
institutionalised, adapted and implemented—thus, it is seen as more than a 
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simple reaction to ‘Brussels’. Vink and Graziano (2007, p. 7) describe Europe-
anisation in a similar manner, as a process of domestic adaptation to Euro-
pean regional integration, which refers to adaptive processes between the 
domestic and the EU with regard to policies and institutions. This is also in line 
with the definition given by Börzel (2002), who additionally highlights the con-
text of uploading of domestic societal preferences to the EU level and the 
downloading of EU policies on the national level of EU member states. How 
Europeanisation is defined in this thesis will be described in the next section 
(2.3), but first the conceptual limitations of Europeanisation will be outlined. 
Bulmer (2007, p. 47) identified that Europeanisation research revolves 
around topics regarding changes of external boundaries, the development 
of European institutions, the penetration of national governance systems, the 
export of political organisations and the EU as a political unification project. 
Within the field of research on Europeanisation, three important elements are 
addressed (Radaelli, 2006, p. 67). First, Europeanisation refers to how the log-
ic of domestic political actors changes when Europe ‘becomes the “gram-
mar” of domestic political action’ (Radaelli, 2006, p. 67). EU policy making 
thus becomes a frame of reference for domestic political actors. Second, 
Europeanisation means change as a response to the EU, for example when 
the EU uses political pressure. Third, the process of Europeanisation includes 
complex sequences and timing. Radaelli (2002) also describes that harmoni-
sation, political integration and convergence are not part of Europeanisa-
tion. According to Radaelli, harmonisation is seen as an important goal of 
Europeanisation; however empirical research has shown that the impact of 
European requirements is rather differential (Graziano & Vink, 2013, p. 38). 
With regard to political integration, a difference must be made between the 
political pooling and delegation of country’s sovereignties and the dynamics 
and consequences this integration brings about (Graziano & Vink, 2013, p. 
38). Convergence is a consequence of Europeanisation and as such cannot 
be used synonymously with Europeanisation, as Europeanisation deals with 
the process of EU integration and not its outcome. Nevertheless, even 
Radaelli (2000) acknowledges the interrelatedness of these concepts with 
Europeanisation, and the distinction has not stopped researchers (some 
examples are: Börzel & Risse, 2000; Delcour, 2013; Vos, 2006) from employing 
these elements as part of Europeanisation. Also in this thesis these aspects 
are crucial to understand the influence of the EU. For example when it 
comes to census-taking and national statistics, harmonisation is a crucial 
aspect. Without harmonisation of data it would not be possible to compare 
statistics in Europe and internationally. It is exactly this divergence that cre-
ates an interesting puzzle worth researching. Looking at the definition Ra-
daelli gives for political integration, there is an essential difference with re-
gard to Europeanisation of member states and non-members. As will be ex-
plained in the next section (2.3), enlargement countries do not have a say 
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with regard to the requirements they need to implement in order to become 
an EU member. There is thus only limited political pooling and it is therefore 
possible to study the consequences of political integration.  
Most of the work by early Europeanisation researchers, such as Börzel and 
Risse (2000) and Kohler-Koch (1996), focused on EU integration and the rela-
tion with its member states. What needs to be taken into account is the dis-
tinction between the process of policy formation within the EU and the con-
sequences of that policy in (enlargement) countries (Grabbe, 2006, p. 47). 
When it comes to external Europeanisation, concerning the EU’s enlarge-
ment countries, the influence of the EU is different than on its member states, 
as will be explained in the next section.  
2.3 Europeanisation in enlargement countries  
When it comes to the relationship of the European Union with its applicants, 
the political relationship is different from that of the EU with its member states, 
and this has implications for the occurrence of Europeanisation (Grabbe, 
2003). First this section will outline enlargement and its differences with inter-
nal Europeanisation (the influence of the EU on its member states), then it will 
explain the particularities of external Europeanisation (the EU’s influence on 
its non-members). Finally the section will explain the use of Europeanisation in 
the context of this thesis.  
Even though enlargement is the EU’s most powerful tool of foreign policy 
(Vachudova, 2005, p. 223), there has been rather limited research on the first 
enlargement rounds of the EU6 and in the 1990s this topic was still rather ne-
glected in Europeanisation research (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005b). 
After the end of the Cold War, enlargement became a permanent item on 
the agenda of the EU (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2006, p. 96). In 1995, 
Austria, Sweden and Finland and in 2004 eight countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia) from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe joined. Bulgaria and Romania became EU members 
in 2007 and Croatia is the most recent member state, since 2013. With the 
2004 enlargement of Central and Eastern Europe, research on enlargement 
and external Europeanisation increased (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005a; Vachudova, 2005). The enlargement of Romania 
and Bulgaria was still on research agendas even after accession (Noutcheva 
& Bechev, 2008; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012) and of course the ac-
cession processes of the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo) are being 
                                                        
6 The first enlargement round was in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EU. This 
was followed by the accession of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 (European 
Commission, 2016a).  
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investigated (Bieber, 2011; Elbasani, 2013b; Keil, 2013b; Noutcheva, 2012; 
Papadimitriou & Petrov, 2012).  
Accession countries do not have a say in the requirements for enlarge-
ment, they must fulfil them in order to become a member of the EU. Upload-
ing of domestic preferences on the EU level, as explained above and used in 
the research by Börzel and Risse (2000), is thus not possible for accession 
countries. This leads to an asymmetrical relationship, which arguably pro-
vides the EU with more influence in the domestic policy making process in 
accession countries than in its own member states. Additionally, the stakes 
for accession countries are higher than for member states, because EU 
membership is the main incentive to comply with the EU requirements 
(Grabbe, 2003, p. 303). As enlargement countries are already subject to the 
pressure and implementation procedures of EU policies, Europeanisation can 
also be applied to them (Grabbe, 2003, p. 304). However, as there are dif-
ferences inherent in the Europeanisation of non-members, this will be denot-
ed as external Europeanisation.  
In order to join the EU, accession countries need to comply with the EU 
conditions for membership. In particular, they have to adopt the acquis 
communautaire, the whole body of EU law and practice, ideally before join-
ing or in a transitional period afterwards (Grabbe, 2003, p. 304). The acquis 
consists of 35 chapters and about 80,000 pages (Vachudova, 2005, p. 123). 
Even though for enlargement countries there is no legal obligation to follow 
the EU rules, they are strongly advised to comply with the regulations as it 
shows their level of preparedness for EU membership. The content of the 
acquis is not negotiable and the EU Commission assesses whether and to 
what extent the EU norms and standards have already been implemented 
by the accession countries (Vachudova, 2005, p. 124). Next to the acquis, 
countries also need to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, which include: ‘sta-
ble institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy […]; 
[and] the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of 
membership […]’ (European Commission, 2014b).  
Although compliance with these requirements has been rather straight-
forward in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Western Balkan countries this is 
more complicated. After the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia—which com-
prised all Western Balkan countries except Albania—the countries are deal-
ing with a post-conflict environment. Since the Western Balkans are dealing 
with new state configurations and state building, the influence of the EU in 
the Balkans has also been described as EU member state building (Keil, 
2013a).  
Within the research on EU enlargement, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2005b, p. 6) found four main research fields: ‘(1) applicants’ enlargement 
politics, (2) member state enlargement politics, […] (3) EU enlargement poli-
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tics’ and (4) the ‘impact of enlargement’. This thesis will analyse Europeanisa-
tion in terms of the impact of the EU on the enlargement processes. Com-
pared with conceptual distinctions of Europeanisation made by Radaelli 
(2006) above, with regard to EU enlargement there are three additional im-
portant distinctions (Grabbe, 2003, pp. 310–312; 2006, pp. 47-–49). First, Euro-
peanisation is not about the reasons why enlargement is taking place, but is 
post-ontological, addressing the effects of the enlargement process. Sec-
ond, within the processes of enlargement there are different kinds of influ-
ence and degrees of influence on the enlargement countries. With regard to 
kinds of influence a distinction must be made between effects from Europe-
anisation and from, for example, globalisation (Grabbe, 2003, p. 311). The 
same holds for the degrees of influence: since there is a general interest (by 
for example EU officials) to claim that change occurs because of the influ-
ence of the EU, there is the danger of overemphasising this influence. Third, 
one needs to distinguish between the intended and unintended effects of 
Europeanisation. The influence of the EU can be diffused as the EU operates 
through many different actors, such as the Commission and the Delegations 
in the countries, with often unclear goals. One of the unintended conse-
quences of asking for population data in the Western Balkan countries was 
the high politicisation of these processes, because in these countries minority 
rights (for example) are connected to the census outcomes. This is also an 
illustration of how the domestic perspective has been underestimated when 
it comes to the influence of the EU.  
Within Europeanisation research there has been a lack of focus on the 
domestic side of the equation (Elbasani, 2013a, p. 5; Mastenbroek, 2005). 
When it comes to the Western Balkans, the success story of previous EU en-
largements that transformed countries into functioning market economies 
and contributed to peace and stability came to a halt (Elbasani, 2013a, p. 
4). In this region, compliance with the EU requirements cannot sufficiently be 
explained by the model of EU conditionality. The focus of Europeanisation 
research nonetheless remained on expectations rather than the domestic 
factors that challenge the implementation of the requirements (Elbasani, 
2013a, p. 5). Börzel (2013) argues that limited statehood can explain the var-
iation in compliance with the EU conditions, and according to Elbasani 
(2013a, p. 9) the strength of the domestic elite, and whether or not they are 
potential EU allies, historical legacies such as post-communist transition, and 
weak stateness, such as the contestation of state sovereignty and territorial 
boundaries, are factors that affect the enlargement process.  
In this thesis Europeanisation will be used to analyse the variation in 
compliance with the EU census regulations of Croatia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia. This will be done by looking at external Europeanisation. With 
regard to Europeanisation of enlargement countries, Elbasani (2013a, p. 5) 
describes Europeanisation as shorthand for the domestic influence of the EU. 
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A similar definition will be used in this thesis: external Europeanisation will be 
defined as the influence of the EU on its enlargement countries. The overall 
compliance will be assessed through the explicit and implicit compliance 
with the EU census regulations, the direct influence of the EU, as well as the 
domestic aspects that can affect Europeanisation.  
Explicit and implicit compliance are both related to the harmonisation of 
population data. Explicit compliance measures whether or not the EU census 
regulations are applied in the case countries. Implicit compliance7 assesses 
whether there are practices that are not officially part of the regulations but 
still applied when it comes to census-taking, for example with regard to the 
collection of ethno-cultural data. Analysing explicit and implicit compliance 
will establish a framework to further investigate the reasons behind the 
variation of compliance with the EU census regulations.  
The direct influence of the EU will be assessed by the effectiveness of two 
mechanisms of Europeanisation—conditionality (based on the logic of con-
sequences) and legitimacy (based on the logic of appropriateness)—in or-
der to analyse the strategies the EU employs to influence developments in 
the enlargement countries. The analysis of these Europeanisation mecha-
nisms will measure the effectiveness of Europeanisation.  
Additionally, there has been a lack of focus on the domestic aspects that 
can influence Europeanisation. Therefore this thesis will also analyse whether 
and to what extent domestic aspects, such as state capacity and domestic 
actors, play a role when assessing external Europeanisation. This will be done 
by comparing the influence of the EU as an external actor with the domestic 
aspects of state capacity and the influence of domestic actors.  
These angles have been chosen as they present an overall picture of the 
Europeanisation of census-taking in the case countries in order to answer the 
overall research question of this thesis: What accounts for the variation in 
compliance with the EU census regulations in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedo-
nia? However, before describing how these angles will be used to answer 
the research question in the empirical chapters, first the operationalisation of 
compliance with the EU census regulations will be outlined.  
2.4 Compliance with the EU census regulations  
Europeanisation research on enlargement in the Western Balkans has so far 
looked into the general compliance with the requirements for EU enlarge-
ment (Noutcheva, 2009, 2012; Trauner, 2009), but except for some authors 
                                                        
7 Implicit compliance is related to socialisation, the internalisation of norms and ideas, and for 
example the social learning model by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004). The idea is that 
implicit compliance occurs through the exchange of census methods and practices by census 
experts.  
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(Elbasani, 2013b; Glüpker, 2013; Strelkov, 2016) compliance with particular 
requirements of enlargement has been neglected. Research on compliance 
of accession countries with the criteria of the acquis has so far not been 
done in detail.  
The research puzzle of this thesis is the variation in compliance with EU 
regulations with regard to census-taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. 
These countries have been selected as they had the same EU conditions to 
comply with, but it was expected that they would show a strong variation 
with regard to census outcomes. This actually happened to be the case. The 
2011 census in Croatia was conducted without any major irregularities and 
the results are published in the EU census hub. The census processes of Bosnia 
and Macedonia were much more complicated. The 2013 census of Bosnia 
had to deal with a lot of delays and the population data was only published 
in 2016. In Macedonia, the last census enumeration in 2011 was stopped 
after a couple of days because of methodological differences. Thus, alt-
hough having the same requirements, the countries’ outcomes differ signifi-
cantly. 
To understand the variation in compliance with the EU census regulations, 
the definition of compliance must be clear. According to Oran Young, 
‘[c]ompliance can be said to occur when the actual behaviour of a given 
subject conforms to prescribed behaviour, and noncompliance or violation 
occurs when actual behaviour departs significantly from prescribed behav-
iour’ (Oran Young, 1979, in: Simmons, 1998, p. 77). Compliance is thus the 
potential outcome of the implementation process in which all stages are 
fulfilled in a dutiful manner. Before describing in detail how compliance with 
the EU census regulations is assessed, the requirements for a population and 
housing census will be clarified.  
2.4.1 The census requirements  
The requirements of the population and housing census are part of the 18th 
acquis chapter on statistics (European Commission, 2013a). The statistical 
requirements compendium (European Commission, 2014c) serves as a refer-
ence document for the statistics chapter of the acquis and as such as the 
framework to assess compliance. With regard to the census, the compendi-
um (European Commission, 2014c, p. 97) includes the Commission regula-
tions on the population and housing census (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009; European Commission, 2010a, 2010b; European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008). 
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Figure 2: Articles of the Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 9 July 2008 on Population and Housing Censuses 
Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
9 July 2008 on Population and Housing Censuses (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union, 2008) is the main frame of reference for all 
censuses in the EU, but also in its enlargement countries. The regulation wants 
to achieve data harmonisation for the population data by outlining the 
‘methodology, definitions and the programme of the statistical data and the 
metadata’, and it stresses the need for ‘reliable, detailed and comparable 
data on the population and housing’ (European Parliament & Council of the 
Articles of the Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 
July 2008 on Population and Housing Censuses 
 
Article 1: Subject matter: 
Outlines the common rules for the decennial population and housing census. 
 
Article 2: Definitions: 
Outlines the use of the definitions for categories such as: Population, housing, buildings, usual 
residence and the reference date. 
 
Article 3: Data submission: 
Outlines the submission of the data to the Commission (Eurostat). 
 
Article 4: Data sources: 
Outlines the possibilities for data collection, such as register-based and conventional census-
es. 
 
Article 5: Data transmission: 
Outlines the reference date of the census and the dates, forms and metadata for the trans-
mission of the population data to the Commission. 
 
Article 6: Quality assessement: 
Outlines the quality assessment dimensions: relevance, accuracy, timeliness/punctuality, 
accessibility/clarity, comparability and coherence, as well as how to report on these. 
 
Article 7: Implementing measures: 
Outlines the technical specifications and the technical format, as well as the modalities and 
structures of the quality reports. 
 
Article 8: Committee procedure: 
Outlines that the Commission will be assisted by the Statistical Programme Committee and 
refers to other relevant regulations, such as Decision 1999/468/EC which outlines the imple-
menting powers of the Commission. 
 
Article 9: Entry into force 
Outlines that this regulation enters into force 20 days after its official publication. 
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European Union, 2008). The regulation includes nine articles (see figure 2 for 
an overview of the articles and appendix 1 for a copy of the regulation). 
Among others these articles define the subject matter (article 1), which refers 
to the ‘common rules for the decennial provision of comprehensive data on 
population and housing’ and the definitions used for census categories (arti-
cle 2), as well as the data transmission (article 5) and submission to Eurostat 
(article 3). The data sources (article 4) to retrieve population data are also 
specified, for example the conventional pen and paper census, which is still 
in use in the case countries, but also register-based censuses, which are for 
example common in the Netherlands. Other aspects of the regulation are 
quality assessment (article 6), for example based on quality criteria such as 
relevance, timeliness, accuracy, accessibility, comparability and coherence 
of the data, and the implementing measures (article 7), such as technical 
specifications (see figure 2 and appendix 1, as well as European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2008).  
The subsequent regulations (Commission of the European Communities, 
2009; European Commission, 2010a, 2010b) all refer to Regulation 763/2008. 
They address the technical specifications of the topics and of their break-
downs (Commission of the European Communities, 2009), the metadata and 
the specification of the so-called hypercubes, the cross-tabulations used in 
the census hub (European Commission, 2010a) and the procedures and 
structure of the quality reports and technical formats of the data transmission 
(European Commission, 2010b). As main frame of reference and with regard 
to the assessment of compliance, Regulation 763/2008 is the most important 
regulation.  
When it comes to census-taking, not only the EU but also the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is of importance. In order 
to improve the comparabity of population data on a regional level the 
UNECE organises regular meetings on census issues. Together with the statis-
tical office of the European Communities (Eurostat), it publishes recommen-
dations for each census round (these are also referred to as the Conference 
of European Statisticians [CES] recommendations). These include recom-
mendations on census issues, such as ‘users’ needs, quality of the data, 
completeness of the count, data protection and security, comparability of 
the results between countries and over time, burden on the respondents, 
timeliness of the outputs, financial and political implications, and public un-
derstanding and acceptance’ (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 2006, p. 13). Next to this, the UNECE is important as it facilitates guid-
ance and assistance to the countries when preparing a census, and its 
meetings and publications are used to exchange good practices. Even 
though the CES recommendations are not official regulations, they are im-
portant as they not only address (potential) EU countries, but the whole 
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UNECE region.8 In addition, they are more comprehensive than the EU regu-
lations, which for example do not include rules on how ethnic data should 
be collected.  
The collection of ethno-cultural data is an important aspect in the West-
ern Balkans. Even though there is no agreement on how to collect such data 
in the EU (Simon, 2011), there is an increasing demand for data on back-
ground characteristics for example for migration statistics and to combat 
discrimination (Huddleston, Niessen, & Tjaden, 2013; Kraler, Reichel, & 
Entzinger, 2015; Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000; Salentin 
& Schmeets, 2017). As data on ethno-cultural characteristics is not part of the 
requirements for a population census, one would expect that this is not im-
portant for compliance with the EU census regulations. However, all Western 
Balkan countries collect data on ethnicity, language and religion (Eurostat, 
2014). This data is needed as it is used to ensure minority rights, in for example 
Croatia and Macedonia, and in Bosnia the political system is based on the 
outcomes of the 1991 census and the three constituent ethnic groups (Serbs, 
Croats and Bosniaks). In Bosnia, the last census before the war (1992–1995) 
was used to settle the Dayton Peace Agreement. It was expected that if the 
census outcome were to significantly diverge from the 1991 numbers, new 
negotiations about the distribution of political power would be necessary. In 
Macedonia the 20% threshold for, among others, additional language rights 
for minority groups, led to a high politicisation of the census process. Ethnic 
Albanians, the biggest minority group in Macedonia, wanted to increase 
their numbers, whereas the ethnic Macedonians wanted to decrease the 
number of the ethnic Albanians. Even in Croatia, which by now is a member 
of the EU, the census results showed that the number of ethnic Serbs in-
creased in some municipalities and would allow them more language rights, 
but this was not to the liking of nationalist groups who started to protest and 
even wanted a referendum to change the constitution. Therefore, this thesis 
looks at the CES recommendations as a general framework on how to col-
lect data on ethno-cultural aspects. Chapter 4 deals with the compliance of 
the accession countries with the EU census regulation, but next to explicit 
compliance with the census laws and methodologies, it also assesses the 
implicit compliance of how census experts assess census practices, with a 
particular focus on the collection of ethno-cultural data. Even though the EU 
does not require the collection of ethno-cultural data, by asking enlarge-
ment countries to collect population data, there are unintended conse-
quences which need to be taken into account as they can have significant 
impact on the census processes and therewith the compliance with the EU 
census regulations.  
                                                        
8 UNECE ‘member States include the countries of Europe, but also countries in North America 
(Canada and United States), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) and Western Asia (Israel)’ (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, n.d.). 
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2.4.2 Measuring compliance with the EU census regulations 
To analyse the influence of the EU on enlargement countries, several models 
have been developed (Elbasani, 2013a; Noutcheva, 2012; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier, 2004). The external incentives model by Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2004) is one example of Europeanisation research in enlarge-
ment countries. Based on reinforcement by reward, the model measures 
whether and how the determinacy of the EU conditions, the size and speed 
of the EU rewards, the credibility of conditionality as well as veto players and 
adoption costs influence compliance with the EU conditions 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005a, p. 12). This model follows the 
logic of consequences according to which countries adopt EU rules if the 
benefits of the EU rewards outweigh the domestic adoption costs. Next to 
this model, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) also introduce two alter-
native models: the social learning model, which is based on the logic of ap-
propriateness and assesses whether countries adopt the EU rules based on 
the perception of appropriateness; and the lesson-drawing model, whereby 
countries adopt the EU rules if these can help to solve domestic problems.  
Whereas the models by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) were ei-
ther based on rational or constructivist explanations, the model by 
Noutcheva (2012, p. 32) combines both explanations. This model describes 
four possible outcomes with regard to compliance: substantial, partial, im-
posed and faked/reversed compliance. Three factors explain the variation in 
compliance behaviour in the Balkans. First, if the legitimacy of EU demands is 
perceived as high, compliance is substantial. Second, where the legitimacy 
of EU demands is perceived to be low the domestic adoption cost becomes 
the decisive factor. If the benefits exceed the costs, this can lead to partial 
compliance. Third, if the legitimacy of the EU demands is perceived as too 
low and adoption costs are high, compliance depends on the coercive 
power of the EU. If the power of the EU is strong, this can lead to imposed 
compliance. If EU power is limited or weak, this can lead to fake compli-
ance, and the policies that were adopted can potentially be reversed. 
In this thesis compliance with the EU census regulations will be assessed by 
a model based on the three phases by Elbasani (2013a, p. 14): verbal adop-
tion, legal adoption and substantive compliance with EU policies. This model 
is used to assess compliance with the EU rules on the census, because the 
structure of ruled adoption is very similar to the process of census-taking. 
Verbal adoption relates to the rhetorical endorsement of EU norms and regu-
lations by domestic actors. The subsequent step is legal adoption, which 
includes the establishment of formal institutions and legal adoption of EU 
rules. Substantive compliance addresses the implementation of the EU rules 
and is the final step in this model. Before describing how compliance with 
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the EU census regulations is measured, the process and difficulties of census-
taking will be outlined.  
The process of census-taking includes the preparation of a census law 
and its methodology, as well as the collection of the data, the enumeration 
process, and finally the processing, publication and dissemination of the 
data. A population and housing census is the backbone of national statistics 
and on average population data is collected every ten years. The data is 
used for example to calculate GDP per capita, but also for the distribution of 
subsidies. The latter is a reason why the census can be highly political. For 
example minority groups have stakes in increasing their numbers when their 
rights are connected to proportional representation. In the case countries, 
the census data is collected via the traditional pen and paper method, 
meaning that during a period of about two to four weeks enumerators visit 
each house in the country to collect data on the inhabitants. After the enu-
meration, the data has to be ordered and processed in order to be pub-
lished. Altogether, collecting census data is an enormous undertaking.  
The assessment of compliance with the EU census regulations helps to 
clarify the Europeanisation of census-taking. In order to ensure compliance 
with the EU census regulations, the EU supports its enlargement countries 
financially and/or technically. For the decennial census, the EU Commission 
through DG Estat (Eurostat) has set up Technical Cooperation Meetings and 
in some countries the census processes are observed by International Moni-
toring Observation (IMO) missions. Since census data is crucial for national 
statistics, the EU is eager to develop a reliable statistical system in its potential 
future member states (Bieber, 2015, p. 11). 
As described above (section 2.4), compliance is the potential outcome 
of the implementation process in which all stages are fulfilled in a dutiful 
manner. Compliance is related to the implementation of rules (Versluis, 2007, 
p. 52), which in this thesis will be assessed not only by the different phases of 
compliance, but also by looking at timeliness and correctness of the census 
process. These are two aspects which are especially important when it 
comes to the implementation of EU policies (Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009, p. 
283). Compliance with the EU census regulations is measured by a model 
based on the three phases of Elbasani, as well as timeliness and correctness 
of the rule adoption. This model has been adapted with regard to census-
taking to identify non-compliance, partial compliance and full compliance 
with the EU census regulations (see table 2). The table also shows the data 
used to analyse compliance and the questions that are used to measure the 
different degrees of compliance. More information on the data collection 
and analysis methods used in this thesis can be found in chapter 3.  
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Table 2: Assessing compliance with census-taking 
Degrees of 
compliance 
Steps of assessing 
compliance  
Measurements Data  
Non-
compliance 
No adoption Are there plans for a census? 
No/Yes 
Official documents and 
newspaper articles 
Verbal adoption Verbal agreement for the census Official documents and 
newspaper articles 
Legal adoption and 
methodological 
preparation of the 
census 
Legal agreement on the content 
of questionnaire and data-
collection, in line with the EU 
census regulations (in particular 
articles 2, 4, 7 and 8) and the CES 
recommendations 
National census law, 
methodology of the 
census & expert survey 
Partial 
compliance 
Enumeration of the 
population 
Census conducted in line with the 
EU census regulations (in 
particular article 4 and 6) and the 
CES recommendations.  
No severe difficulties/ 
contestations during the 
enumeration process.  
Official documents, in-
depth interviews and 
newspaper articles 
Full 
compliance 
Publication of the 
census data 
Publication of the census data in 
line with the EU census regulations 
(in particular articles 3, 5, 6 and 7) 
and CES recommendations.  
Acceptance of the census data 
by the international community 
and all domestic actors.  
Official documents, in-
depth interviews and 
newspaper articles 
Part of the EU census 
hub 
Census data part of the EU census 
hub; see census hub (European 
Statistical System, nd.) and 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 
519/2010 
Census hub and in-depth 
interviews 
 
Non-compliance includes the verbal and legal adoption of the census, as 
well as the methodological preparation. Although the preparation of the 
census law is already quite elaborate, these aspects are considered as non-
compliant, as in this stage the case countries have only facilitated the cen-
sus outset, but have not yet taken concrete measures to conduct the cen-
sus. This, however, can already be highly sensitive, especially if the country is 
ethnically divided and the questionnaire includes questions on sensitive data 
(e.g., ethnicity, language, religion). Next to the verbal, legal and methodo-
logical compliance with regulations, the actual enumeration and the publi-
cation of the data are of high importance. Partial compliance in this model 
includes the actual collection of the census, the enumeration process. Even 
though the census law and the methodology already provide the framework 
for the census, the enumeration process is crucial as without it there is no 
data. In order to be fully compliant the case countries need to publish the 
census data and in the best case scenario, the population data should also 
be part of the European census hub. The census hub is a database of the 
European Statistical Service which disseminates the results of the 2010 census 
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round of all EU members plus Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein 
(European Statistical System, nd.). It was expected that enlargement coun-
tries also take part in this project, however only Croatia managed to publish 
its data in the census hub.  
In addition to the three steps of compliance, the aspects of timeliness 
and correctness from Hartlapp and Falkner (2009) will be taken into account. 
These are very similar to the aspects of quality assessment mentioned in 
Regulation 763/2008 on the population and housing census. Timeliness is ra-
ther straightforward to assess, as it ‘means to meet the transposition deadline 
of a directive’ (Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009, p. 283). However, the other aspects 
of quality assessment (relevance, accuracy, accessibility, comparability and 
coherence of the data) are more difficult to assess, since the quality reports 
are not always accessible. Furthermore, the focus of this research is on the 
political implications of the census and EU enlargement and less on the 
technical and methodological issues of census-taking. Therefore the remain-
ing aspects of the quality assessment are measured via the aspect of cor-
rectness. According to Hartlapp and Falkner (2009, p. 284) correctness is 
achieved if all aspects are implemented, but it can also be partial, if only 
some aspects are implemented. Therefore whether or not the census data is 
accepted by the international community will be taken as an indicator to 
assess correctness. If the international community accepts the census results, 
it is expected that the data are correct. In addition, whether or not a country 
is part of the census hub serves as a further indicator. It is expected that be-
cause the census hub requires additional check-ups, countries that are part 
of the census hub have correct census data.  
The next section will describe how this thesis embeds the theoretical con-
cept of Europeanisation in the empirical chapters.  
2.5 Embedding Europeanisation in the chapters  
As outlined in this chapter, Europeanisation is used to study the influence of 
the EU on its enlargement countries, in particular how the enlargement pro-
cess affects the compliance with specific requirements of the acquis, the 
population and housing census. This thesis analyses the impact of enlarge-
ment on the processes of census-taking in the case countries by using differ-
ent angles of Europeanisation: explicit and implicit compliance, the direct 
influence of the EU as well as domestic aspects that can affect Europeanisa-
tion.  
Each of the three separate empirical chapters includes one of the Euro-
peanisation angles. Chapter 4 assesses the Europeanisation of census-taking 
via explicit and implicit compliance (see table 3 for an overview of how Eu-
ropeanisation is embedded in the chapters of this thesis). The analysis reveals 
The theory behind the Europeanisation of census-taking 
51 
not only explicit compliance with the EU census regulations, but also diver-
gence when it comes to the collection of ethno-cultural data. Chapter 5 
analyses the effectiveness of two Europeanisation mechanisms and there-
with contributes to the actual effects of Europeanisation. By analysing the 
effectiveness of conditionality and legitimacy on the compliance with the EU 
census regulations, this chapter assesses the extent of the influence of Euro-
peanisation mechanisms. Chapter 6 assesses whether and to what extent 
other factors and/or actors than the EU play a role with regard to compli-
ance with the EU census regulations. This chapter not only compares two 
domestic explanations (state capacity and domestic actors), it also com-
pares the influence of domestic actors with the influence of external actors.  
Table 3: Embedding Europeanisation in the chapters  
 Research question/sub-question Europeanisation angle 
Chapter 4: Counting for what 
purpose? The paradox of 
including ethnic and cultural 
questions in the censuses of 
Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Macedonia 
Can we speak of the 
Europeanisation of census-taking, 
in the absence of concrete rules 
on collecting ethno-cultural 
data? 
Explicit and implicit compliance 
Chapter 5: ‘When counting 
counts’: Europeanisation of 
census-taking in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia 
Which of the Europeanisation 
mechanisms (conditionality or 
legitimacy) is more likely to 
explain compliance with the EU 
census regulations in the case 
countries?  
Domestic influence of 
Europeanisation through the 
mechanisms of conditionality 
and legitimacy 
Chapter 6: Census-taking in 
the Western Balkans: A matter 
of state capacity or the 
influence of domestic and 
external actors? 
How important are state 
capacity, domestic and external 
actors for compliance with the 
EU census regulations in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia? 
Domestic effects (state capacity 
and domestic actors) on 
Europeanisation compared with 
the influence of the EU as 
external actor 
2.5.1 Europeanisation of census-taking and the paradox of collecting ethno-
cultural data 
In looking at the overall compliance with regard to the EU census regula-
tions, chapter 4 not only considers the explicit compliance visible in the cen-
sus laws and methodologies, but also implicit compliance revealed in prac-
tices of census-taking not covered by the EU census regulations. The census 
law and methodology of the case countries are analysed to show their 
compliance with the EU census regulations, and in addition an expert survey 
was conducted to assess the general practices and views on census-taking, 
which are related to the implicit compliance with the census regulations 
(more information on the data collection can be found in chapters 3 and 4). 
Next to explicit compliance with regard to census laws and methodologies, 
or the variations thereof, chapter 4 analyses whether there is a common 
European ‘grammar’ with regard to the practices of census-taking. The 
analyses are based on a survey in which data was collected among census 
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experts in two rounds. The survey questionnaire included questions about 
practices with regard to census-taking in the EU, but also within the UNECE 
countries (except for the Russian speaking ones; see chapters 3 and 4 for 
more information and appendices 4 and 5 for the questionnaires). Different 
viewpoints were discovered on aspects which are important for census-
taking, but not yet part of the EU census regulations. An example is the col-
lection of ethno-cultural data. This data is for example needed for migration 
statistics and to assess minority groups (Kraler et al., 2015). Next to the analy-
sis of compliance with regard to the EU census rules, this chapter outlines the 
paradox of collecting ethno-cultural data.  
2.5.2 Conditionality and legitimacy of the Europeanisation of census-taking 
Chapter 5 assesses whether the impact of the EU enlargement process can 
explain the variation in census-taking outcomes in Bosnia, Croatia and Mac-
edonia. In this chapter two mechanisms of Europeanisation are compared: 
conditionality and legitimacy. Conditionality is based on the logic of conse-
quences and assesses the rational cost/benefit incentives behind the differ-
ences of countries in EU accession. Conversely, legitimacy focuses on the 
acceptance and implementation of the EU census regulations, as well as the 
nature of debates and contestations surrounding the census processes. This 
chapter analyses whether countries comply with the EU rules because the EU 
conditions (EU rewards) outweigh the domestic adoption costs, or because 
these are seen as appropriate and legitimate. For this purpose, in-depth in-
terview data has been collected and is contextualised with newspaper arti-
cles (more information on the methods can be found in chapters 3 and 5). 
This chapter concludes that the two mechanisms are complementary. 
2.5.3 State capacity, domestic and external actors 
Within Europeanisation research there has been a lack of interest in the do-
mestic side of the equation (Elbasani, 2013a; Mastenbroek, 2005). In order to 
assess the influence of the domestic perspective on Europeanisation of cen-
sus-taking, chapter 6 analyses the influence of two domestic aspects (state 
capacity and domestic actors) and compares these with the influence from 
external actors to explain the variation in compliance with regard to census-
taking in the case countries. In the literature on state-building, institutional 
factors (such as state capacity but also the agency of actors, both domestic 
and external) are mentioned as potential capacity builders (Risse, 2011; 
Schneckener, 2011) and while much research has been done on the EU’s 
enlargement strategy (Börzel & Schimmelfennig, 2017; Keil, 2013b; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005b), little research has been conducted to 
analyse the agency that influences EU integration and census-taking pro-
cesses. Therefore this chapter first tests whether the domestic factor of limited 
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statehood—the lack of structures to enable the execution of EU rules —is one 
of the main obstacles for the Western Balkans’ compliance with EU regula-
tions. Next to this the influence of domestic actors, as well as that of the EU, is 
tested. State capacity is assessed by a comparison of the World Bank Gov-
ernance indicators,9 and the influence of actors by the use of in-depth inter-
view data and newspaper articles (here also, more information on the 
methodology can be found in chapters 3 and 6). The chapter argues that 
state capacity cannot fully explain the variation in census-taking outcomes. 
The analysis shows that the influence of external actors, in this case the EU, 
potentially can be very strong. However, more importantly, the analysis 
shows that the influence of domestic actors can be crucial, which is in gen-
eral underestimated in Europeanisation research.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the theoretical background of Europeanisation re-
search. To account for the asymmetrical relationship the EU has with its en-
largement countries, this thesis makes a distinction between Europeanisation 
in member states and external Europeanisation, which is the influence of the 
EU on its enlargement countries. Within research on external Europeanisation 
there has not been a strong focus with regard to compliance with particular 
aspects of the acquis communautaire. The population and housing census is 
part of the chapter on statistics of this acquis, and presents an interesting 
case for Europeanisation research. This is necessary as the EU strives for har-
monisation with regard to statistical data, also in its enlargement countries. 
However, and this is the main puzzle of this research, although the case 
countries had the same EU conditions to comply with, they show variation 
when it comes to the census outcomes: ranging from fully compliant (Croa-
tia), to partially compliant (Bosnia) and non-compliant (Macedonia). 
In order to analyse the variation in compliance in census outcomes, this 
chapter outlined the operationalisation of compliance with the EU census 
regulations. This is measured by different degrees of compliance (non-
compliance, partial compliance and full compliance) depending on how 
and to what extent the actual census process is in line with the EU regulations 
and the CES recommendations.  
The final task of this chapter was to situate three angles of Europeanisa-
tion—denoted in this thesis as the influence of the EU on its enlargement 
countries—and to embed them in the empirical chapters of the thesis: ex-
plicit and implicit compliance, the direct influence of the EU and the domes-
tic aspects that can affect Europeanisation. 
                                                        
9 Although there is a lot of critique on these indicators, they are still the most used in research. For 
more information see section 6.3 and Schmeets (forthcoming 2018).  
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Overall compliance is analysed by looking at the explicit compliance of 
the census laws and methodologies, but also the implicit compliance of 
census practices, such as the collection of ethno-cultural data. Although not 
officially required by the EU, the collection of ethno-cultural data is an im-
portant part of the census in the Western Balkans, as for example minority 
and language rights are based on the census outcomes. By analysing explic-
it and implicit compliance chapter 4 provides a background for further re-
search to analyse the main research puzzle of this thesis: the variation in 
compliance. To analyse this puzzle from the EU perspective, the direct influ-
ence of the EU is analysed by comparing two Europeanisation mechanisms, 
conditionality and legitimacy (chapter 5). Chapter 6 looks beyond the EU 
perspective and incudes domestic factors that can influence census-taking 
and compliance with the EU census regulations. Therefore, state capacity 
and the influence of domestic actors are analysed and compared with the 
influence of the EU as external actor (chapter 6). Taking into account these 
three angles of Europeanisation, this thesis provides a coherent overview of 
the Europeanisation of census-taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia.  
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Abstract  
This chapter illustrates how the use of the additional coverage mixed meth-
ods model contributes to a more coherent understanding of the phenome-
non of census-taking—here, census-taking in the Western Balkans as part of 
European Union (EU) enlargement. The additional coverage approach ena-
bled analysing the phenomenon of census-taking from the broader perspec-
tive of ‘Europeanisation’ as well as from the local perspective of the case 
countries (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia). This model 
was applied because it matches the strengths of the quantitative expert 
survey data collected using the Delphi approach and the qualitative in-
depth interviews, in order to analyse the differences in compliance with the 
EU census regulations in the case countries.  
  
Using a mixed methods research design while studying census-taking 
57 
3.1 Introduction 
Mixed methods research is increasingly popular, but it presents different chal-
lenges than classical research designs. It is defined as a procedure to com-
bine and integrate methods for data collection and analysis at some stage 
of the research process (Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006). To do this, re-
searchers need to know how to apply all the methods they are using. There is 
a lot of literature on how to select the optimal research design (inter alia: 
Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Morgan, 2014; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). 
However, the application of a research design differs for every research pro-
ject. This chapter will illustrate how the use of the additional coverage mixed 
methods model described by Morgan (2014) contributes to a more coherent 
understanding of the same phenomena, in a research project looking at 
census-taking in the Western Balkans as part of European Union (EU) en-
largement. This research combines in-depth interview data with an expert 
survey conducted in two rounds, focussing on why countries in the Western 
Balkans comply differently with the EU census regulations.  
Until recently, there was only limited research on the population and 
housing census (hereafter, census). The Western Balkan countries are con-
sidered to be future EU member states and as such are strongly recom-
mended to comply with the EU census regulations (European Parliament & 
Council of the European Union, 2008). The illustrative study is unique in that, 
for the first time in research on census-taking, it bridges the gap between 
qualitative and quantitative data collection, thereby providing a more co-
herent picture of the phenomenon of census-taking.  
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that a mixed method de-
sign has many advantages over a single method when researching census-
taking processes. Whereas the expert survey used to analyse the under-
standing of census practices in Europe is exploratory, the in-depth interviews 
are more focussed and explanatory as they are with people directly in-
volved in the censuses in the case countries. The expert survey applied the 
Delphi method to collect data among a population of 75 census experts. 
Combining this data with 28 in-depth interviews resulted in an original data 
collection strategy for census research.  
This chapter starts by analysing the reasons for choosing a mixed methods 
model, and the different kinds of mixed methods research design. Next, the 
research design is described and the conceptual choices as well as the 
separate methodological choices for the individual chapters of the thesis 
are highlighted. The qualitative and quantitative data collection and analy-
sis are described in detail in two separate sections. These sections are fol-
lowed by a short explanation of how the findings are integrated, as well as 
the challenges that have to be taken into account in such an approach. 
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The chapter then concludes with an overview of the advantages and chal-
lenges of the additional coverage model.  
3.2 Mixed methods: potential designs and selected model  
Mixed methods research consists of the collection, analysis and integration 
of qualitative as well as quantitative data in several stages of the research 
process of one study, which can happen either concurrently or sequentially 
(Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003, p. 212). Importantly, it also 
includes the integration of the paradigmatic and philosophical backgrounds 
of both approaches/paradigms. Whereas quantitative research usually de-
rives from the assumptions of deductive research, qualitative research is 
generally more inductive. This distinction however has been criticised by 
pragmatists who believe that both logics can be combined (Onwuegbuzie 
& Leech, 2005, p. 270). Mixed methods research departs from the idea that 
research objectives should steer the research design. Alongside qualitative 
and quantitative research, mixed methods research is regarded as a third 
research paradigm (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). Creswell et al. 
(2003, p. 213) have argued that by engaging in mixed methods research, 
the researcher emphasises the separate parts of the research strategy and 
thereby increases the artificial boundaries between qualitative and quanti-
tative research. To avoid overemphasising these boundaries is in fact one of 
the challenges of mixed methods research.  
Various authors (Morgan, 2014; Plano Clark, Garrett, & Leslie-Pelecky, 
2010; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003) have addressed the challenges of organis-
ing and implementing qualitative and quantitative methods in a single co-
herent research design. One of the main advantages of mixed methods 
research is the possibility to answer research questions that cannot be tack-
led by single method approaches. Next to this, it also provides the opportuni-
ty to present a greater diversity of viewpoints (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, p. 
15). This latter reason is why this study on census-taking chose to apply a 
mixed methods research design. So far, research on censuses has been ei-
ther quantitative, focussing on the census processes and, for example, how 
to increase the quality of the data (Schulte Nordholt, Ossen, & Haas, 2013), 
or qualitative, looking for example at the construction of the census catego-
ries and questionnaires (Yanow, 2003). Applying a mixed approach makes it 
possible to present a broader perspective on census-taking processes. 
There are various options for mixed methods research designs (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011; Creswell et al., 2003; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009; 
Morgan, 2014). This chapter focuses on the research designs described by 
Morgan (2014, p. 10): the convergent design, the sequential design and the 
additional coverage design. According to Morgan (2014, p. 52), the re-
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searcher’s choice among these designs depends on the purpose and pro-
cedures of the research. The convergent model is used for cross-validation or 
triangulation of the results by different methods. The purpose of such re-
search is to find convergent findings while addressing the same research 
question. In the sequential model the different methods build upon each 
other, which means that either the qualitative approach is used to enhance 
the quantitative approach or the other way around. In this approach the 
priority of one method over the other, as well as the time sequence, needs 
to be established (Morgan, 2014, pp. 11–14). In the additional coverage ap-
proach the goal of the research is to ‘serve separate, but closely linked pur-
poses so that the results of one can enhance the effectiveness of the other’ 
(Morgan, 2014, p. 11). Designs similar to the additional coverage model that 
have been developed by other authors, and that would fit the purpose of 
complementarity in this research, include the partially mixed methods design 
(Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009, p. 267) and the convergent parallel design 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 69).  
The sequential model supposes that each method has its own separate 
purpose and that the results of each method are used to enhance the other 
(Morgan, 2014, p. 11), which is not the aim of the current study. The conver-
gent model would not be a good fit either, as in order to be fully conver-
gent, the different methods have to measure the exact same phenomenon. 
However in this research the quantitative and the qualitative methods 
measure different facets of the same phenomenon. For this study, the addi-
tional coverage model was most appropriate, because it allows studying the 
different facets of census-taking and therewith providing a more coherent 
answer to the overall research question, as will be described in the next sec-
tion.  
3.3 Illustrative study 
The importance of studying different facets of the same phenomenon via 
different methods is especially salient in the research on census-taking in the 
Western Balkans as part of EU integration. This thesis analyses the effect of EU 
enlargement on census-taking in the Western Balkans, in particular in Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) and the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia). All enlargement countries 
have the same conditions to fulfil in order to become EU members; however, 
they differ widely with regard to fulfilling them. The population and housing 
census (hereafter census) is one of these conditions for membership, as it is 
part of the 18th chapter of the acquis communautaire on statistics. The puzzle 
of this research is the differences in compliance with EU standards with re-
gard to census-taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. The overarching 
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research question of the project is: What accounts for the variation in com-
pliance with the EU regulations with regard to census-taking in Croatia, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? 
The research strategy of this project is based on comparative case studies 
(George & Bennett, 2005). The selection of the three case countries (Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia) is based on the method of ‘crucial cases’ (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012, pp. 176–177; George & Bennett, 2005). The case studies 
have a relatively similar history, as they were all part of the former Yugoslavia, 
and all of them are (or in the case of Croatia were) EU enlargement coun-
tries. They also present three different cases of census-taking. Croatia con-
ducted its second complete census in 2011. Bosnia conducted its first census 
since independence from the former Yugoslavia in October 2013 and pub-
lished the results almost three years later, in June 2016. Macedonia aborted 
its third census during the enumeration phase in 2011 and there are currently 
no new plans for a population census.  
This research is embedded in the theoretical framework of Europeanisa-
tion, which has many definitions—broader ones, looking at ’processes of a) 
construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and “ways of doing things”’ 
(Radaelli, 2006, p. 59), and more concrete ones, which see Europeanisation 
as shorthand definition for the domestic influence of the EU (Elbasani, 2013a, 
p. 5). Earlier research has studied the influence of the EU from a primarily 
qualitative perspective (Noutcheva, 2009; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 
2004). Some studies on Europeanisation apply a mixed methods approach 
(Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012; Sedelmeier, 2011). Most of the Europeani-
sation research which focuses on the Western Balkan region is qualitative 
(Aybet & Bieber, 2011; Elbasani, 2013b; Keil, 2013a; Noutcheva, 2009), but 
the topic can also be approached using quantitative measures (Böhmelt & 
Freyburg, 2017). 
As for censuses in the Western Balkans, there has been a recent increase 
in research projects (Bieber, 2015; Daskalovski, 2013; Keil & Perry, 2015; Visoka 
& Gjevori, 2013). All of these studies are qualitative, and are for example 
based on single cases (Daskalovski, 2013) or comparative case studies of the 
countries (Bieber, 2015; Visoka & Gjevori, 2013). 
According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003, p. 15), most quantitative re-
search is steered towards confirmation and explanation, whereas qualitative 
research tends to be more exploratory in nature. This is however not the case 
in the current work; the qualitative part of this research has an explanatory 
character, whereas the quantitative survey addressing general aspects of 
census-taking is exploratory. In this research, both quantitative and qualita-
tive data were collected in order to answer the overall research question. 
Since there was very little information available on census-taking in the Euro-
pean context and in order to fully understand the Europeanisation of census-
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taking, the quantitative expert survey was exploratory and designed to ex-
plain the broader perspective on census-taking in Europe. The qualitative in-
depth interviews provide explanatory data on the domestic aspects sur-
rounding the census in the individual case countries. The thesis not only looks 
at the phenomenon of census-taking as it appears in the case countries, as 
made possible by the in-depth interview data, but also how this phenome-
non is seen within the EU and by census experts related to the EU and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).  
In the next section the additional coverage research design chosen for 
this research will be elaborated in more detail. 
3.4 Research design  
In the additional coverage model, data collection and analysing methods 
run parallel to each other, thus each has its own analysis section in a re-
search project. In order to provide a better overview of the mixed methods 
approach used here, a visual model is presented in the form of a pyramid 
(see Figure 3). Since the research question is the place of departure for the 
research design, it is placed in the middle. From the middle, there are con-
nection points to the qualitative and the quantitative approaches, which 
are respectively left and right from the research question. The two ap-
proaches address different data collection and analysis processes: the quali-
tative part is based on the in-depth interviews, whereas the quantitative part 
looks at the data from the expert survey. Although the data is collected and 
analysed separately, in the end the results are integrated, which is shown at 
the top of the pyramid. Initially both approaches were given equal weight, 
but because in this research the qualitative part ultimately proved more 
valuable in its contribution, as it gave more insight into the cases, its triangle 
is represented as bigger than the quantitative side. In other designs that 
might use this pyramid shape to visually present their research, both parts 
could have equal size or the quantitative part could be dominant. The over-
all process could also be made iterative, especially when the results feed 
(new) research question(s). 
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Figure 3: Visual research design 
Unlike a sequential approach, the timing of the data collection was almost 
parallel. Apart from some explorative and follow-up interviews (in March 
2014 and January 2016), most of the interviews were collected in September 
and October 2015, in between the two rounds of data collection of the sur-
vey, which was in June and November/December of 2015 (see Figure 4).  
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The overall research design of this project is based on the additional cover-
age mixed methods model, but because the separate chapters have differ-
ent foci, some of them apply a different research design (see Table 4). In 
most cases both methods have been used to provide background 
knowledge for the chapters, however the interplay of the methods was not 
always suitable to answer the sub-questions posed in the chapters. Chapter 
4 for example assesses the practices of collecting ethno-cultural data in the 
EU by using the exploratory expert survey and comparison of census meth-
odologies and questionnaires, applying the additional coverage model as 
research design. Chapter 5 uses a form of case study research, congruence 
analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2012), based primarily on the explanatory in-
depth interview data, in order to assess the effectiveness of two Europeani-
sation mechanisms in relation to the censuses in the case countries. Chapter 
6 is based on case study research and the in-depth interviews in order to 
analyse the influence of state capacity, domestic actors and external actors 
on the censuses in the case countries. The conclusion in Chapter 7 integrates 
the results and answers the overall research question of this thesis.  
The following sections will describe in greater detail the separate data 
collection and analysis processes used for the qualitative and the quantita-
tive data, in the overall research design. 
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Table 4: Methods and data applied in the separate parts and the overall design of this research  
 Research question/sub-
question 
Methods Data 
Overall research design What accounts for the 
variation in compliance with 
the EU census regulations in 
Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia? 
 
Additional 
coverage model 
Exploratory expert 
survey and 
explanatory Interview 
data  
Chapter 4: Counting for 
what purpose? The 
paradox of including 
ethnic and cultural 
questions in the 
censuses of Croatia, 
Bosnia, and 
Macedonia 
Can we speak of the 
Europeanisation of census-
taking, in the absence of 
concrete rules on collecting 
ethno-cultural data? 
Additional 
coverage model 
Exploratory expert 
survey and 
comparison of census 
methodologies and 
questionnaires 
Chapter 5: ‘When 
counting counts’: 
Europeanisation of 
census-taking in 
Croatia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia 
Which of the Europeanisation 
mechanisms (conditionality or 
legitimacy) is more likely to 
explain compliance with the 
EU census regulations in the 
case countries?  
Congruence 
analysis 
Explanatory Interview 
data (plus official 
documents for 
contextualisation) 
Chapter 6: Census-
taking in the Western 
Balkans: A matter of 
state capacity or the 
influence of domestic 
and external actors? 
How important are state 
capacity, domestic and 
external actors for 
compliance with the EU 
census regulations in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia? 
Comparative case 
study 
Explanatory Interview 
data &World Bank 
Governance 
indicators 
3.5 Qualitative data collection: In-depth interviews 
For the qualitative part of this research, in-depth interviews were conducted 
with census experts and representatives from Eurostat, the Directorate-
General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and 
the National Statistical Institutes, as well as international census consultants 
who were part of the International Monitoring Operations in the Balkans. This 
happened in the period from June to October 2015; the interviews at Euro-
stat were conducted in March 2014 and in January 2016. For the interviews, 
the author travelled to the case countries, to speak to the National Statistical 
Institutes and other organisations, but also to Brussels and Luxembourg, for 
interviews at DG NEAR and Eurostat respectively. In total 28 interviews were 
conducted, some of them with several people at the same time, for exam-
ple at the Croatian Statistical Office where two census methodologists were 
present. Some of the interviewees were interviewed more than once, most of 
them at Eurostat. Most interviews were conducted in person at the place of 
work or in a café close to the interviewee’s preferred location, and two in-
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terviews were held over the phone for logistical reasons. A short general 
overview of the topics discussed during the interviews can be found in the 
appendices (see Appendix 3). The interview questions themselves were 
adapted according to the interviewee, depending on their position or role 
with regard to the census. For example, the questions posed to the Interna-
tional Census Consultants were phrased differently than those posed to the 
individuals working at the National Statistical Institutes. Since it was not per-
mitted to tape record the interviews at the European Commission, and also 
to ensure that interviewees were able to speak freely and would not be in-
hibited by the tape recording device, it was decided to take notes only, for 
all the interviews. In order to increase the quality of these notes, after each 
interview valuable information was added where necessary. In the end, the 
interview data was also contextualised with official documents from the EU 
Commission, the National Statistical Offices and newspaper articles. For 
analysis of the interview notes, Qualitative Analysis Software Atlas.ti was used 
while applying the method of constant comparison (Boeije, 2005, pp. 75–78). 
This method relies on theoretical selection, for example in this case on Euro-
peanisation. The main purpose of the method is to detect and describe var-
iations in manifestations of certain phenomena, in this case census-taking 
(Boeije, 2005, p. 75). 
When planning interviews, there are a couple of aspects to take into ac-
count. First are practical issues such as the geographical location of the in-
terviews and the research budget (Rubin & Rubin, 2011, pp. 53–54). Fortu-
nately budget restraints were not an issue here. Access to interviewees, 
however, was problematic in some cases, but could be solved by including 
additional interviewees.10 The main strength of the qualitative interviews is 
the very detailed in-depth knowledge and the local perspective on all of the 
case studies. The semi-open structure of the interviews provided the flexibility 
needed in order to fully understand the specific nature of each case. Asking 
people directly involved with the censuses, and in the case of Bosnia and 
Macedonia also people involved in the monitoring of the censuses, gave 
direct insights into their domestic census-taking processes. Without these 
detailed insights from the interviews (on, for example, the census enumera-
tion phase and reactions of domestic actors, used in the analysis provided in 
Chapters 5 and 6), it would not have been possible to answer the main re-
search question of the project. Nonetheless, in order to embed the cases in 
the broader framework of Europeanisation, additional data collection was 
necessary. 
                                                        
10 For example the State Statistical Office in Macedonia lacked staff to provide an interviewee—
or used this as an excuse not to speak to the author. This was solved by contacting the former 
Director of this institution who was willing to be interviewed. So even though it was not possible to 
obtain direct contact with the National Statistical Office, the author was able to get in touch with 
other relevant interlocutors. 
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3.6 Quantitative data collection: Expert survey 
Compared to interviews, expert surveys are a more standardised tool of 
measurement. However, when using surveys as a method the researcher 
needs to be aware of the respective steps and the inherent challenges in 
the selected survey design: the defined population and sample design (e.g., 
sample method, selection of cases), data-collection mode (e.g., web, tele-
phone and/or paper and pencil) and (re)approach strategy, the 
(non)response target and tailored questionnaire design (Dillman, Smyth, & 
Christian, 2014). In this research the survey design is based on the Delphi 
method (Turoff, 2002; see also Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Linstone & Turoff, 2002), 
adjusted to only two data collection rounds. The Delphi method is in essence 
an expert survey which has several rounds of questionnaires. The first round is 
used to obtain general knowledge about a certain topic and the second to 
test and rank the importance of the knowledge; further rounds can be used 
to discuss the results (see also: Aichholzer, 2009; Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Yousuf, 
2007). It allows for interaction with the respondents, as it includes the possibil-
ity for reflection and elaboration in the second round. The first round of the 
survey was used to, for example, identify sensitive census questions and to 
see how census experts perceive the EU census regulations. In the second 
round the respondents were mainly asked to reflect on their answers from 
the previous round, but also to answer some more detailed follow-up ques-
tions such as specifying the kind of help the Western Balkans need. The ques-
tionnaires for both rounds can be found in appendices 4 and 5.  
The questionnaire used in this survey was developed with the help of the 
questionnaire laboratory from Statistics Netherlands and was tested exten-
sively to assure that, for example, the order and grouping of the questions 
made sense (Dillman et al., 2014, pp. 230–231). In addition, the questionnaire 
was also checked by the external advisors of this project, in particular on 
aspects such as content, sensitivity of the questions and length. The survey 
was conducted through the online survey platform Qualtrics. It included 
questions on the background characteristics of the respondents; they were 
for example asked to indicate their knowledge of a particular topic (such as 
the EU census regulations or the Western Balkan region). Even though the 
survey is a fairly quantitative data collection method, by including open 
questions it also provided a certain amount of qualitative data. The use of 
more than one round of data collection gave the opportunity to ask more 
detailed follow-up questions and provided the respondents with an oppor-
tunity for interaction and clarification. 
As mentioned above, the census expert survey was carried out in two 
rounds in June 2015 and November/December 2015. For this survey only 
census experts were contacted (for more background information on sur-
veying experts see Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009; Meuser & Nagel, 2009). As a 
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basis the list of census experts attending the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe (UNECE) census meetings in Geneva was consulted (with 
the exception of Russian-speaking ones), but this list was enhanced with cen-
sus experts identified by Eurostat. The final list was checked by the external 
advisors of the project: Pieter Everaers, Director at Eurostat, and Eric Schulte 
Nordholt, Senior Researcher and project leader of the census at Statistics 
Netherlands. The list included all census experts from the National Statistical 
Institutes of the EU member states as well as experts from the Balkans,11 Nor-
way, Switzerland, Iceland, Canada, Turkey, the United States and Israel, as 
well as people working for Eurostat, the UNECE and International Census 
Consultants. There is a wide geographical scope, but as the census commu-
nity is rather small, it can be assumed that these experts were familiar with 
the issues at stake. As the total number of experts was limited, instead of ap-
proaching only some of the census experts, all of them (n=75) were invited to 
participate in the survey. The survey thus included the whole population of 
identified census experts. The response rate of the first round was 69% (n=52) 
and the second round had a 50% (n=38) response rate.  
For the analysis of some questions, a deliberate division was made be-
tween experts who declared that they had knowledge about the Western 
Balkans and those who declared that they did not know much about the 
region. This was, for example, used in Chapter 4, to test whether respondents 
familiar with the historical situation and ethnic cleavages in the Western Bal-
kans would have a greater tendency to wish to exclude ethnic and cultural 
aspects from a census than those with less background awareness.  
The quantitative part of this research has the main strength of giving a 
broader context of the European12 census-taking practices. Without this 
knowledge it would have not been possible to give an overview of European 
census practices and opinions of how these should ideally be implemented 
by census experts, as will be described in Chapter 4. This part of the project 
provides additional background knowledge without which the project 
would not be able to explain the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ of census-
taking. Nonetheless in order to analyse the individual case studies the in-
depth interviews were invaluable.  
                                                        
11 These include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and 
Kosovo.  
12 The author is aware that the term European is rather broad in this context. It is used to denote 
census practices on the European continent. The census community is through the UNECE how-
ever also interwoven also with non-European countries (such as for example Canada). In the 
analysis of the data a distinction is made between the EU census regulations and the CES rec-
ommendations (see chapter 4 for more information).  
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3.7 Discussion and conclusion 
The main advantage of this mixed methods research design is that by en-
gaging in more than one means of data collection, it was possible to study 
the aspect of census-taking within the specific case contexts, while also 
providing more information on the broader issues surrounding census-taking 
in the European context. Both aspects are crucial in order to answer the 
overall research question: What accounts for the variation in compliance 
with the EU census regulations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? 
When doing mixed methods research, there are challenges to consider 
(Creswell et al., 2003; Morgan, 2014). Some of these relate to the practical 
implications of doing mixed methods research: for example if the research 
project is not being done by a team, the researcher has to be an expert in 
both data collection and analysis methods. It can also be a challenge not to 
overemphasise the boundaries between qualitative and quantitative ap-
proaches (Creswell et al., 2003, p. 213).  
In the illustrative study, the choice for a mixed methods model was driven 
by the conceptual decision to collect data on census-taking from the Euro-
pean as well as the local perspective. Mixed methods research ‘provides a 
better understanding of research than either approach itself’ (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011, p. 8). The integration of the results from different data col-
lection and analysis methods can also be challenging, but there are sugges-
tions to remedy this (for example: Plano Clark et al., 2010). The additional 
coverage model allowed for separate data collection and analysis (as is 
also made visible in the separate chapters of this thesis), but to later inte-
grate them in the overall conclusion of this thesis. Nonetheless, the combina-
tion of the different methods has revealed different facets of census-taking. 
Without the in-depth interviews the domestic aspects of the censuses in Bos-
nia, Croatia and Macedonia, such as the enumeration of the census and 
the domestic reactions, could not have been analysed. In addition, the ex-
pert survey delivered valuable insights on the European perspectives on 
census-taking, for example on the collection of ethno-cultural data. The 
separate data collection and analysis was necessary because the qualita-
tive and quantitative parts measured different facets of the same phenom-
ena, and it would not have been possible to provide a coherent picture of 
the censuses in the Western Balkans using only one approach. The following 
chapters present an exemplar on the interplay of the use of qualitative and 
quantitative data, while researching census-taking in the Western Balkans.  
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Chapter 4 
 Counting for what purpose?  
The paradox of including ethnic and cultural 
questions in the censuses of Croatia, Bosnia 
and Macedonia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A slightly different version of this chapter has been published as Hoh, A.-L. 
(2017a). Counting for what purpose? The paradox of including ethnic and 
cultural questions in the censuses of Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. Südos-
teuropa, 65(1), 125–148.  
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Abstract 
The Western Balkan countries are on the long road to EU membership. One 
aspect of the accession process is the requirement for a population census, 
which falls under the acquis communautaire chapter covering the statistics 
needed. In the Western Balkans, censuses have included questions on eth-
nicity, language and religion. The collection of data on ethnic and cultural 
characteristics raises an unresolved paradox: Such questions are highly sensi-
tive, but, in order to be able to protect minorities through, for example, anti-
discrimination laws, the authorities need to know that these minorities exist. 
This chapter uses the additional coverage model mixed methods approach 
to illustrate the effects of including ethnic and cultural characteristics in the 
census questionnaires in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, where population 
numbers are used to determine group rights and/or proportional representa-
tion. The chapter argues that, although taking a census forms part of the 
requirements for EU membership, it is not possible to speak of Europeanisa-
tion in this area, since there is no coherent European approach on how to 
collect ethnic and cultural data. However, as what appears in the censuses 
is linked to rights, the census processes can be highly politicized, and this is 
being overlooked in the general process of Europeanisation.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Collecting sensitive ethnic and cultural data, such as ethnicity, language 
and religion, raises an unresolved paradox. On the one hand, if population 
groups are not defined by category, they do not formally exist and are con-
sequently not given their due rights. On the other hand, the definition of 
these groups and the linking of political benefits to population numbers may 
lead to negative discrimination or may even challenge concepts of national 
identity and state boundaries. Hence the inclusion of ethnic and cultural 
questions and categories in a population census is highly problematic 
(Bochsler & Schläpfer, 2015; Cooley & Mujanović, 2016). The difficulties that 
arise can influence the whole census operation and even lead to its failure. 
This chapter does not aim to provide answers on whether to record ethnic 
and cultural characteristics or how this should be done, but it points out the 
paradox involved and the consequences that follow. 
Census data is used not only for national purposes such as taxation, but 
also as a requirement by the EU. The demand for reliable and comparative 
population data through census-taking falls under Chapter 18 of the acquis 
communautaire, which covers the necessary statistics and is outlined in the 
statistical compendium (European Commission, 2014c). Although census-
taking would appear to be a rather small aspect of the process, given the 
size of the acquis, it is in fact an enormous undertaking.  
On average, population censuses are taken every ten years. In the West-
ern Balkans, this average has not been attained by all the post-Yugoslav 
countries, however. For example, due to the difficulties created by war after 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia (1992–1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter 
Bosnia) did not conduct its first census till 2013. Other countries, such as Croa-
tia, held censuses in 2001 and 2011, and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (hereafter Macedonia) conducted censuses in 1994 and 2002, 
but aborted one planned for 2011. 
Although the EU does not require data on ethnic and cultural characteris-
tics from its potential member states, all the Western Balkan countries have 
included questions about these aspects in their censuses, and this was also a 
practice in the former Yugoslavia. In the post-conflict environment in most of 
these countries, these questions are now connected with discrimination. 
Positive discrimination can ensure the granting of minority rights.13 However, 
the labelling of people which puts them into different categories can also 
lead to exclusion and negative discrimination. Especially when privileges 
and rights are specifically linked to numerical thresholds, census processes 
can become problematic. This has been shown in ethnically divided socie-
                                                        
13 This is, however, just one of the tools to ensure minority rights. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for example, affirms the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality (OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 2012). 
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ties, where the process of counting and categorising a population can lead 
to negative discrimination against minority groups (Leibler & Breslau, 2005; 
Urla, 1993). As Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia were enlargement countries 
at the time of their recent censuses, we would expect the censuses to have 
been carried out in the same way; however, the countries have shown con-
siderable variation in their census-taking procedures. Croatia carried out a 
complete census in 2011; Bosnia collected census data in 2013 but only pub-
lished the results, after serious delays, in June 2016; and Macedonia aborted 
its 2011 census altogether.  
The argument of this chapter is that, although taking a census has been 
made part of the EU conditions for joining, it is not possible to speak of any 
‘Europeanisation’ dictating the collection of ethnic and cultural data, since 
there is no coherent European approach on how to accomplish this. The 
effects of including questions to elicit ethnic and cultural data in the popula-
tion census can all too easily politicise the census process, as will be shown in 
the examples of Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, where population num-
bers are linked to rights and/or proportional representation. 
As there are no EU rules on collecting ethnic and cultural data, this chap-
ter uses the additional coverage model mixed methods approach (Morgan, 
2014). This combines survey data from census experts who provide an inter-
national perspective on census-taking with case analyses of the ethnic and 
cultural characteristics present in the census questionnaires for Croatia, Bos-
nia and Macedonia. By these means, the thesis demonstrates the paradox 
of collecting ethnic and cultural data. The approach is innovative, not only 
because it combines new methods and data, but because existing research 
has not yet looked at the censuses in the Western Balkans within the general 
framework of Europeanisation (Bieber, 2015; Visoka & Gjevori, 2013). 
4.2 The sensitivities of census-taking  
In the Western Balkans, there has been a long tradition of census-taking. 
Censuses were already being conducted when these territories were under 
Ottoman and Habsburg rule (Shaw, 1978; van der Plank, 2012). After the First 
World War the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes held a census (in 
1921), and in socialist Yugoslavia after the Second World War, population 
counts became relatively regular events. Their most important question, 
closely related to ethnic and cultural characteristics in socialist Yugoslavia, 
concerned ‘nationality’, though initially without a category for ‘Yugoslav’. 
This was only added in the census of 1961 (Sekulic, Massey, & Hodson, 1994); 
and it was only in 1971 that ‘Muslim’ was first allowed as a national category 
for Bosniaks (Bringa, 1993). This remained the practice until the last Yugoslav 
census, which took place in 1991, after which ‘Bosniak’ was adopted as an 
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official category (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013). Until the dissolution of the country 
in 1991, identity questions in Yugoslav censuses were based on self-
identification and included open-answer questions for national identity, lan-
guage and religion (Bieber, 2015, p. 10). 
When it includes ethnic and cultural questions, a census not only provides 
an overview of the demographic, social and economic characteristics of a 
country’s population (Valente, 2010); it also creates the opportunity for indi-
viduals to identify themselves as being members of this population (Ruppert, 
2007). With the creation of identity categories through questions on ethnicity, 
language and religion, individuals and peoples start identifying with specific 
groupings which thereby become legitimised. In the end, they are impelled 
to recognize themselves as representatives of these census categories—as 
members of societal groups, and eventually of the state (Ruppert, 2007). The 
relationship between a census and sense of identity is highly political as it 
connects with claims over territory and the assumption of power over people 
with other identities or ethnic and cultural characteristics (Kertzer & Arel, 
2002a, p. 36). 
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, issues of ethnicity and geographic be-
longing developed into tools for ethnic bargaining over borders, rights and 
political representation (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 6). A population census is 
an essential lever by which ethnic groups can (re)affirm their legitimacy and 
supremacy (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013). Although it was recognized that ques-
tions on ethnicity, language and religion were sensitive matters (Kertzer & 
Arel, 2002a), in the census round of 2010 all the Western Balkan countries 
asked for this data (Eurostat, 2014). Mapping identity in the region seems still 
to be a major objective and the key reason for conducting censuses. Visoka 
and Gjevori (2013, p. 1) have shown how census processes in the Western 
Balkans have given ethnic groups the opportunity to fight identity battles so 
as to (re)claim political ownership. This is possible because rights are linked to 
numerical thresholds. For example, in Croatia minority rights are granted ac-
cording to the census results (Petričušić, 2002). In Bosnia, they are linked to 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, which stopped the war of 1992–1995, and 
which divided the political system among the three constituent ethnic 
groups—Bosniak, Croat and Serb—as judged on the population distribution 
shown in the 1991 census (Bieber, 2004). In Macedonia, the census is linked 
to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which stopped the armed conflict be-
tween ethnic Albanians and Macedonians in 2001. Under this agreement, 
minorities making up more than 20% of the population received language 
rights and proportional representation in the police and bureaucracy 
(Brunnbauer, 2002; Vasilev, 2013). 
Although there is much discussion about these census questions and cat-
egories, there is no coherent agreement as to what exactly constitutes eth-
nicity (Simon, 2011). Nonetheless, ethnicity is regarded as being closely relat-
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ed to other cultural characteristics, such as language and religion (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2006). In Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, religion and language are taken not only as markers of individual iden-
tity, but as indicators of national or ethnic identity: they are part of an ‘ethnic 
package’ (Bieber, 2015, p. 5). In the recommendations of the Conference of 
European Statisticians (CES) on the population and housing census formulat-
ed by the UNECE and Eurostat (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 2006),14 these aspects are taken into account under the heading of 
‘ethno-cultural characteristics’ (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 2006, pp. 95–98). Language, in particular, is seen as an indicator of 
national identity, since it cannot be disconnected from the state (unlike reli-
gion, through secularisation) and tends to fluctuate since, in comparison with 
other identity markers like religion, linguistic assimilation can be achieved 
relatively easily (Arel, 2002). There has been much discussion on how to con-
vert exploration of these categories into census questions, and the formula-
tion of the census questions and categories shows the construction of ethnic 
discourses (Goldschneider, 2002; Kertzer & Arel, 2002b; Ruppert, 2011; Urla, 
1993; Yanow, 2003). These discourses follow (ethnic) group preferences, 
which are used to define public policy (Nobles, 2002). In the cases of Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Macedonia, they are linked to rights and political representa-
tion through numerical thresholds. This linking of population numbers to rights 
and thresholds ultimately leads to discrimination: either positive (in the grant-
ing of minority rights) or negative (in enforcing segregation) (Nobles, 2002). 
This is what constitutes the paradox of collecting ethnic and cultural data. If 
population groups are not defined in terms of categories, they do not for-
mally exist and consequently have no rights. However, if political benefits are 
linked to population numbers, this can lead to negative discrimination or 
even create a challenge to national identity and state boundaries. Since 
census processes give ethnic groups the opportunity to (re)claim political 
ownership, census-taking is necessarily political (Cooley & Mujanović, 2016). 
Therefore it is important to look at the dynamics that exist between censuses 
and the ethnic and cultural categories they may impose. Since the census is 
also part of the EU acquis and the countries at the time of the last census 
were all enlargement countries, the next section will look at the potential 
influence of Europeanisation on census-taking.  
4.3 Europeanisation and census-taking 
Within the acquis communautaire, the requirement to conduct census-
taking appears in the chapter on statistics, and is a condition countries need 
                                                        
14 The Ljubljana guidelines also provide some ideas on good practices for collecting statistical 
data in ethnically diverse societies (OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 2012). 
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to comply with before accession to the EU. Unlike the Copenhagen Criteria, 
which are regarded as being part of the political conditionality for EU acces-
sion (focusing on political transformation towards democratisation and EU 
member state building (Anastasakis, 2008; Keil, 2013b)) the acquis conditions 
are regarded as more technical (Anastasakis, 2008, p. 367). The census is 
part of the acquis for the EU: members and aspiring members have to be 
able to present ‘sufficiently reliable, detailed and comparable data on the 
population and housing’ every ten years (European Parliament & Council of 
the European Union, 2008). The methodology, definitions and programme of 
the statistical data and metadata need to be aligned, both within the Union 
and in its enlargement countries. Officially the enlargement countries do not 
yet need to adhere to these regulations, but it is strongly recommended that 
they do so (Everaers, 2015). Such institutionalisation of EU rules, procedures 
and policy paradigms is denoted as Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2006, p. 59). 
This thesis defines Europeanisation as the influence of the EU on the censuses 
conducted in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. 
The EU conditions for census-taking include EU regulations on, for exam-
ple, the technical specifications, definitions and data sources of censuses 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2009; European Commission, 
2010a; European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008). They 
also rely on CES recommendations (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 2006).15 The latter provide guidance and assistance to countries 
conducting a census, and also have the same purpose as the EU census 
regulations: to ensure the harmonisation of statistical data (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 1). Sensitive aspects around eth-
nic and cultural characteristics—ethnicity, language and religion—are not 
covered by the EU regulations. In the CES recommendations, they do indeed 
appear, but only as non-core topics. The collection of ethnic data is exclud-
ed from the population censuses in most West European countries, with the 
notable exceptions of Ireland and the United Kingdom (Simon, 2011). The 
reasons for not including such data in the western part of Europe are, firstly, 
adherence to data protection laws, and, secondly, because the categories 
are seen as imprecise and inaccurate, with the potential to challenge the 
self-perceptions of ethnically homogeneous societies (Simon, 2011, p. 1376). 
This last is the case in France (Simon, 2008). Most European countries, there-
fore, use ‘country of birth’ and ‘citizenship’ as proximate indicators of ethnici-
ty (Simon, 2011).  
In order to go deeper into the issue of collecting ethnic and cultural 
characteristics, this chapter uses an additional coverage model mixed 
method approach (Morgan, 2014), which enables integration of qualitative 
                                                        
15 For an overview of the content of the EU census regulations and the differences with the CES 
recommendations see chapter 2.4.1 and appendix 1.  
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and quantitative data. The chapter combines discourse analysis and de-
scriptive statistics. Since there is no coherent EU approach to collecting data 
on ethnicity, a survey has been conducted among census experts from all 
over Europe and beyond, to get a reference frame and to elicit expert opin-
ions on current practices regarding this aspect. The experts came from the 
National Statistical Offices of the different countries and were present at the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) census meetings in 
Geneva.16 In addition, this research draws on contacts from Eurostat and 
further census experts whose names were provided by Eurostat—the list was 
checked by Pieter Everaers, Director at Eurostat, and Eric Schulte Nordholt, 
Senior Researcher and project leader of the census at Statistics Netherlands. 
Those consulted included census experts from all the EU member states as 
well as experts from the Balkans, Switzerland, Iceland, Canada, Turkey and 
Israel. Thus there is a wide geographical scope, but as the census community 
is rather small, it can be assumed that these experts were familiar with the 
issues at stake.  
In total, 75 census experts were contacted. The response rate for the first 
round was 69% (n=52).17 The second round had a response rate of 50% 
(n=38). The survey was conducted following the Delphi method (Hsu & Sand-
ford, 2007). It took place in two rounds in June, and then Novem-
ber/December 2015, as this allowed for interaction with the respondents and 
for reflection and elaboration on the answers the first round returned. In the 
first round, specific aspects were identified, such as what might be per-
ceived as sensitive issues in a census. These aspects were then taken up in 
the second round and follow-up questions were asked about them. In addi-
tion, the survey included control questions to aid in filtering the data. For 
instance, the respondents were asked to indicate their knowledge of a par-
ticular topic (such as the EU census regulations or the Western Balkans). For 
the analysis of some questions, a deliberate division was made between 
experts who declared that they had knowledge about the Western Balkans 
and those who declared that they did not know much about the region. This 
was to test whether respondents familiar with the historical situation and eth-
nic cleavages in the Western Balkans would have a greater tendency to 
wish to exclude ethnic and cultural aspects from a census than those with 
less background awareness.  
In order to analyse the practices of enquiring into ethnic and cultural 
categories, this chapter looks at census methodologies and questionnaires 
from Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. I have selected the censuses from the 
                                                        
16 With the exception of experts from Russian-speaking countries, such as Belarus, Georgia, Mol-
dova and others. 
17 The ‘n’ represents the total number of respondents.  
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2010 census round so as to compare the three countries.18 (Bosnia had no 
census before 2013.) The analysis is based on documents in the English lan-
guage. In some instances, interview data and newspaper articles have been 
used to contextualise the findings. The three West Balkan countries I follow 
were chosen because, at the time of the census, they were all (potential) 
candidates for EU enlargement, and because of the variations they showed 
with regard to census-taking. Croatia—today an EU member—had its census 
enumeration in 2011 and presented its results in November 2013.19 Macedo-
nia aborted its census enumeration of 2011, a few days into the process. 
Bosnia completed its census enumeration in October 2013, but the census 
data was only published, after serious delay, in June 2016.  
4.4 Expert perspectives on counting ethnic and cultural 
characteristics  
As already stated, there are no clear EU conditions on collecting data on 
ethnic and cultural categories in the EU census regulations (Simon & Piché, 
2011). This section of the chapter therefore analyses the results of the census 
expert survey conducted, so as to provide a broad perspective.  
In general, census experts are aware that there are census topics which 
can be very sensitive. When these experts were faced with the question 
whether sensitive questions should be part of a population and housing cen-
sus questionnaire in general (n=49), most of them (49%) said they would in-
clude sensitive questions that could be answered on a voluntary basis: the 
questions would be included, but there would be no obligation to answer 
them.20 Some 14% would include sensitive aspects in a census, and 20% 
would exclude sensitive aspects altogether. Further, 12% of the experts stat-
ed that the issue was not applicable, as in their countries the collection of 
census data was not made in the traditional way, but through registers or 
other sources. Also, 4% would consider including sensitive questions if they 
were important for the distribution of subsidies. The question addressed to 
these respondents was formulated very broadly and it was left open to them 
to make their own choice of what was meant by ‘sensitive’. However, when 
asked directly what kind of census topics they thought might cause difficul-
ties, the vast majority of the experts indicated ethnicity (94%) and religion 
(94%) as sensitive or highly sensitive, while language (61%), nationality (61%), 
citizenship (30%) and place of birth (20%) were identified as sensitive or highly 
sensitive by a smaller proportion of the experts (Table 5). Even though na-
                                                        
18 The 2010 census round comprised all the censuses conducted between 2005 and 2014 (United 
Nations Statistics Division, 2013).  
19 Croatia’s census data is also part of the European project called the ‘Census Hub’, which is a 
tool to compare the census data of all EFTA countries (European Statistical System, n.d.). 
20 The percentages may not total 100, due to rounding. This is also the case for the tables below.  
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tionality is high on the list, the focus of this chapter will remain on the aspects 
of ethnicity, religion and language, as these are identified as the key ethnic 
and cultural characteristics in the CES recommendations and are seen as 
identity markers for the ‘ethnic package’.  
Table 5: Sensitivity per aspect 
 Highly sensitive Sensitive Not sensitive Not at all sensitive   n 
Income 44% 42% 12% 2% 50 
Place of Birth 2% 18% 44% 36% 50 
Citizenship 2% 28% 44% 26% 50 
Language 12% 49% 31% 8% 49 
Religion 65% 29% 4% 2% 49 
Ethnicity 72% 22% 2% 4% 50 
Nationality 25% 36% 21% 17% 47 
 
The census experts were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
inclusion of citizenship, ethnicity, language and religion in census question-
naires for all countries in the UNECE region.21 In their replies, there was a clear 
trend—most experts disagreed or strongly disagreed with including ethnicity 
(57%) or religion (61%) in the census questionnaire (table 6). However, with 
regard to language (32%) and citizenship (10%), a lower proportion were 
against the inclusion of questions. This result is not completely surprising, since 
citizenship is a required census topic under the EU census regulations and a 
core topic in the CES recommendations, and language is an indicator often 
used in policy-making (Simon, 2005, p. 22). As described above, ethnicity 
and religion are not mentioned in the EU regulations and are non-core in the 
CES recommendations. That most of the experts would not include these 
aspects probably explains why there are no coherent rules and why practic-
es are so divergent. This theme will be developed at a later stage in this 
chapter.  
Table 6: Agreement/Disagreement with ethnic and cultural characteristics as part of census 
questionnaire: UNECE/CES recommendations 
 Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree or Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree n 
Citizenship 33% 45% 12% 8% 2% 49 
Ethnicity 2% 18% 22% 18% 39% 49 
Language  12% 35% 20% 16% 16% 49 
Religion 4% 10% 24% 24% 37% 49 
 
                                                        
21 The UNECE region encompasses ‘the countries of Europe, but also countries in North America 
(Canada and United States), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) and Western Asia (Israel)’ (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, n.d.). As 
described above, the countries in Central Asia, as well as Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, 
were not included in the survey.  
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The survey included another question that was very similar, but instead of 
asking about the UNECE region, this one focused on the EU census regula-
tions: Did the census experts think the EU population and housing census 
regulations should contain more precise rules about census questions that 
enquire into citizenship, ethnicity, language and religion (table 7)? The results 
show answers for citizenship to be fairly spread out and indecisive. But for 
ethnicity, language and religion, the results were relatively similar: about two 
experts in every three disagreed or strongly disagreed with any need for 
more concrete EU rules. This may reflect the diverging practices in Europe on 
how to collect ethnic data; but also it may be seen as an indicator of the 
degree of sensitivity that surrounds these issues.  
Table 7: Agreement/Disagreement with ethnic and cultural characteristics as part of census 
questionnaire: EU census regulations 
 Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree n 
Citizenship 11% 9% 45% 29% 6% 35 
Ethnicity 3% 3% 30% 24% 39% 33 
Language 6% 9% 30% 24% 30% 33 
Religion 3% 6% 27% 24% 39% 33 
 
Table 8 shows that there was a divide in responses between those experts 
claiming they had good knowledge of the Western Balkan region and those 
stating that they did not. Although they came from a small sample of re-
spondents, the results were significant (at the 0.05 level) for ethnicity and 
language.22 While experts who indicated that they were knowledgeable 
about the Western Balkan region preferred to exclude the aspect of ethnici-
ty from censuses or would only include it as a voluntary category, the an-
swers from experts who indicated that they did not know the region were 
more spread out. This shows that the sensitivity of the question is known to 
census experts especially if they know the Balkan region. Most Balkan experts 
would also only include enquiry into language as a voluntary category in the 
census, while the majority of non-Balkan experts would most definitely in-
clude this aspect in a census.  
Table 8: Should ethnicity, language and religion be excluded, as they might threaten the data 
collection? 
Census category Ethnicity (n=33) Language (n=32) 
Balkan expert No (n=15) Yes (n=18) No (n=15) Yes 
(n=17) 
Excluded in any case 40% 44% 27% 6% 
I would include them on a voluntary basis 20% 50 % 20% 88% 
They should definitely be included 40% 6% 53% 6% 
 
                                                        
22 The results for religion were not significant and are therefore not shown.  
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In the main, census experts—and especially those with a good knowledge of 
the Western Balkans—do not agree with the inclusion of questions on ethnici-
ty and religion in a census. Language and especially citizenship are charac-
teristics often used for policy-making and mapping migration, and so ques-
tions on these can more often be justified. The survey reflects what was es-
tablished earlier: that there are no EU conditions requiring the collection of 
data on ethnic and cultural categories. Even the census experts’ opinions 
diverge on how to collect such details. It should be noted that although, in 
the main, the experts were against including ethnicity and religion in a cen-
sus, the national censuses under investigation did include these questions.  
4.5 Ethnic and cultural categories in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia 
The Western Balkan countries are on their way to EU membership, and as 
such present an interesting case for the analysis of census-taking. On the one 
hand, the census is part of the EU acquis—though, as the survey results have 
shown, there are no coherent European guidelines on how to ask about 
ethnicity, language or religion, and the EU does not require countries to en-
quire into these aspects. On the other hand, since the dissolution of Yugosla-
via, ethnicity has been institutionalised (Bieber, 2004). It is intricately inter-
twined with positive and negative discrimination. In part, this is a legacy from 
the old Yugoslav system, which had elaborate mechanisms for ethnic repre-
sentation and minority protection; but after the wars following the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia, ethnic representation increased (Bieber, 2004, pp. 4–5). Par-
ticularly in ethnically heterogeneous societies like Bosnia and Macedonia, 
this can lead to difficulties in the census process, as will be outlined in the 
following sections.  
4.5.1 Croatia  
The latest census in Croatia was conducted, as planned, in April 2011. Even 
though, due to difficulties in hiring staff, there was a delay in the publication 
of the census data, no major difficulties were experienced (Hoh, 2015). In the 
methodological guidelines for the Croatian census of 2011, ethnicity is 
grouped with language and cultural identity, being seen as ‘sense of be-
longing to a society (nation)’ (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). This in-
cludes awareness of integration into the community, and also ‘special quali-
ties in relation to other such communities’ (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). 
The description of ‘sense of belonging’ to the society or nation clearly links 
ethnicity to national identity, in this case the Croatian national identity. The 
latter part of the description also links it to a possible differentiation from oth-
er ‘communities’. The methodological guidelines go on to provide details of 
The paradox of including ethnic and cultural questions 
81 
how the data on ethnicity should be presented: first the data for Croats 
should be listed, and then the other 22 ethnic minorities in alphabetical order 
(Croatian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). This shows Croats being differentiated 
from other ethnic groups, which are ranked separately in the official presen-
tation. By listing only a set number of ethnicities, the presentation ensures 
that a selection entailing inclusion/exclusion must be made (Bieber, 2015, p. 
4). In this case, one might be left wondering why the selection is presented 
alphabetically and not according to which group is most prevalent.  
Thus, in the Croatian census questionnaire, citizenship is grouped with 
questions about ethnic and cultural identity (Republic of Croatia & Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2011). This is not in line with the CES recommendations, 
according to which the question on citizenship should be clearly distin-
guished from ethnic and cultural characteristics to avoid confusion or indi-
rect links being made between them (United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, 2006, p. 96). In addition, there is no option to abstain from declar-
ing citizenship, unless a person does not possess citizenship at all. In the 
methodology it is stipulated that if a person does not want to declare his/her 
citizenship, the results will present this person as having unknown citizenship 
(Croatian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). By putting citizenship so close to the oth-
er ethnic and cultural categories, the census implies that there is a link be-
tween citizenship and the ethnic identity package.  
With regard to the categories for the questions on ethnicity, language 
and religion, instead of offering open categories, as advised in the CES rec-
ommendations, the questionnaire first offers the option ‘Croat’ (or in the 
case of language, ‘Croatian’ and for religion ‘Catholic’ or ‘Atheist’) 
(Republic of Croatia & Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Only afterwards is 
there an open field to declare anything else. In the methodology it is stated, 
with regard to the categories for ethnicity and religion, that ‘persons [can] 
freely declare’ their ethnic or religious affiliation (Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics, n.d.). This facility is not offered, however, with the question on lan-
guage. Language in Croatia is taken to be a person’s mother tongue 
(Croatian Bureau of Statistics, n.d.). Individuals speaking more than one lan-
guage at home should declare the one they consider to be their mother 
tongue. This too is out of line with the CES recommendation, according to 
which the questionnaire should include at least two questions on language 
and give open-answer boxes (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 2006, p. 97). On the Croatian census it is not possible to declare 
more than one language. According to the enumerators’ instructions, the 
answers for these categories should not be read out by the enumerators, so 
as not to influence outcomes (Interview 1: Croatian Bureau of Statistics offi-
cial). Fines for possible malpractice by enumerators are described in the 
census law (Croatian Parliament, 2010). The questionnaire offers a box to tick 
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for undeclared ethnicity and religion; but this option is unavailable when it 
comes to language.  
Though enumerators should not influence responses, when we look at the 
census questionnaire it seems that ‘Croat’, ‘Croatian’ and ‘Catholic’ are the 
preferred categories for the questions on ethnicity, language and religion. 
The questionnaire shows that, among the sensitive aspects, language is 
treated differently from ethnicity and religion. Whereas ethnicity and religion 
have an option for non-declaration, this is not the case with language. How-
ever, when the categories are grouped, they can be seen as an ‘ethnic 
package’, with language being the most important indicator—and one that 
may be taken to show national identity (Arel, 2002). In addition, in the Croa-
tian questionnaire, citizenship is linked with ethnic and cultural characteris-
tics, which is something that should definitely be avoided according to the 
CES recommendations.  
In Croatia, rights granted to minorities depend on a numerical threshold 
as outlined in the 2002 Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities. 
If national minorities make up more than 1.5% of the total population, they 
receive at least one seat, or a maximum of three seats, for their representa-
tives in the Croatian parliament (Petričušić, 2002, pp. 617–618). Representa-
tion in local government bodies depends on population numbers too: the 
threshold is 15% (Petričušić, 2002). If a certain minority makes up more than 
30% in a local self-governed unit, this language can be used as the official 
minority language (Petričušić, 2002, p. 615). According to the law, Cyrillic 
script could be introduced as the official form of writing in about 30 munici-
palities where Serbs make up more than 30% of the population. This caused 
major protest in 2014, as well as a call for a referendum for changing the 
constitution (Milekic, 2014; Pavelic, 2014). The implementation of the law on 
minority languages was highly influenced by the EU accession process of 
Croatia (Petričušić, 2008; Tatalović, 2006). Although, with regard to ethnic 
and cultural questions, the census in Croatia was not in line with the CES rec-
ommendations, the collection of the census data was achieved without 
major difficulties. The census data is destined for use as a basis in policy-
making and can have consequences for ethnic minority groups, as was 
shown by the protests in 2014. Since there are no EU conditions on how to 
deal with ethnic and cultural data and Croatia had closed the acquis chap-
ter on statistics before the start of the census, it can be seen that the census 
did not play a big role in Croatian EU accession. 
4.5.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina  
In October 2013, Bosnia and Herzegovina held its first census. Although, ac-
cording to the International Monitoring Operation led by Eurostat, ‘the cen-
sus enumeration was carried out smoothly and in accordance with interna-
tional standards, (Durr, Bianchini, Demirci, Kostadinova-Daslakovska, & 
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Pieraccini, 2013, p. 8), there were reports of minor irregularities (Jukic, 2013; 
Perry, 2013). The results were published after serious delays in June 2016 (Toe, 
2016b, 2016c).  
The Bosnian census law and methodology address the ethnic composi-
tion of the enumerators, which should follow the ethnic composition re-
vealed by the census results of 1991, and mention fines for enumerators who 
try to influence a respondent’s answer with regard to the sensitive questions 
on ethnicity, language and religion (Director of the Agency for Statistics of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d.). This already gives an indication of the sensitiv-
ity of these aspects in the region.  
The census questionnaire issued by Bosnia and Herzegovina features 
questions on ethnic and cultural characteristics, which appear in a different 
order than in Croatia. Citizenship is not grouped in the same answer section 
as ethnic and cultural characteristics. However, the Bosnian questionnaire 
includes the category ‘entity citizenship’ (Agency for Statistics Bosnia and 
Herzegovina [Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine], 2013). This has 
been much debated and it is believed that it might be used by ethnic Serbs 
to pave the way towards a referendum over independence for Republika 
Srpska, the entity which has a majority of ethnic Serbs (Armakolas & 
Maksimovic, 2014; Perry, 2015; Popis, 2013). 
If we look at the ethnic and cultural questions, the Bosnian census ques-
tionnaire asks first for ethnicity and religion, and only afterwards for language 
(Agency for Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina [Agencija za statistiku Bosne i 
Hercegovine], 2013). For all these questions, the first answer category is an 
open-answer field in which to insert the reply the respondent gives. It is only 
below this open field that there are boxes giving preselected options. For 
ethnicity, these are ‘Bosniak’, ‘Croat’ and ‘Serb’; for religion they are ‘Islam-
ic’, ‘Catholic’, ‘Orthodox’, ‘Agnostic’ and ‘Atheist’; for language they are 
‘Bosnian’, ‘Croatian’ and ‘Serbian’. While the preselected categories for 
ethnicity seem to be ordered alphabetically, the answer categories for reli-
gion appear connected with those for ethnicity in the question above.23 The 
same holds for the answer categories for language. It is made to look as if 
there is a clear connection between these categories, and that people 
should stick to the preselected ethnic, religious, and linguistic answers in an 
‘ethnic package’ so as to increase the numbers shown for the constituent 
ethnic groups. Ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is described as ‘eth-
nic/national affiliation’ and language is noted as ‘mother tongue’. It is not 
permissible to tick more than one answer box, and therefore not possible to 
declare multi-ethnicity or more than one religion.  
                                                        
23 This observation includes only the English translation of the census form. In another language 
the statement about the alphabetical order might not be true.  
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Above these answer boxes, it is stated that the questions on ethnicity and 
religion are not obligatory, but it should be pointed out that an answer does 
need to be given: ‘[If] the answer cannot be obtained, the enumerator shall 
write down “Unknown”’ (Director of the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, n.d., p. 156). Here, children whose parents have different eth-
nic and/or religious backgrounds need to decide which side they are on. 
From an outsider perspective, this seems strange in a country which contains 
several ethnic groups with intermarriages between them. This practice also 
goes against the CES recommendations, according to which respondents 
should be free to declare more than one ethnic affiliation (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 96). The methodological guide-
lines allow the declaration of more than one ‘mother tongue’, but only in 
‘exceptional cases, when the enumerated person declares that s/he has 
two mother tongues’ (Director of the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, n.d.). In such an instance, this has to be put in the open-answer 
field. Though language can be taken as an indicator of national identity, as 
described above, Bosnia, it seems, allows more leeway with regard to this 
aspect than it does with the other ethnic and cultural categories. The lan-
guage categories offered in the census questionnaire—‘Bosnian’, ‘Croatian’ 
and ‘Serbian’—are not as different as might appear, since they all devel-
oped from the same linguistic origin (Greenberg, 2004). Another aspect tak-
en into account in the Croatian census methodology but not taken up in this 
one is that, in Croatia, people can declare their ‘regional, religious or any 
other affiliation’ in the category of ethnicity (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 
n.d.). There is no mention of such an opportunity in the Bosnian census law 
and methodology. This is indeed surprising, since the category ‘Bosniak’ is a 
somewhat recent invention. Before the break-up of Yugoslavia ‘Muslim’ was 
the term used (Bringa, 1993). This may cause confusion among the Bosniak 
population, who in the last Yugoslav census (1991) had to declare them-
selves ethnic Muslims, but now find themselves referred to as ‘Bosniak’.  
A further divergence in these census questions from those of Croatia is 
that language is treated differently from religion and ethnicity. While the 
questions on ethnicity and religion are not mandatory, the language ques-
tion must be answered. Here there is no direct option allowing respondents 
to avoid declaration of their mother tongue. What the CES recommenda-
tions insist should not appear is any link between ethnicity and national affili-
ation (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 96). But this 
recommendation is ignored: the category for ethnicity is called ‘eth-
nic/national affiliation’. There seems altogether to be a preference for the 
set ethnic packages of ‘Bosniak’, ‘Croat’ and ‘Serb’ in the census form. 
These ethnic packages clearly represent the three constituent ethnic 
peoples included in the Dayton Agreement (Marko, 2013): if a person ticks 
the box ‘Bosniak’, it is expected that ‘Islamic’ and speaking ‘Bosnian’ will 
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follow. The same seems to be the case for the combination ‘Croat’, ‘Catho-
lic’ and ‘Croatian’; and, in turn, for ‘Serb’, ‘Orthodox’ and ‘Serbian’. It comes 
as no surprise that the publication of the census data for ethnicity, language 
and religion only mentions the categories connected to these three constit-
uent groups (Agency for Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina [Agencija za 
statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine], 2016). Initially, there was concern that the 
data from the census in Bosnia might affect the power-sharing structures in 
the country, which, following the Dayton Agreement, divide representation 
proportionally among the constituent (ethnic) peoples—Bosniaks, Croats 
and Serbs—as they appear in the census results of 1991 (Marko, 2013). How-
ever, the population numbers given in the 2013 census do not differ signifi-
cantly from the 1991 figures (Perry, 2016). Though the census was supervised 
by the EU through an International Monitoring Operation, the census results 
have been questioned by the ethnic Serbs (Perry, 2013). This challenge, indi-
rectly connected with a potential increase in ethnic numbers, is part of a 
political impasse in Bosnia on how to count the resident population 
(Recknagel, 2016). The whole issue is still causing debates. Even though the 
results have been published, Republika Srpska authorities do not recognize 
them (Recknagel, 2016; Toe, 2016b, 2016e).  
4.5.3 Macedonia  
Macedonia conducted censuses in 1994 and 2002. In the 2010 census 
round, a new census was planned for early October 2011 (Eurostat, 2014). 
However, on the tenth day of the enumeration process, the Macedonian 
Parliament annulled the Census Law it had adopted earlier and cancelled 
the census altogether. This was due to political disagreements, especially on 
whether or not to include the diaspora population of the country in the 
count (Daskalovski, 2013).  
Macedonia’s 2011 census questionnaire is the only one of the three stud-
ied here that gives the title ‘ethnic characteristics’ to a section (Republic of 
Macedonia State Statistical Office, n.d.). The order of questions on ethnic 
and cultural characteristics is the same as in the Croatian questionnaire—a 
question on ethnicity, followed by questions on language and religion. As in 
the Bosnian questionnaire, the ethnic and cultural questions are not grouped 
in the same answer section as the question on citizenship. However, unlike 
the other questionnaires, the Macedonian one does not give any preselect-
ed answer categories for the questions on ethnicity, language, and religion: 
it offers open-answer fields for all. In addition, it provides three questions 
about language: ‘mother tongue’, ‘language usually spoken’, and 
‘knowledge of foreign languages’. There is one question each for ‘ethnic 
affiliation’ and ‘religious affiliation’ (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical 
Office, n.d.). Apart from the question on ‘knowledge of foreign languages’, 
none of these are mandatory. Though there is no direct option offered to 
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avoid declaration in these categories, the census methodology states that 
the enumerators may fill in that the person did not declare, or put ‘I do not 
know’ (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2011, p. 54). In short, 
this questionnaire is the only one making all three ethnic and cultural cate-
gories voluntary, and is thus the sole example fully in line with CES recom-
mendations. 
Another differentiating feature is that the Macedonian census law allows 
the collection of census data in a language other than Macedonian and a 
script other than Cyrillic. The law does not mention the name of the lan-
guage (Albanian) but refers to it as ‘the official language used by a mini-
mum 20% of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia’ (Republic of 
Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2010, p. 19).  
As all the Macedonian census questions only offer open-answer options, 
the questionnaire potentially allows the declaration of more than one eth-
nicity. This questionnaire is thus the only one without a prominent ethnic pref-
erence. It is remarkable that, although this census form was most in line with 
CES recommendations, it was the one that did not go through with the enu-
meration. The Macedonian census form did not suggest any ethnic prefer-
ence, but the census failed due to lack of trustworthy data (Daskalovski, 
2013; Vrgova, 2015). The census was stopped because there was an incon-
sistent implementation of the accompanying methodology (Eurostat, 2014). 
This revolved around the issue of whether to include the diaspora population 
to boost ethnic (and linguistic) numbers, or whether to exclude this group 
(Marusic, 2011a). Already one year before the census operation started, 
Albanian politicians were proclaiming that they would not accept the cen-
sus results (Interview 2: OSCE official). Then, throughout the census process, 
ethnic Albanians wanted to increase their own numbers in the survey, while 
ethnic Macedonians were just as eager to play these numbers down 
(Marusic, 2011b). Following the Ohrid Framework Agreement, language 
rights should be given to communities if the language is spoken by more 
than 20% of the population. Also, proportional representation in the police 
and in the bureaucracy depends on recorded population numbers 
(Brunnbauer, 2002, p. 5). Since the census of 2002, the only ethnic group 
meeting the threshold of 20% has been the Albanian group. It was the politi-
cal struggle between the ethnic Albanians, who wanted to boost population 
numbers so as to keep their rights and standards, and the ethnic Macedoni-
ans, who wanted to decrease Albanian influence, that led to the cancella-
tion of the census operation.  
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4.6 Comparison 
Since there are EU and international guidelines for census-taking, one might 
expect that countries would harmonise their practices in this area. However, 
when we look at the ethnic and cultural questions in the census forms of the 
case countries, we see diverging approaches. In all the census forms, the 
questions on ethnicity and religion are not obligatory (table 9), and this, at 
least, is in line with the CES recommendations. While Croatia had closed-
answer categories presented first, and then an additional open-answer field, 
Bosnia offered these open and closed fields the other way round. Macedo-
nia, by contrast, offered open-answer fields only. Macedonia also differed 
on the language question: while in Croatia and Bosnia the question on lan-
guage was mandatory, the Macedonian census form did not insist on this. It 
did, however, present several questions about language, and, for a question 
on ‘foreign languages’ spoken, made an answer obligatory. The only ques-
tionnaire fully in line with the CES recommendations was the one Macedonia 
produced. Ironically, the Macedonian census was also the only one to be 
aborted. Meanwhile, the census operations in Croatia and Bosnia were 
completed, despite these countries’ suggesting preferred ethnic packages 
in their questionnaires. Indeed, Croatia, which produced the questionnaire 
least in line with the CES recommendations, was the most successful of the 
three states in completing the census operation. Bosnia was more in line with 
the recommendations than was Croatia, but since this country’s question-
naire suggested categories and included a much-debated question on enti-
ty citizenship, it emphasised a linking of the political with ethnic and cultural 
identities. All this shows that there is far more to a census than a simple popu-
lation count. As has been shown in Macedonia and Bosnia, a census can be 
highly politicised.  
Table 9: Comparison of ethnic and cultural questions in the census questionnaires of Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia 
 Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia 
Ethnicity   ‘Croat’, open-
answer field 
  Not obligatory 
  Open-answer field, 
‘Bosniak’, ‘Croat’, ‘Serb’ 
  Not obligatory 
  Open-answer field 
  Not obligatory 
Language    ‘Croatian’, open-
answer field 
  Obligatory 
  Open-answer field, 
‘Bosnian’, ‘Croatian’, 
‘Serbian’ 
  Obligatory 
  Open-answer field 
  Not obligatory 
  Several questions on 
language (only one 
obligatory) 
Religion   ‘Catholic’, ‘Atheist’, 
open-answer field 
  Not obligatory 
  Open-answer field, 
‘Islam’, ‘Catholic’, 
‘Orthodox’ 
  Not obligatory 
  Open-answer field 
  Not obligatory 
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4.7 Conclusion  
Because political participation and mandate representation quotas have 
become linked to the political structure of West Balkan countries, ethnic and 
cultural characteristics need to be collected. But there are no EU conditions 
on how to manage this, and international recommendations are only partial-
ly followed, even though enquiry into ethnic and cultural categories often 
forms part of the population censuses in the Balkan region. Recognizing this 
problem, Chapter 3 has used survey data to provide an international 
framework to review these categories. The results, based on the survey data 
and the census questionnaires of three sample countries, clearly demon-
strate that there is no one-size-fits-all approach on how to collect ethnic and 
cultural data. Some subsidiary points have emerged. First, there seems to be 
a difference in the degrees of sensitivity attached to different aspects: eth-
nicity and religion are highly sensitive and citizenship and language are less 
so. Second, since there is no coherent EU approach on how to deal with 
ethnic and cultural data, it is not possible to speak of Europeanisation in this 
policy area.  
In each of the three case countries the main paradox surrounding the 
collection of ethnic and cultural data is present: in order to be recognized, 
minority groups need to have their presence known, but the collection of 
data about their existence can cause discrimination or bring about other 
negative consequences. The negative implications are already visible in the 
politicisation of censuses and census outcomes. This politicisation was some-
what weaker in Croatia, where the debate on ethnic and cultural character-
istics came up largely after the census, when, following the results, about 
thirty municipalities were allowed to introduce Cyrillic script for their official 
language. This led to major protests and even a referendum on whether to 
change the constitution to increase the numerical threshold (Hoh, 2015, p. 
78). The Bosnian census categories recognized three constituent ethnic 
groups, which all had (and have) their own agendas for ethnic national 
state-building (Keil, 2013b; Keranen, 2013). Intense political debate on the 
census definitions was the main reason why the publication of the census 
results was so seriously delayed. Even now, after the results have been pub-
lished, the Serb authorities do not recognise them (Recknagel, 2016; Toe, 
2016b, 2016c). In Macedonia, the census was highly politicised, as both the 
main ethnic groups—Macedonian and Albanian—wanted to maintain or 
increase their political influence. The linking of language rights to numerical 
thresholds led to the spread of different methodologies in the census opera-
tion, ultimately causing it to fail altogether.  
Thus, in all three countries studied, the inclusion of questions on ethnic 
and cultural characteristics in the census has had political repercussions. 
Moreover, these have been divergent in character. This thesis does not at-
The paradox of including ethnic and cultural questions 
89 
tempt to provide a solution, but highlights the further paradox that including 
ethnic and cultural questions in a census shapes ethnic preferences, which 
may influence policy-making and the distribution of rights; but these ethnic 
preferences may also be used for ethnic nation-building (Anderson, 2006). 
The influence of ethnic preferences has so far been underestimated by the 
EU. Lack of attention to how it is addressed in census-taking flaws the current 
EU approach to state-building and enlargement (Keil, 2013b). There is no 
coherent European approach on how to collect ethnic and cultural data, 
and we cannot speak of Europeanisation of census-taking.  
As minority rights and political representation in the Western Balkans are 
connected to the results shown in its censuses, further research is needed on 
the possible outcomes of this linkage, which so far have been unanticipated. 
That this is one of the important challenges the EU faces in the Western Bal-
kans is made clear by the ongoing debate on the definition of ‘usual resi-
dence’ in Bosnia and the current political crisis in Macedonia.  
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Abstract 
In 2000, the European Union extended the membership perspective to the 
Western Balkans; however these countries have taken different political 
paths towards EU accession at different speeds. The population census is one 
of the conditions for EU accession and part of the 18th acquis chapter on 
statistics. This chapter seeks to explain the variation in census-taking in the 
2010 census round in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia considering two Europeanisation mechanisms: 
(a) the conditionality and (b) the legitimacy of the EU regulations in the area 
of census-taking. While conditionality assesses the cost/benefit calculation 
between the EU rewards/pressure and domestic adoption costs, legitimacy 
analyses whether the EU census regulations will be accepted based on their 
perception of appropriateness. Congruence analysis is used to compare the 
effectiveness of the Europeanisation mechanisms on the censuses in the 
countries under investigation. The study concludes that in Croatia legitimacy 
had the most impact, whereas the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia can be better explained by condi-
tionality. Therewith this work contributes to the recent findings that condi-
tionality as well as legitimacy matter for research on Europeanisation.  
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5.1 Introduction 
More than a decade after the European Union extended the membership 
perspective to the Western Balkans in 2000, these countries have taken dif-
ferent political paths towards EU accession, and at different speeds. The 
pathway of EU accession is tied to conditions and depends on compliance 
with EU rules and norms by the candidate countries. The process of align-
ment with EU rules and norms has been described as a major challenge for 
the countries in the Balkan region (Noutcheva, 2012; Prifti, 2013). The popula-
tion and housing census (hereafter census) is one of the aspects which rep-
resents a challenge in some of the enlargement countries.  
Within the acquis communautaire the census is part of the 18th chapter 
on statistics and outlined in the statistical compendium (European 
Commission, 2014c). Census-taking is crucial for the production and dissemi-
nation of population data and serves as a backbone for official statistics. The 
census is the tool for a state to gain information about its population and 
their living standards. Census data is important for the sample designs to 
conduct statistical surveys. As the EU is very keen on using statistics for evi-
dence-based decision making, a reliable population count is a crucial ele-
ment in the EU accession process. However, in the Balkan region, the collec-
tion of the data for the population and housing census is an exceedingly 
sensitive issue as important decisions over the distribution of public funds 
and/or the allocation of institutional quotas for various societal (eth-
nic/linguistic) groups are based on census data (Everaers, 2015). Essentially, 
census-taking is often highly politicised in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual socie-
ties and especially in the Western Balkans (Bieber, 2015). 
Censuses in the Western Balkan region were conducted long before EU 
accession. The last census of Yugoslavia was collected shortly before its 
break-up in 1991. Now within the framework of EU enlargement, accession 
countries have to comply with EU conditions for census-taking. Except for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose census took place in 2013, all Western Bal-
kan countries conducted their censuses in 2011, the reference year of the EU 
population count (Eurostat, 2014). Although all Western Balkan countries 
have the same EU conditions to comply with, three cases were chosen 
based on the different outcomes with regard to census-taking: ranging from 
aborted (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, hereafter Macedo-
nia), to delayed (Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter Bosnia) and relatively 
timely, with minor contestation (Croatia). In addition to the different census 
outcomes, these are also countries in different stages of EU accession; 
whereas Croatia became an EU member in 2013, Macedonia is a candidate 
country and Bosnia a potential candidate. 
Earlier scholars have researched the censuses in the region, but focused 
foremost on the construction of national identity through the census catego-
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ries (Bieber, 2015) or the aspect of ethnicity (Daskalovski, 2013; Visoka & 
Gjevori, 2013). Recently, more attention has been paid to the politics of 
numbers behind the population count (Daskalovski, 2013; Keil & Perry, 2015), 
but so far there is little research on the impact of the EU on the censuses in 
the Western Balkans (Keil, 2015). 
This chapter assesses whether the impact of the EU enlargement process 
can explain the variation in census-taking outcomes in Bosnia, Croatia and 
Macedonia. This will be done by using congruence analysis to test the im-
pact on census-taking of two mechanisms of Europeanisation: conditionality 
and legitimacy. Legitimacy focuses on the acceptance and implementation 
of the EU census regulations, as well as the nature of debates and contesta-
tions surrounding the census processes. This will show whether countries 
comply with the EU rules because they see it as appropriate and legitimate 
to do so. Conversely, conditionality, which is based on the logic of conse-
quences, assesses the rational cost/benefit incentives behind the differences 
of countries in EU accession (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005a, 
2007) and, in particular, whether the benefits of complying with EU condi-
tions (EU rewards) outweigh the domestic adoption costs. The chapter ex-
plores which of the two Europeanisation mechanisms is more likely to explain 
compliance.  
5.2 Census-taking within Europeanisation 
Europeanisation has many definitions, from broader ones looking at ‘pro-
cesses of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and “ways of doing 
things”’ (Radaelli, 2006, p. 59), to more concrete ones, which see Europeani-
sation as a shorthand definition for the domestic influence of the EU 
(Elbasani, 2013a, p. 5). As this research is only looking into a rather small as-
pect of the acquis and how this influences the censuses in the enlargement 
countries, Europeanisation is defined here as the influence of the EU on the 
Western Balkan countries (Elbasani, 2013a, p. 5). Earlier research on Europe-
anisation has looked into EU member state building (Bieber, 2011; Keil, 2013b) 
but also the effectiveness of the acquis conditionality in South Eastern Eu-
rope (Trauner, 2009) and the normative and strategic dimensions of EU ex-
ternal power (Noutcheva, 2009, 2012). Recently more attention has been 
paid to domestic factors which affect Europeanisation in the region, such as 
the lack of ‘stateness’ (Elbasani, 2013a), and human rights and corruption 
(Glüpker, 2013).  
Within the framework of Europeanisation, census-taking is under-
researched. The EU developed the EU census regulations to harmonise statis-
tical data in all (potential) member states and uses this data ‘evidence-
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based decision making’ (Everaers, 2015, p. 185). Thereby, census data be-
comes crucial for policy-making and the distribution of, for example, subsi-
dies. What differentiates censuses in the Western Balkans from those in most 
European countries is that the distribution of rights (such as minority rights) 
and political power can depend on the population data (Keil, 2015). In most 
Western European countries, census-taking is primarily a technical statistical 
exercise, however in the Balkan countries the census is a tool to know the 
numbers of the different population groups present (Interview 3: Eurostat 
official; Interview 4: EU delegation Sarajevo official).  
After Yugoslavia dissolved, issues of ethnicity and ethnic group size, as 
well as geography, were important tools used in the conflicts for bargaining 
new borders, rights and representation schemes in the newly established 
states in the Western Balkans (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 6). Bieber (2015) has 
shown that the census constitutes a site to negotiate national identities, to 
represent majority and minority groups. Since rights and the representation of 
power in the cases under investigation depend on the census results of eth-
nic groups, the process of census-taking is highly political (Kertzer & Arel, 
2002b, p. 36). Particularly political are the census questions on ethnicity, lan-
guage and religion, place of usual residence and whether or not to include 
the diaspora in the census. These aspects have been identified as the most 
contested issues in the Western Balkans (Everaers, 2015, p. 192) because 
these questions can be used and potentially manipulated to increase ethnic 
numbers.24 Even though it is important in the Western Balkan countries, the EU 
does not require collecting data on the sensitive ethno-cultural characteris-
tics (ethnicity, language and religion). Also in the Conference of European 
Statisticians Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and 
Housing (CES recommendations)25 these aspects are only part of the non-
core categories (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 
162). Nonetheless, in the 2010 census round, all Western Balkan countries 
included these topics in their census questionnaires (Eurostat, 2014).26  
The EU has high stakes in the stability of the region and wants to develop 
reliable statistics in its potential member states (Bieber, 2015, p. 11). In the 
2010 census round almost all the Western Balkan countries were financially 
and/or technically supported by the European Commission, through for ex-
ample Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU. Even though it is highly rec-
ommended that candidate countries follow the EU census regulations, they 
                                                        
24 This is not only important in the case countries but is also an issue in Montenegro (Vuković, 
2015), Serbia (Nikolić & Trimajova, 2015), Slovenia (Josipovič, 2015) and Kosovo (Musaj, 2015).  
25 The CES recommendations form the international guidelines for census-taking. These are formu-
lated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in collaboration with Eurostat 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2006).  
26 Earlier research has shown that this is also important for cultural politics in Spain (Urla, 1993) and 
used for ethnic exclusion in Israel (Leibler & Breslau, 2005).  
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are not legally obliged to comply. However, compliance does increase their 
chance of EU membership.  
5.3 Europeanisation of census-taking: Conceptual framework 
Earlier research on the transformative power of the EU has shown that EU 
conditionality can explain patterns of EU rule transfer to candidate countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Howev-
er, in the Western Balkans, Noutcheva (2009) has shown that the lack of per-
ceived legitimacy of the EU rules leads to different outcomes in compliance 
with EU conditions. While the aspect of conditionality looks at the 
(dis)incentives the EU offers in light of a cost/benefit calculation, the aspect 
of legitimacy will be analysed by looking at the implementation of the EU 
census rules in addition to the nature of the debates and contestations sur-
rounding the censuses.  
5.3.1 Conditionality 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p. 662) describe conditionality as ‘a 
bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU pro-
vides external incentives for a target government to comply with its condi-
tions’. The EU rewards accession countries that comply with its conditions 
and withholds rewards in the case of noncompliance. Within the literature, a 
differentiation is made within the democratic and acquis conditionality of 
the EU, asserting that the domestic political costs are more important for 
democratic conditionality, which is connected to compliance with the Co-
penhagen Criteria (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2007, pp. 91–92). In the 
case of census-taking, which is part of the acquis conditionality, however, 
the aspect of domestic adoption costs is also of importance. Since the cen-
sus data is used to establish numerical thresholds (for example, for minority 
rights, as well as political representation), it can affect the adoption costs for 
the domestic political elite. Therefore, the EU rewards for having a census 
need to be stronger than the potential losses of the domestic political elite. 
In order to tip the balance towards compliance, the EU can also pressure 
candidates by withdrawing pre-accession funds or setting short-term condi-
tions within the accession process, through, for example, the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements.  
Conditionality will be assessed by looking at the cost/benefit calculation 
of EU rewards/pressure versus domestic adoption costs. The EU rewards will 
be assessed by looking at the material and social rewards the accession 
countries receive or lose in case of compliance or noncompliance, and the 
pressure the EU puts on its enlargement countries for them to comply with 
the EU census regulation. The domestic adoption costs will be assessed ac-
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cording to the potential gains/losses of rights for the domestic political elite, 
such as numerical thresholds connected to the census results. Following the 
logic of consequences, it is expected that the credibility of threats and 
promises from the EU, as well as EU pressure, can make a difference with 
regard to the successful implementation of conditions for the population 
and housing censuses, if they outweigh the domestic adoption costs.  
5.3.2 Legitimacy 
Numerous authors have shown that in the Western Balkan countries compli-
ance with the EU conditions cannot be fully explained when only taking into 
account the rational choice idea of conditionality (Bieber, 2011; Freyburg & 
Richter, 2010; Noutcheva, 2009). Therefore, the aspect of the perceived le-
gitimacy of the EU conditions will also be considered. This mechanism is 
based on the acceptance of norms, values and identities, and follows the 
logic of appropriateness, which assumes that actors choose the most ap-
propriate (legitimate) course of action (March & Olsen, 1989; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 667). If external actors accept the 
authority of the EU and are convinced of the legitimacy and appropriate-
ness of EU rules, they adopt and comply with them (Schimmelfennig, 2014, p. 
20). In respect to census-taking, the acceptance of the EU census regula-
tions, as well as the contestation surrounding the census, will be used as indi-
cators for legitimacy. To be perceived as fully legitimate, the EU conditions 
must not only be accepted by the Statistical National Institute of the acces-
sion country but also by its political elite, because domestic actors can have 
a crucial role as, for example, veto players in post-communist countries 
(Mendelski, 2013). Conversely, if there is contestation and opposition against 
the appropriateness of the EU census regulations, the country is likely not to 
comply with the EU conditions for census-taking. The contestation of the 
censuses will be taken into account because this will show whether and to 
what extent the EU census regulations are accepted by the public/political 
elite. It is expected that if the EU census regulations are accepted as legiti-
mate, there will be no contestation of the census process and there will be 
full compliance with the EU census regulations.  
To measure the effect of legitimacy on compliance with the EU census 
regulations, it will be assessed whether the National Statistical Institutes of the 
case countries, as well as their political elites, accept and implement the EU 
census regulations and whether or not there is public/political contestation 
of the census. The latter will be assessed by looking at public/political de-
bates and their outcomes surrounding the censuses. If the census is highly 
contested (strongly debated) it is expected that compliance with the EU 
census regulations is not due to the mechanism of legitimacy. If there is little 
or no debate and the EU census regulations are accepted and implement-
ed, the mechanism of legitimacy is regarded as strong. However, the nature 
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of the debate also matters; for example, if the outcome of the debate is to 
comply with the EU census regulations and this is implemented and accept-
ed, compliance is also expected to be due to legitimacy. 
5.4 Method, case selection and data 
To compare the mechanisms of EU conditionality and legitimacy, congru-
ence analysis will be used. This method is a small-N research design which 
uses case studies to contrast and compare the explanatory relevance of 
theoretical approaches (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 144). This approach is 
also known as systematic process analysis (Hall, 2006). To compare the 
mechanisms of Europeanisation, empirical data collected via semi-
structured interviews, conducted with people at the National Statistical Insti-
tutes, international census experts and EU officials, as well as the census laws, 
questionnaires and methodologies of the case countries will be analysed 
and compared with the EU regulations on census-taking (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008). These documents will be 
complemented with data from the EU progress reports and newspaper arti-
cles. 
The countries have been chosen because although they have to comply 
with the same EU conditions, they show a variation with regard to census 
operations and outcomes. Croatia, by now an EU member, has conducted 
two censuses since independence from Yugoslavia, in 2001 and in 2011 re-
spectively. The last census in 2011 was conducted after the acquis chapter 
on statistics was already closed but before the accession date of July 2013. 
Macedonia, an EU candidate country since 2005, however without opening 
membership negotiations, has also conducted two censuses since inde-
pendence, one in 1994 and one in 2002. Another was planned for 2011, but 
aborted after a few days of enumeration due to unequal implementation of 
the methodology. Bosnia submitted its application for EU membership in 2016 
and is considered a potential candidate country. The country conducted its 
first census since 1991 in October 2013 and the results were published, after a 
long delay, in June 2016.  
Here we will focus foremost on the 2010 census round, which following the 
international definition includes all censuses conducted in the time period 
from 2005 up to 2014 (United Nations Statistics Division, 2013). This census 
round was chosen because throughout the previous round (the 2000 cycle, 
from 1995 to 2004) there were as yet no EU conditions with regard to census-
taking. Since then, attention accorded to the collection, harmonisation and 
dissemination of population data has increased; in the enlargement pack-
age of 2015 the chapter on statistics was even included in the list of aspects 
that are part of strengthened reporting (European Commission, 2015a).  
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5.5 When counting counts: Case analysis  
5.5.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina  
In October 2013, Bosnia conducted its first census since independence from 
the former Yugoslavia. This census was long expected as the preparations 
had already started in 2008. As it was the first census since independence 
from Yugoslavia and the armed conflict (1992–1995), there was an urgent 
need for reliable population data. The census law was adopted in February 
2012. The Agency for Statistics is officially responsible for the census but co-
operates with the Statistical Institutes of the Entities: the Republika Srpska (RS) 
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Director of the Agency for 
Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, n.d., p. 13). An International Monitoring 
Operation (IMO), led by Eurostat, started in April 2012, shortly after the adop-
tion of the census law. Since then, the IMO has conducted more than 20 
missions in Bosnia. From the beginning of the census project, there was a 
strong commitment from the EU towards this census. Without EU help and 
guidance it would have been very difficult to carry it out (Interview 5: DG 
NEAR official). Of the approximately 23 million EUR census costs (Eurostat, 
2014), more than 13 million was paid by the EU (Interview 4: EU Delegation 
Sarajevo official). Next to this, the Swedish International Development Coop-
eration contributed about 1.85 million EUR to the census exercise via the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (AAM Consulting, 2013; Eurostat, 
2014). The enumeration process took place in October 2013 and was in line 
with international standards (Durr et al., 2013). There were some reports of 
irregularities (Perry, 2013), however, most of these, related to diaspora enu-
meration, were expected to be sorted out during the data processing (Durr 
et al., 2013, p. 12). There was indeed a lengthy interim period in which data 
processing remained on hold (Interview 8: Statistical Agency official) due to 
a missing agreement on the definition of ‘place of usual residence’ (Inter-
view 6: Statistical Agency official). The EU urged Bosnia to publish the popu-
lation data by July 2016 (Toe, 2016d). Even though the IMO estimated that 
Bosnia was not likely to meet this deadline (Durr & Demirci, 2016, p. 8), the 
data was finally published on 30 June 2016. However, debates continued 
after the publication, as the RS still does not accept the definition of ‘place 
of usual residence’ (Toe, 2016b). 
Regarding the Europeanisation mechanism of conditionality, the rewards 
and the pressure for complying with the EU conditions are high. Particularly 
since Bosnia submitted its membership application in February 2016, the pub-
lication of the census data has been made a condition for Bosnia’s EU ac-
cession process (RFE/RL, 2016). This was emphasised in April 2016, when the 
European Parliament called ‘for the results of the population and housing 
census to be published without further delay’ (European Parliament, 2016). 
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The successful completion of the census has been emphasised in the pro-
posed Reform Agenda for 2015 to 2018 by the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2015c) and the importance of the acquis chapter 
on statistics is mentioned in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA), in force since July 2015 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2015). 
The publication of the census data had the potential, furthermore, to attract 
international funding and support (Interview 7: Eurostat official). The ultimate 
reward bestowed by the EU would be acceptance of the Bosnian member-
ship application, giving the EU an additional opportunity to press for the pub-
lication of the census results. The SAA, the Reform Agenda and the member-
ship application itself can thus all be considered as rewards as well as instru-
ments to pressure Bosnia to comply with EU conditions for census-taking.  
The domestic adoption costs for complying with EU census regulations are 
high as well, since the census results can be used to certify the death toll and 
ethnic cleansing during the war (1992–1995) (Interview 4: EU delegation Sara-
jevo official). It was expected that the census outcome might affect the 
political system, which distributes power among the three constituent ethnic 
groups: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs (Armakolas & Maksimovic, 2014; Bieber, 
2004). The government and the parliament are constituted by the three eth-
nic groups and within the parliament there is parity at the state level, based 
on the 1991 population distribution (Bieber, 2004, p. 6). If the census of 2013 
had strongly diverged from the 1991 population numbers, this could have 
sparked debate about the current constitutional design based on the con-
stituent ethnic groups. This increased the political and domestic adoption 
cost for Croatian politicians especially, as it was expected that their numbers 
would have decreased and they might lose the legitimacy of basing their 
power on the constituent group structure. In the end, the overall census 
numbers did not differ much from the 1991 population but still caused de-
bates (Recknagel, 2016). In addition to this, there are concerns that the as-
pect of ‘entity citizenship’, which was included in the census questionnaire, 
could pave the way for a referendum of independence in the RS (Armakolas 
& Maksimovic, 2014; Perry, 2015; Popis, 2013). The RS ‘hopes to “ratify” ethnic 
cleansing through the census and to confirm that the RS is a proto-nation 
state [however] a larger share of non-Serbs would challenge this ambition’ 
(Bieber, 2013). By now a referendum for a Serb national holiday has taken 
place, which is seen as a test run for secession of RS from Bosnia (Deutsche 
Welle, 2016). Overall, there are concerns that the new population data will 
not only be used for socio-economic purposes but misused for political pur-
poses (Interview 4: EU delegation Sarajevo official; Interview 6: Statistical 
Agency official; Interview 8: Statistical Agency official). When the Director of 
the Statistical Agency, Velimir Jukic, announced in May 2016 that the Agen-
cy would publish the census results before the deadline on 1 July 2016, fol-
lowing the EU regulations without consensus among the statistical institutes, 
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the President of the RS, Milorad Dodik, declared that he would refuse to ac-
cept the results (Toe, 2016a). Given that Bosnia published the data one day 
before the deadline of July 1, the balance of the cost/benefit calculation 
ultimately tipped in favour of compliance with the EU census regulations, 
meaning that EU pressure and rewards outweighed the domestic adoption 
costs.  
The debate between the RS and the Statistical Agency is also important 
when looking at the impact of legitimacy. This debate caused the delay in 
data processing, which rested on the definition of ‘place of usual residence’ 
(Interview 4: EU delegation Sarajevo official). Although this is clearly defined 
in the EU regulations, the RS wanted to include an additional question on 
place of work/education, as a control to check whether people actually 
reside in Bosnian territory (Interview 4: EU delegation Sarajevo official; Inter-
view 6: Statistical Agency official; Interview 5: DG NEAR official). The adjusted 
definition shows the intent of the RS to ‘”legalise the ethnic cleansings from 
the 1990s” and create conditions for its separation from the Bosnian state’ 
(Armakolas & Maksimovic, 2014, p. 86). Although fully in line with the IMO 
recommendations (Interview 10: International Census Consultant), the data 
processing was still on hold during the interviews with study informants in 
2015, as the statistical institute of the RS continued to oppose the definition of 
the resident population provided by the EU (Interview 6: Statistical Agency 
official). In brief, the debate demonstrates that the census in Bosnia is con-
tested. Even though in the end the Statistical Agency implemented the EU 
census regulations, the ongoing contestation of the census definitions (Toe, 
2016b) suggests that the instrument of legitimacy is not very strong in Bosnia 
and, as such, cannot be considered an important factor that contributes to 
the publication of the census data. 
5.5.2 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Macedonia had already gathered population data in 1994 and in 2002. The 
1994 census was ‘hotly contested’ (Daskalovski, 2013, p. 8) and observers 
were surprised when they discovered how political the census operation was 
(Friedman, 2002). This was the first census conducted after independence 
from Yugoslavia in 1991. A year before the second census, an armed ethnic 
conflict between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians broke out. This 
was stopped with the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001. The 2002 
census was also disputed by Macedonians, Albanians and other ethnic 
groups, but assessed as fair and accurate by the international community 
(Vrgova, 2015, p. 116). The 2011 census was planned for April, then delayed 
to October (Marusic, 2011c). After the EU delegation in Macedonia had 
warned Eurostat of difficulties with the preparations for the census (Interview 
11: EU Delegation Skopje official), Eurostat set up a light monitoring operation 
after an official request from Macedonia (Everaers, 2015, p. 185). The IMO 
Chapter 5 
102 
started in October 2010 (Interview 9: International Census Consultant). Fol-
lowing the advice of the IMO the census enumeration was delayed, but a 
green light was given for the census data collection in October 2011 (Inter-
view 12: Eurostat official). Nonetheless, the census was stopped due to an 
increase of unreliable census forms, signed by only one of the two enumera-
tors (according to the census law both must sign) and/or applying different 
methodologies (Interview 13: State Statistical Office official). Although the 
2011 census in Macedonia was observed by the IMO, there was no guaran-
tee of reliable population data. The census was officially stopped because 
of the unequal implementation of census methodologies and disagreements 
about counting the diaspora population (European Commission, 2013b, p. 
13; Eurostat, 2014, p. 21).  
With regard to conditionality, there are no concrete EU rewards, nor 
strong EU pressure for complying with the regulations on census-taking, and 
in the overall accession process Macedonia is ‘at an impasse’ (European 
Commission, 2015b, p. 2). Even though Macedonia is already an EU candi-
date country, there are currently no significant developments regarding EU 
accession. The European Commission first recommended opening member-
ship negotiations in 2009 but they still have not been opened. In 2015, the 
recommendation was only extended under the condition that the ‘urgent 
reform priorities’ and the political agreement to overcome the current politi-
cal crisis, following a huge wire-tapping scandal, were implemented 
(Balkans in Europe Policy Group, 2015; European Commission, 2015b, p. 14; 
Marusic, 2016). Therefore, there are neither reliable EU rewards, nor pressure 
from the EU to push for a census complying with the EU census regulations.  
In addition to the lack of EU rewards/pressure, the domestic adoption 
costs for holding a census are high, since in Macedonia (as in Bosnia) the 
political system has institutionalised ethnicity. According to the Ohrid Frame-
work Agreement (OFA), if minorities make up more than 20% of the popula-
tion, language rights as well as the ‘equitable representation of persons […] 
in public bodies at all levels and in other areas of public life’ (OSCE, 2001) 
depend on the population numbers. Following the 2002 census, the only 
minority making up more than 20% of the population is ethnic Albanians 
(Vrgova, 2015, p. 116). Throughout the census process, ethnic Albanians 
wanted to increase their numbers and ethnic Macedonians wanted to de-
crease the numbers of the ethnic Albanians (Marusic, 2011b). In the end, the 
enumeration process was problematic, as different methodologies on how 
to count the resident population circulated and a lot of census question-
naires were signed by only one of the two enumerators (Interview 13: State 
Statistical Office official). These aspects made it impossible to guarantee 
reliable data and when the State Census Commission resigned four days 
before the enumeration was finished, the census operation was cancelled 
(Jordanovski & Dimevski, 2011; Marusic, 2011a). The whole census operation 
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was highly politicised and political representation depended on the census 
outcomes. In this case, the domestic adoption costs clearly outweighed the 
non-existent EU rewards/pressure for complying with the EU census regula-
tions. This indicates that conditionality may have had a strong negative im-
pact on compliance with the EU census regulations.  
When looking at the mechanism of legitimacy, this seems to have only 
limited influence on compliance with the EU rules. The EU census regulations 
were only partially accepted and the reasons for having a census were at 
least in part political rather than socio-economic. As described above, the 
OFA clearly sets a threshold of 20% for the official use of other languages, but 
also proportional representation in the public bodies depends on the popu-
lation numbers (Brunnbauer, 2002, p. 5; OSCE, 2001; Vasilev, 2013). In 2010, a 
year before the census enumeration started, politicians proclaimed that they 
would not accept the census methodology (Interview 2: OSCE official). This 
debate was also visible when the State Census Commission, which consisted 
of 25 members ‘appointed by the Government of the Republic of Macedo-
nia’ (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2010, p. 15), influenced 
the census operation, to such an extent that they tried to impose different 
methodologies on how to count the diaspora population. The State Census 
Commission was responsible for appointing half the regional instructors; the 
other half would be appointed by public announcement (Republic of 
Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2010, p. 17). This arrangement led to diffi-
culties and delays in hiring sufficient enumerators; when the enumeration 
started, in some areas there was a lack of well-trained enumerators and 
staff, which delayed the enumeration (Interview 13: State Statistical Office 
official). Three days before the enumeration started, the representative of 
the Albanian Party Democratic Union for Integration still wanted to include 
the diaspora population in the population count. When this request was not 
accepted, since it was not in line with the Eurostat recommendations, he 
and another Albanian representative resigned from the State Census Com-
mission (Jordanovski & Dimevski, 2011; Marusic, 2011b). Despite recurring 
disputes about the census methodology and difficulties with hiring staff, Euro-
stat confirmed that the State Statistical Office was technically ready for the 
census operation (Interview 12: Eurostat official). Overall, the methodology 
and the questionnaire were described as being in line with the EU census 
regulations (Interview 13: State Statistical Office official). Nonetheless, the 
census was captured by political forces trying to influence the population 
count to increase ethnic numbers (Interview 11: EU Delegation Skopje offi-
cial; Interview 2: OSCE official). Even though the EU census regulations were 
accepted by the State Statistical Office, there was a strong contestation of 
the 2011 census, which shows a low level of legitimacy. 
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5.5.3 Croatia 
Croatia’s separation from Yugoslavia in 1991 was followed by violent conflict 
(1991–1995). As a result of this conflict, the country is ethnically relatively ho-
mogeneous, with Serbs as the biggest minority ethnic group with 186,633 
people or about 4% of the population (Hoh, 2015, p. 78). The census in 2011 
was Croatia’s second since independence, and was conducted without 
any major problems (Hoh, 2015). The 2001 census, according to the Europe-
an Commission, was ‘in line with the UNECE/Eurostat recommendations for 
the 2000 censuses of population and housing in the ECE region’ (European 
Commission, 2006, p. 9). The costs for the census were calculated up front 
and addressed in the census law. A census budget of 21 million EUR was 
calculated, but in the end the approximate costs were only about 16 million 
EUR (Eurostat, 2014). Unlike in Bosnia, the costs were all covered by the Croa-
tian government. Only one small part of the Post Enumeration Survey was 
covered by the EU through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(Eurostat, 2014, p. 10). There was a delay concerning the publication of the 
census data (Pavelic, 2012), which was caused due to difficulties in hiring 
staff. The government did not allow the Statistical Office to hire the best cen-
sus enumerators for the data processing phase; instead the Statistical Office 
had to hire people who had been unemployed for a long period (Interview 
1: Croatian Bureau of Statistics official). The census results were finally pub-
lished on 8 November 2013 (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Today, the 
census data of Croatia is part of the Eurostat census hub, which can be con-
sidered as a sign of the high quality of the data.  
With regard to conditionality, back in 2007 the Croatian population statis-
tics were regarded as being compliant with the acquis (European 
Commission, 2007, p. 7). In the year of the 2011 census, Croatia also con-
cluded its accession negotiations (Elbasani, 2013a, p. 5). Actually, the chap-
ter on statistics had already been closed in October 2009, before the census 
law was finalised. Therefore the 2011 census was not followed as closely by 
the EU as, for example, the Bosnian census (Interview 14: DG NEAR official). 
Since Croatia had already demonstrated its ability to conduct a census, it 
was expected that it could do so again (Interview 14: DG NEAR official). In 
the end, the 2011 census was described as ‘harmonised with international 
standards […] in order to provide the international comparability of data’ 
(Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2011, p. 8). Bearing in mind that by the time of 
the census the acquis chapter on statistics was already closed, it was ex-
pected that Croatia would comply with the EU census regulations. Thus the 
census did not form a subject of the accession negotiations and because of 
this EU rewards and pressure can be considered low. 
As political representation in Croatia depends to a lesser extent on the 
census outcomes, the domestic adoption costs for complying with the EU 
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census regulations were not as high as in Bosnia or Macedonia. Even though 
rights for minorities in Croatia also depend on the population numbers, the 
numerical threshold of 1.5% to guarantee representative seats for minorities 
(Petričušić, 2002; Tatalović, 2006, p. 55) is much lower than the 20% threshold 
in Macedonia. In addition, between 1991 and 2001 the share of ethnic mi-
norities decreased by 50% (Tatalović, 2006), with the result that Croatia is 
ethnically more homogeneous than Bosnia or Macedonia. Therefore, the 
domestic adoption costs were low and even though the rewards for comply-
ing with the EU conditions were low as well, Croatia was compliant. Condi-
tionality therefore does not provide a firm explanation for Croatia’s full com-
pliance with the EU census regulations.  
The impact of legitimacy was by contrast very high. Despite the lack of EU 
rewards, Croatia implemented the EU census regulations before it was a 
member of the European Union. The EU census regulation (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008), together with the CES 
recommendations, are mentioned as two of the most important documents 
for international standards on the website of the Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2011, p. 9). The enumeration process was 
‘carried out successfully and according to international standards in April 
2011’ (European Commission, 2011a, p. 40). As mentioned above in relation 
to conditionality, Croatia had a proven ability to conduct a census (Inter-
view 14: DG NEAR official). The CBS was very firm on using the international 
definitions, for example for the category of ‘place of usual residence’—this, 
in spite of concern by demographers and politicians, who wanted to keep 
the former definitions in order to compare the data over time or wanted to 
include the diaspora (Interview 1: Croatian Bureau of Statistics official). There 
was no public/political debate on the census and thus the Croatian census 
can be regarded as not contested. After the results were published, the po-
tential introduction of the Cyrillic script, used by the Serb minority, in about 20 
municipalities sparked protests (Pavelic, 2013, 2014). However, the census 
itself was not contested and there were no big gains or losses for political 
parties with regard to ethnic proportional representation after the census. 
The lack of contestation and the CBS acceptance of the EU census regula-
tions show that in the case of Croatia the impact of legitimacy is much 
stronger than the impact of conditionality. 
5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter assessed the effectiveness of the Europeanisation mechanisms 
of conditionality and legitimacy on the compliance of Croatia, Bosnia and 
Macedonia with the EU census regulations. The cases of Bosnia and Mace-
donia show that the impact of the domestic adoption costs on the mecha-
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nism of conditionality should be taken seriously, and that these costs can 
even influence the mechanism of legitimacy. High domestic adoption costs 
in Bosnia and in Macedonia contributed to debates and contestation of the 
EU census regulations and resulted in a low level of legitimacy in these cases. 
In Bosnia, EU rewards and pressure were much higher than for Macedonia 
and this tipped the balance of the cost/benefit calculation in favour of 
complying with the EU census regulations. Whereas in the case of Bosnia the 
empirical findings suggest a strong influence of the mechanism of condition-
ality on compliance with the EU census regulation, legitimacy can provide a 
further explanation for the delay of the census operation. In Croatia, the 
mechanism of conditionality cannot explain compliance with the EU census 
regulations, as although the domestic costs were rather limited, Croatia did 
not benefit from EU rewards. In the case of Croatia, however, the empirical 
findings show that legitimacy can have a strong positive impact on compli-
ance with the EU regulations. The noncompliance of Macedonia, as evi-
dence shows, can be explained by either conditionality, as domestic adop-
tion costs outweighed EU rewards and pressure, or legitimacy, since there 
was strong contestation of the EU census regulation. The mechanism of legit-
imacy can explain the cases of Croatia and Macedonia. It might not pro-
vide strong explanations in Bosnia, but even in this case it provides insights as 
to why the census process was delayed. Therefore, this research confirms 
earlier studies which concluded that conditionality alone cannot fully explain 
compliance with the EU rules. In order to understand fully the influence of the 
EU on its enlargement countries, both mechanisms need to be considered. 
Due to the variation these cases show, it is not possible to generalise how 
these mechanisms would affect the other countries in the Western Balkans. 
This thesis focuses on the Europeanisation mechanisms, but further research 
could address the role of other domestic factors such as domestic veto 
players, and the inclusion of sensitive data on ethnicity, language and reli-
gion in the census questionnaire. 
Nonetheless, this analysis does demonstrate that when the political repre-
sentation and/or rights depend on the population numbers, census-taking is 
connected to the Copenhagen Criteria, in particular minority rights and 
democratic conditionality. This is not only important for the Western Balkans 
but can be crucial in other countries where aspects of ethnicity/identity are 
connected to census data (see also Simon, 2011), such as Spain (Urla, 1993). 
This research has shown that acquis conditionality is not only a technical 
exercise but is in fact highly political, and that, especially with regard to cen-
sus-taking, this aspect should not be underestimated.  
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Abstract  
Limited statehood has been identified as an obstacle for integration of the 
Western Balkan countries. Even though enlargement countries are all re-
quired to comply with the same conditions, they show significant variation. 
This chapter contributes to the debate on whether it is institutional factors or 
the agency of actors that matter most in Europeanisation processes. The 
analysis shows that state capacity is insufficient in explaining the variation in 
census outcomes, and that the influence of external actors can potentially 
be very strong. The influence of domestic actors is in general underestimated 
and can be of crucial importance.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Since 2003 the Western Balkan countries have been on the path towards 
becoming EU member states. Although there is talk of ‘enlargement fatigue’ 
and the future of EU enlargement seems insecure, EU Commissioner for en-
largement Johannes Hahn recently gave the assurance that all Western 
Balkan countries should sooner or later become EU member states (Ladurner, 
2017). Currently these countries are in very different stages of the EU en-
largement process and are moving at different speeds toward EU member-
ship. Croatia received membership in 2013; Serbia and Montenegro have 
started membership negotiations; Macedonia and Albania are official can-
didate countries, without having started membership negotiations; and final-
ly, Bosnia submitted its membership application in February 2016 but is still, 
like Kosovo, regarded as a potential candidate. 
The process of EU enlargement rests upon the principle of conditionality, 
where EU rewards are conditional upon the countries’ compliance with EU 
conditions (Bieber, 2011; Elbasani, 2013a). The EU conditions for membership 
consist of the Copenhagen Criteria, which lay out the key factors for com-
pliance, such as democracy and a functioning market economy, and the 
acquis communautaire, the enforcement of all current EU rules (European 
Commission, 2014b). One of the preconditions for EU membership is the pop-
ulation and housing census (hereafter census), which is part of the 18th ac-
quis chapter on statistics. In essence, a census is an approximately decennial 
population count in a country; nonetheless, census-taking can be highly 
political, especially if the census outcomes are connected with proportional 
representation as in the Western Balkans. As accession countries, the Western 
Balkan countries are strongly recommended to follow the EU census regula-
tions, but there have been different outcomes with regard to the population 
census—ranging from successful (Croatia, Serbia) to long delayed and/or 
partly boycotted (Bosnia and Kosovo) to aborted (Macedonia). Census da-
ta is used as the backbone of national statistics, but increasingly also on the 
EU level as the EU needs harmonised statistical data for evidence-based 
decision making (Everaers, 2015).  
Vachudova (2014) argues that the EU continues to have an effect on the 
democratisation processes in the Western Balkans. However, according to 
Mendelski (2013, p. 101), the transformative power of the EU is weaker than 
sometimes assumed by Europeanisation research. Recent research (Börzel, 
2013; Elbasani, 2013a, p. 6) suggests that limited statehood—the lack of 
structures to enable the execution of EU rules—is one of the main obstacles 
for the Western Balkans’ compliance with EU regulations. While much re-
search has been done on the EU’s enlargement strategy (Börzel & 
Schimmelfennig, 2017; Keil, 2013b; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2006), little 
research has been conducted to analyse the agency that influences EU 
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integration and census-taking processes. Within the literature on state-
building, institutional factors (such as state capacity but also the agency of 
actors, both domestic and external) are mentioned as potential capacity 
builders (Risse, 2011; Schneckener, 2011). This chapter will therefore answer 
the following research question: How important are state capacity and do-
mestic and external actors, for compliance with the EU census regulations in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia? The chapter argues that state capacity 
cannot fully explain the variation in census-taking outcomes. The analysis 
shows that the influence of external actors, in this case the EU, potentially 
can be very strong. More importantly, the influence of domestic actors is in 
general underestimated and can be of crucial importance.  
State capacity will be assessed by comparing the World Bank Govern-
ance Indicators over the period of the 2010 census round, which spans the 
period 2005–2014 (United Nations Statistics Division, 2013). In order to analyse 
the influence of domestic and external actors, data from in-depth interviews 
and newspaper articles will be used.  
6.2 Census-taking in the Western Balkans 
Census-taking is bound up with the formation of states (Curtis, 2001, p. 3) and 
is inherently political. Historically, census data has been used for colonial 
domination (Anderson, 2006, pp. 163–164), to conscript citizens into military 
service, and to ensure payment of taxes (Nobles, 2000, p. 3). Statistics are 
seen as a description of the state, ‘by and for itself’ (Desrosières, 1998, p. 
147), as they provide the state with an overview of its population, which is 
used not only to oversee and conscribe its citizens, but also serves them 
through (for example) the distribution of subsidies and policy-making. Since 
‘census making is itself a practice of state formation, an assertion of sover-
eign authority over people and social relations’ (Curtis, 2001, p. 36),27 the 
process of census-taking is closely connected to state institutions. For exam-
ple, Lee and Zhang (2017) measured the legibility of a state by looking at its 
population census. In this chapter, however, it will be tested whether state 
capacity, but also the influence of domestic and external actors, can ex-
plain the variation in the outcomes in census-taking in the Western Balkans. 
Since all Western Balkan countries are considered future EU member 
states, they are expected to meet EU standards for statistical data. The EU 
uses the population data for evidence-based decision making. Pieter 
Everaers, Director of the Department for Cooperation in the European Statis-
                                                        
27 According to Curtis (2001, p. 33), censuses are made and not taken, because they ‘do not 
simply report aspects of social relations existing [. . .]. Rather, census making configures social 
relations in keeping with particular political and cultural objectives and interests in order that such 
relations may be known and governed’. 
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tical System at Eurostat, the statistical agency of the EU, describes evidence-
based decision-making as “an important cornerstone of European society” 
(Everaers, 2015, p. 185). In order to comply with the EU census regulations, 
(future) member states need to follow the EU regulation for census-taking 
(European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008). Even though 
enlargement countries have the same EU conditions to follow, their last cen-
suses had very different outcomes and consequently the EU has increased its 
attention to the population census in its enlargement countries. 
To analyse the compliance of enlargement countries with the EU census 
regulation, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia have been chosen as case 
countries. Besides the fact that all of these countries are considered (or in the 
case of Croatia, are) EU members, they also share a similar history with re-
gard to census-taking, since before its breakdown they all were part of Yu-
goslavia where the last census took place in 1991. Nonetheless, there is a 
strong variation in census outcomes: Croatia had a relatively successful cen-
sus in 2011; the 2013 census in Bosnia was marked by serious delays and the 
data was published only in 2016; and the 2011 census in Macedonia was 
aborted a couple of days into the enumeration process.  
6.3 State capacity and census-taking 
Academic literature has addressed the enlargement process of the Western 
Balkans from the Europeanisation perspective (Aybet & Bieber, 2011; Bieber, 
2011; Elbasani, 2013a; Keil, 2013a; and Chapter 4 of this thesis). Scholars 
(Denti, 2014; Keil, 2013a) also use the term ‘EU member state building’, be-
cause the EU has tried to build functional states as well as to integrate them. 
This approach creates a paradox, as on the one hand the process of state-
building aims at sovereign states, whereas on the other hand, the integration 
process also undermines the sovereignty of the new states (Chandler, 2010; 
Juncos, 2012; Woelk, 2013). According to Krasner (2001, pp. 7–12) there are 
four aspects of sovereignty that can be problematic: (1) Interdependence 
sovereignty, the ability of a state to control trans-border activities; (2) domes-
tic sovereignty, the effective control of state territory; (3) international legal 
sovereignty, which is whether or not a state is internationally recognised; and 
(4) Westphalian sovereignty, whether states have autonomous governing 
structures. Papadimitriou and Petrov (2012, p. 749) have identified Kosovo’s 
sovereignty as problematic on more than one of the aspects of Krasner’s 
typology. This is also the case when looking at the minimalist state of Bosnia 
(Bieber, 2011). Limited statehood has been identified as an obstacle for and 
a missing link in the EU integration process of the Western Balkans (Börzel, 
2013; Elbasani, 2013a). In areas of limited statehood, international sovereign-
ty is intact, but domestic sovereignty, the effective control of state territory, is 
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missing (Risse, 2011, p. 2). According to Börzel and Risse (2011b, p. 201), states 
with limited statehood are unlikely to comply with rules from supranational 
institutions, ‘simply because they lack the enforcement capacity to imple-
ment these policies’.  
Within the broader concept of governance—‘the institutionalised modes 
of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, 
or to provide public goods’ (Risse, 2011, p. 9)—this chapter will look at the 
capacity of a state to penetrate society and extract resources (Migdal, 
1988, p. 8). In order to assess the state capacity of the case countries, the 
study makes use of the World Bank Governance (WBG) indicators, selecting 
four of the indicators as appropriate to measure state capacity.28 ‘Govern-
ment effectiveness’ is the first of these, and measures the quality and inde-
pendence of the public and civil service, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of a government’s commitment to 
such policies (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). Second, the indicator for ‘regula-
tory quality’ measures the ability of a government to formulate and imple-
ment policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector devel-
opment (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). The third indicator, ‘control of corrup-
tion’, assesses the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain 
and whether a state is ‘captured’ by private interests (Kaufmann et al., 2010, 
p. 4). The fourth is ‘political stability’, which measures the likelihood of the 
government being destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional means 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4).  
                                                        
28 Fukuyama (2013, pp. 348–349) identified these four indicators to measure state capacity. The 
other two WBG indicators were not selected, because within the broader framework of govern-
ance the focus remains on structural and process dimensions (Risse, 2011, p. 9), rather than citizen 
participation (which is covered by the indicator ‘voice and accountability’) or confidence in the 
rules of the society (which is measured by the indicator for ‘rule of law’) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2010). It should be noted that although there is debate about whether or not these are 
the right measurements for state capacity (Fukuyama, 2013; Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert, 2016; 
Skocpol, 1985, p. 28), this thesis does not take into account potential alternatives (Holt & 
Manning, 2014) as these are still the measurements most often used for state capacity (for 
example by Börzel & Schimmelfennig, 2017; Mendelski, 2013; Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012) 
and most of the critique on the WBG indicators has been refuted by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2007).  
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Figure 5: Average sum of Indicators for State Capacity (Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Political Stability, and Control of Corruption) for 2004–2015 
 
Figure 5 shows an average score of all four indicators29 for the Western Bal-
kan countries, but also for EU members Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
neighbouring Turkey, in order to provide a bigger picture of the region in-
cluding countries that are already EU members. Looking at the comparison 
of these indicators, one can see that Croatia scores best overall among the 
case countries; only Slovenia’s scores are better. Notably, Croatia’s scores 
are superior to those of Romania and Bulgaria. In the region, the lack of state 
capacity manifests also in the contestations of geographical borders and 
political authority (Börzel, 2013, p. 178). Serbia and Croatia are regarded as 
consolidated (Börzel, 2013, p. 179), but other countries in the region, such as 
Bosnia and Kosovo, are still seen as unconsolidated states with weak capaci-
ty. Macedonia’s scores were rather negative in the beginning (with -0.52 in 
2005), but since then have slowly increased (to 0.24 in 2014) albeit with a 
                                                        
29 These scores can range from ‐2.5 to 2.5. The correlation between these indicators for the three 
case countries was strong and significant at the 0.01 level and therefore the average score of the 
indicators is presented in one figure. The individual scores of the indicators for state capacity 
(government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability and control for corruption) for the 
case countries Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia can be found in Table 12 in Appendix 6.  
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slight drop in 2015 (when the average score was 0.06). Bosnia’s scores for all 
years are below 0, and this country showed the worst scores overall for state 
capacity (with only Kosovo scoring worse, between 2010 and 2014).30  
When comparing the average scores of the indicators with the census 
outcomes of the 2010 census round,31 state capacity alone does not explain 
the variation in census outcomes. Croatia has, compared to the other West-
ern Balkan countries, the highest average score for state capacity and also 
conducted a complete census in 2011. The Croatian census data was har-
monised with international standards (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2011) 
and there were no major irregularities during the census process. Since the 
data is also part of the European census hub,32 the Croatian census can be 
regarded as fully compliant with the EU census regulations. Regarding Croa-
tia’s high scores for state capacity this is not very surprising. However, when 
we compare the census outcomes of Macedonia and Bosnia with their state 
capacity scores we see a different picture. Considering the state capacity 
scores, from 2010 onwards the only country with worse scores than Bosnia is 
Kosovo. Bosnia started the census process in 2008, but was only able to con-
duct the census in 2013. The data processing was delayed, but in the end 
the data was published in June 2016. Although there were some deviations, 
Eurostat declared the census data valid and observed that ‘the entire pro-
cess was conducted in compliance with international standards’ (Croatian 
News Agency, 2016). In line with the conclusion that Bosnia’s census was 
eventually compliant with international standards, it will be regarded as de-
layed compliance with EU census regulations, because of the hold-up and 
the disagreements regarding data processing. Macedonia, which com-
pared to Croatia and Bosnia has a medium average score on state capaci-
ty indicators, in theory should have the capacity to conduct a census. Cer-
tainly, the process of census-taking should have been smoother than in Bos-
nia. Nonetheless Macedonia’s 2011 census was stopped a couple of days 
                                                        
30 These scores are also mirrored in the EU progress reports. Whereas Croatia met the political 
criteria of the EU in 2011, ‘core challenges’ were mentioned with regard to the political criteria in 
Macedonia (European Commission, 2011b, p. 38). In 2011, Bosnia was described as making only 
‘limited progress’ in meeting the political criteria (European Commission, 2011b, p. 58). In 2014 
Bosnia was described as ‘once again’ making ‘very limited progress’ (European Commission, 
2014a, p. 1). Comparing these measures to the 2017 Freedom House report (Freedom House, 
2017), Croatia managed to retain its status as ‘free’ in 2017, although its 2016 Freedom of the 
Press status was assessed as only ‘partly free’. Macedonia and Bosnia retained their ‘partly free’ 
status; whereas Bosnia’s Freedom of Press status in 2016 was marked as ‘partly free’, Macedonia’s 
press was ‘not free’ in 2016. 
31 The 2010 census round includes all censuses collected between 2005 and 2014 (United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2013). Within the EU, the reference year for the census was 2011 (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2008). 
32 The census hub (European Statistical System, n.d.) is created by the European Statistical System 
to disseminate the population data of all member states. Initially it was also the plan to include 
enlargement countries, but this did not work out.  
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into the enumeration process. Because the Macedonian census was abort-
ed, it will be regarded as non-compliant with the EU census regulations.  
Even though consolidated statehood has been described as a precondi-
tion for advancing EU membership negotiations (Börzel, 2013, p. 180), this 
analysis shows that state capacity is insufficient in explaining the variation in 
census outcomes and compliance with the EU census regulations. Therefore, 
next to this institutional factor, the influence of domestic and external actors 
will be assessed in the next sections.  
6.4 Domestic and external actors 
Following Migdal (1988, p. 19), the state’s leadership has the power to make 
and implement rules, as well as the power to create the parameters for rule 
making. Local agency is a factor often hidden or unrecognised in peace-
building processes. However, local agency is a great resource for sustaining 
peace in the long term (Chandler, 2013; Qehaja & Prezelj, 2017). Peace-
building processes are closely connected with state-building (Barnett & 
Zürcher, 2008). Usually local agency is perceived in terms of veto players, 
where actors either accept or hinder the implementation of EU regulations 
depending on potential gains and losses (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 
2004, pp. 666–667). In the accession process for Central and Eastern Europe 
countries the influence of veto players was considered small 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 667), whereas in the Western Balkans 
political actors are important when looking at the divergent compliance 
responses (Noutcheva, 2009). Domestic strategies of ethnic and economic 
clientelism can hinder EU conditionality and capacity-building (Börzel, 2013, 
p. 182). Census outcomes are connected to political representation and 
minority rights via numerical thresholds, potentially increasing the adoption 
costs to domestic political elites to such an extent that they prefer to opt for 
noncompliance. Such is the situation in the three case countries (see also 
Chapter 3 of this thesis). In Croatia, minority rights depend on the census 
data. In Bosnia, parliamentary representation of the constituent groups is 
based on the census outcomes of 1991 (Bieber, 2004, p. 6), and in Macedo-
nia the Ohrid Framework Agreement guarantees language rights to minori-
ties making up more than 20% of the population. Therefore, alongside the 
aspect of state capacity, the interest of the domestic actors in the census, 
and in complying or not with the EU census regulations, becomes important 
for the analysis.  
With regard to the census, the domestic actors taken into account for the 
analysis are the National Statistical Institutes and domestic politicians. Census 
bureaus, which are embedded in the National Statistical Institutes, are not 
only simple producers of statistical data, as they are involved in the process 
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of categorising they are political actors (Nobles, 2000, p.1). Domestic politi-
cians are relevant as their influence can either support or hinder the census 
process. Their willingness to comply with the EU census regulations is of high 
importance, as will be shown by the examples of Macedonia and Bosnia. 
The influence of the domestic actors is assessed by in-depth interview data 
and contextualised with official documents and newspaper articles.  
In addition to the influence of domestic actors, external actors, in this 
case the EU, can also influence the census processes and compliance. In 
countries with contested statehood, such as Kosovo or Bosnia, external ac-
tors can exercise authority (Börzel, 2013, p. 182; Krasner & Risse, 2014). Even 
though there is critique on the EU’s approach to member state building, the 
EU has been described as the most important external actor in the Western 
Balkans (Vachudova, 2015, p. 522). All of the Western Balkan countries have 
been part of a series of technical cooperation meetings led by Eurostat 
(Everaers, 2015, p. 185) to assist and prepare the accession countries for EU 
integration and if needed to help them with (for example) the population 
census. The censuses in Macedonia in 2011, as well as in Bosnia in 2013, were 
observed by International Monitoring Operations (IMOs) led by Eurostat. In 
the event that a country requests a monitoring mission, it depends on this 
mission to guarantee ‘fair and transparent census-taking’ (Everaers, 2015, p. 
185) and therewith legitimise the census results. This already shows that these 
countries do not have the capacities to conduct the census on their own. 
Since the EU is a very important actor in the Western Balkans, its influence as 
an external actor will be taken into account in the analysis.  
The influence of the EU as external actor will also be analysed through in-
depth interview data, as well as official documents.  
6.5 Case analyses 
6.5.1 Croatia 
The 2011 census in Croatia took place in April 2011. Looking first at the actors 
involved in the census-taking process, responsibilities concerning the Croa-
tian census are outlined in the country’s census law (Croatian Parliament, 
2010). The main responsibility lies with the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
(Croatian Parliament, 2010). Five other institutions (the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and European Integrations, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of De-
fence, the Ministry of Justice and the State Geodetic Administration) are 
designated in the census law to help within their area of competence, and 
their tasks are clearly outlined (Croatian Parliament, 2010). The CBS relied on 
the infrastructure of these institutions to conduct the census, but the census 
was otherwise not influenced by them (Interview 1: Croatian Bureau of Statis-
tics official). There were no difficulties regarding the outline of the census law 
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or the enumeration process. Some local politicians, academics and demog-
raphers wanted to keep the former definitions of the census categories, but 
the CBS insisted on adjusting these definitions in line with the EU census regu-
lations (Interview 1: Croatian Bureau of Statistics official). After the data col-
lection process, the government prohibited the CBS from hiring the best cen-
sus enumerators for the data processing; instead they were to hire people 
who had been unemployed for a longer period (Interview 1: Croatian Bu-
reau of Statistics official). The director of the CBS, Ivan Kovac, blamed the 
Croatian government for not allowing the CBS to hire additional administra-
tive staff to process the data in a more timely manner (Pavelic, 2012). This 
caused delays in the processing of the census data; however this was not as 
serious as in for example Bosnia. The Croatian census data was published in 
November 2013 (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). The Serbian National 
Council, the local authority of the ethnic Serbs in Croatia, was very critical of 
the census and mentioned ‘serious irregularities’ in the census process 
(Pavelic, 2012). In Croatia, minority rights depend on the census outcomes 
(Petričušić, 2002), therefore ethnic minorities have an increased interest in 
the census. Overall, the census process in Croatia was not significantly af-
fected by domestic actors and there were not many reports of irregularities 
during the census process. After the census results were published, however, 
there were protests by Croatian war veterans, as in some areas the Serb mi-
nority had gained rights to use the Cyrillic alphabet in public places (Pavelic, 
2013, 2014). The protesters even called for a referendum to change the rights 
of minorities, but they were not successful (Pavelic, 2014). Thus, while domes-
tic actors were interested in the census, they did not influence the census 
process. In sum, as mentioned above, the Croatian census complied with EU 
census regulations.  
With regard to external actors, there was little to no influence, apart from 
the technical cooperation meetings organized by Eurostat for the whole 
region of the Western Balkans (Everaers, 2015, p. 185). In these meetings the 
national census experts exchanged best practices among themselves and 
with the European Commission in order to harmonise their data collection. All 
Western Balkan countries participated in these meetings and therefore all of 
them had the same influence. However, in contrast to Macedonia and Bos-
nia there was no IMO mission in Croatia. Also, with regard to finances the 
census was independent of external actors. The whole operation was fi-
nanced by Croatia. The census budget of 21 million EUR was already estab-
lished in the census law (Croatian Parliament, 2010) and in the end the cen-
sus costs were estimated much lower, at about 16 million EUR (Eurostat, 
2014). Thus, the influence of external actors on the 2011 census in Croatia 
can be considered as low.  
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6.5.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In Bosnia, the State Statistical Agency (SSA) conducted the census together 
with the statistical agencies of the federations of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Republika Srpska (RS). The census process started in 2008. The census 
law however was only adopted in 2012. The enumeration process was initial-
ly planned for April 2013, but was then delayed until October. Officially the 
census was in line with the international standards (Durr et al., 2013), but 
there were reports of irregularities (Perry, 2013). The 2013 census was the first 
census in independent Bosnia, and because of this there was substantial 
concern already before the census. It was expected that the census data 
could be used to certify the death toll and ethnic cleansing of the war 
(1992–1995) (Interview 4: EU delegation Sarajevo official). Another concern 
was the inclusion of the census question on ‘entity citizenship’, which could 
pave the way for a referendum on the independence of the RS (Armakolas 
& Maksimovic, 2014; Perry, 2015; Popis, 2013). The adjusted definition of place 
of usual residence was perceived by the Bosniak diaspora as intent of the RS 
to ‘”legalise the ethnic cleansings from the 1990s” and to create conditions 
for its separation from the Bosnian state’ (Armakolas & Maksimovic, 2014, p. 
86). Because of the continued disagreement on the definition of ‘place of 
usual residence’, the data processing was on hold from February 2015 until 
June 2016 (Interview 8: Statistical Agency official). Although there is a clear 
definition of this category in the EU census regulations, the RS wanted to in-
clude the aspect of place of work/education, to control whether people 
actually reside in Bosnian territory (Interview 4: EU delegation Sarajevo offi-
cial; Interview 6: Statistical Agency official; Interview 14: DG NEAR official). 
The Statistical Institute of the Republika Srpska was very critical of the ap-
proach of the Statistical Agency and the IMO mission, and even published 
an open book of 72 pages (Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics, 2016) to 
explain why they do not accept the census results. The Statistical Institute of 
the Republika Srpska wants to include the extra question to control whether 
people actually reside in Bosnia (Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics, 2016). 
They are convinced that there is an overcount of about 400,000 people and 
that the census ‘cannot be verified as fair or unbiased’ (Republika Srpska 
Institute of Statistics, 2016, p. 3). In May 2016, the Director of the Statistical 
Agency, Velimir Jukic, announced that the census results would be pub-
lished before the deadline set by the EU, which was 1 July 2016. Therewith 
the data was published in line with the EU census regulations, but without 
consensus among the statistical institutes, since the Statistical Institute of the 
Republika Srpska did and still does not agree with the definitions handled by 
Eurostat. In the end, then, the Statistical Agency and its Director decided to 
publish the census data, even though the president of the RS, Milorad Dodik, 
declared that he will not accept the results (Toe, 2016a). This shows that in 
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Bosnia the domestic actors pursue different interests when it comes to the 
census.  
When looking at the external actors in Bosnia, one must acknowledge 
that the EU played an important role. From the beginning on, the EU delega-
tion in Sarajevo was strongly committed to the census (Interview 4: EU Dele-
gation Sarajevo official). Also with regard to finances the external influence 
of the EU on the census in Bosnia was rather high, as the EU financed more 
than 50% of the census costs: the total cost of the census was approximately 
23 million EUR (Eurostat, 2014), of which more than 13 million was paid by the 
EU (Interview 4: EU Delegation Sarajevo official). In addition, the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation contributed about 1.85 million EUR 
to the census via the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (AAM 
Consulting, 2013; Eurostat, 2014). As another external influence, the census 
was observed by an IMO mission. This IMO had 23 missions and consisted of 
six experts.33 The IMO started shortly after the adoption of the census law in 
April 2012. Since Bosnia submitted its membership application in February 
2016, the EU was able to push for the publication of the census data, by 
making this one of the preconditions for the accession process (RFE/RL, 
2016). This was also emphasised by the European Parliament in April 2016 
(European Parliament, 2016), the Reform Agenda published in 2015 
(European Commission, 2015c) and the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA), which entered into force in July 2015 (Official Journal of 
the European Union, 2015). By declaring the published population data valid 
and in line with the international standards, Eurostat also legitimises the data. 
Thus the EU was able to influence the census, not only via direct involvement 
through the IMO and Eurostat, but also via external pressure through the 
enlargement process. Nevertheless even the IMO did not succeed in ensur-
ing full acceptance of the census data, since the RS still does not recognize 
the results and questions their reliability (Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics, 
2016). 
6.5.3 Macedonia 
Like in Bosnia, the census in Macedonia was highly politicised. This was main-
ly because the census outcome is connected to proportional representation. 
Due to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, minorities making up more than 
20% of the population receive language rights and proportional representa-
tion in the police and bureaucracy (Brunnbauer, 2002, p. 5). The only ethnic 
minority meeting this threshold is the ethnic Albanians. Therefore political 
groups, which are mostly structured along ethnic lines, were very interested 
in the census numbers. For example, Albanian political parties wanted to 
                                                        
33 The IMO reports can be accessed at http://www.bhas.ba/census/.  
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move the census date to July in order enable expatriates to participate in 
the census (Lutovska, 2010; Vrgova, 2015, p. 117). 
In Macedonia, the National Statistical Institute and the State Statistical Of-
fice conducted the census together with the State Census Commission, 
which consisted of 25 members and was appointed by the government 
(Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2010). The State Census 
Commission had a multi-ethnic make-up based on the data from the 2002 
census (Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2010, p. 15). The cen-
sus was planned for April, but in the end took place in October 2011. How-
ever, there were still debates, for example within the State Census Commis-
sion about the census methodology and especially the definition of ‘place 
of usual residence’ and the question of whether or not to include the diaspo-
ra in the total population count. In addition there were difficulties between 
the State Census Commission and the State Statistical Office. The State Cen-
sus Commission was responsible for appointing half of the regional instructors 
(Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, 2010, p. 17). However, when 
the enumeration started there was a lack of enumerators, which in some 
areas delayed the process (Interview 13: State Statistical Office official). 
Three days before the start of the enumeration, the representative of the 
Albanian Party Democratic Union for Integration still wanted to include the 
diaspora population in the population count. When this was not accepted 
he and another Albanian representative resigned from the State Census 
Commission (Jordanovski & Dimevski, 2011; Marusic, 2011b). The census 
enumeration still started, however different methodological approaches and 
definitions were spread and troubled the collection of the census data. The 
enumeration process was stopped, because too many forms came in signed 
by only one of the two enumerators (under law the form had to be signed by 
both enumerators), and the collection of reliable population data could not 
be guaranteed (Interview 13: State Statistical Office official). From the be-
ginning there was a lot of domestic interest in the census process. One year 
before the census took place, some politicians already proclaimed that they 
would not accept the census results (Interview 2: OSCE official). In the end 
the unwillingness of domestic actors to accept the international census regu-
lations—and definition for place of usual residence in particular—made a 
reliable population count impossible.  
The EU delegation in Skopje had warned Eurostat of difficulties in the cen-
sus preparations (Interview 9: EU Delegation Skopje official). After Macedo-
nia requested the IMO, it was set up as a ‘light’ mission in October 2010 
(Everaers, 2015, p. 185; also confirmed by Interview 9: International Census 
Consultant). Compared to the IMO mission with Bosnia, the one in Macedo-
nia was rather short, with only five or six meetings and two experts. Beyond 
this ‘light’ monitoring mission, Macedonia did not receive much external 
support. For example, it did not have any international financial help 
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(Eurostat, 2014) and since the enlargement process is at a standstill, the EU 
cannot pressure the country to comply with the EU census regulations via 
other means. The OSCE in Skopje, as well as the EU delegation in Skopje, 
criticized Eurostat and the IMO for underestimating the difficulties and politi-
cal climate of the census (Interview 2: OSCE official; Interview 11: EU Delega-
tion Skopje official). The census was aborted, because domestic actors from 
the State Census Commission, as well as politicians, disagreed over rules on 
how to collect the population data. Unlike in Bosnia, where the EU could use 
the enlargement process to press for the population data, in Macedonia it 
had only limited abilities, which were not sufficient to overcome the domes-
tic problems.  
6.6 Comparison 
When comparing the three cases (Table 10) and their scores for state ca-
pacity, only Croatia shows a good score. Macedonia and Bosnia both have 
rather weak scores. In the absence of a strong state capacity, other factors 
can better explain the census outcomes. In Croatia the domestic and the 
external actors were not as interested in the census as were the actors in 
Bosnia and Macedonia. The 2011 census in Croatia can be regarded as a 
relatively technical exercise and there was not much domestic interest in the 
census process; whereas the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia show that if 
there is a lack of state capacity this needs to be overcome by other means. 
In these countries the political elites were very interested in the census out-
comes, especially since these can have effect on the proportional represen-
tation of the ethnically organised political parties. This interest made the cen-
suses in these countries highly political. Even though external actors did not 
take over the census operations, considering it important that the countries 
be able to conduct the census by themselves, there was a difference be-
tween the levels of assistance the countries received. Croatia had no assis-
tance, but still was able to conduct a census in line with the EU census regu-
lations. In Bosnia the level of assistance was high, considering both the finan-
cial help and the 23 IMO missions. Macedonia did not receive as much ex-
ternal assistance, but here the census failed. Thus state capacity cannot 
sufficiently explain the variance in compliance with the EU census regula-
tions. In the case of domestic disputes, the case of Bosnia shows that the EU 
can be a strong actor and this external influence can be the decisive factor 
for compliance. However if there are domestic disputes hindering compli-
ance with the EU regulations and the EU has little leverage, census processes 
can also be aborted, as was the case in Macedonia. These cases show that 
domestic agency is important in census-taking processes and should not be 
underestimated.  
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Table 10: Comparison of state capacity, domestic actors and external actors, by country 
 State capacity Domestic actors External actors  Census outcome 
Croatia Strong Willingness to 
comply 
Very little 
influence/interest 
Compliant 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Very weak Domestic disputes 
hindering 
compliance 
High interest, high 
influence (EU carrot) 
Delayed 
compliance 
Macedonia Weak  Domestic disputes 
hindering 
compliance 
Medium interest, little 
influence (no EU 
carrot) 
Non-compliant 
6.7 Conclusion 
Vachudova (2015, p. 524) has already noted that ‘the great variation in out-
comes even across the EU’s ten new post-communist members underscores 
that many details of domestic reform have largely been determined by do-
mestic factors’. This seems also to be the case when we look at the census 
processes in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. In all of these countries the 
census outcomes are used for proportional representation, which led to dif-
ferent degrees of census politicisation. Whereas in Croatia there was very 
little debate, there were long and still ongoing disputes in Bosnia and the 
Macedonian census was cancelled due to disagreements on the method-
ology. These outcomes are also almost mirrored when looking at the levels of 
state capacity. While Croatia has better scores than EU member states Ro-
mania and Bulgaria, Macedonia’s scores are weak and those of Bosnia are 
very weak. The analysis has shown that state capacity is insufficient to ex-
plain the variation in compliance with the EU census regulations.  
Even though Croatia was close to EU accession before the last census, 
there was no strong external pressure with regard to the census. The census-
es in Bosnia and Macedonia were both observed by an International Moni-
toring Observation. In Bosnia the IMO was quite extensive and also EU pres-
sure was high. This was less the case in Macedonia where there was only a 
‘light’ IMO and there was not much pressure from the EU since accession 
negotiations are at a standstill. The case of Bosnia shows that strong external 
influence can tip the balance in favour of a complete census, which how-
ever is still internally contested. The case of Macedonia demonstrates that in 
the absence of a strong push from external actors, domestic actors are in a 
position to block the census process. 
In Croatia, the political domestic actors did not have much influence in 
the census. The cases of Bosnia and Macedonia, however, show that do-
mestic actors can have a negative influence on census processes, especial-
ly if political actors want to hijack the census process and/or its results for 
their advantage. In Bosnia there was and still is a dispute on how to define 
the total residence population as the outcomes might influence the ethnic 
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homogeneity of the territories of the Federations. In Macedonia, there was 
also no clear definition of the total population and the in- or exclusion of the 
diaspora population. This is connected to the threshold outlined in the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement according to which minorities making up more than 
20% are granted more rights.  
This analysis shows that state capacity is insufficient to explain the varia-
tion in compliance with the EU census regulations. This means that structural 
issues alone cannot explain compliance patterns. Agency, especially of 
domestic actors, can be very strong and should not be underestimated. In 
the case of Bosnia, the EU as external actor was able to tip the balance in 
favour of compliance, but in Macedonia, the EU had very little power to 
overcome the discrepancies which occurred during the census enumera-
tion.  
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7.1 Introduction 
On the path of EU enlargement the Western Balkan countries have the same 
conditions to comply with. These consist of the political—the Copenhagen 
Criteria—as well as the technical conditions—the acquis communautaire, 
which outlines the full body of EU rules and norms. These countries, however, 
show very different compliance patterns. This is particularly the case when 
looking at their population and housing census, which is part of the 18th ac-
quis chapter on statistics. Whereas some countries had few complications 
with the collection of population data and included all the EU regulations 
(such as Croatia), others had to cope with serious delays throughout the 
process and discussion about which definitions should be used (Bosnia) or 
even failed to finish the census enumeration data due to methodological 
differences (Macedonia). This thesis has looked into the reasons why there is 
such a variation when it comes to compliance with the EU census regulations 
in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia even though they all had the same EU 
conditions to comply with. The overall research question is thus: What ac-
counts for the variation in compliance with the EU census regulations in Cro-
atia, Bosnia and Macedonia? 
Looking at the variation in census-taking is important, as the census is the 
backbone of most statistics, as well as being used for policy-making within 
the national context and the EU, for example for the distribution of funds and 
subsidies (Everaers, 2015, p. 185). As such the population census is part of the 
preconditions for European membership. However, as the census data is also 
used to allocate resources, ultimately some profit more than others, which 
makes census processes highly political—even more so, when rights of minor-
ity and ethnic groups are connected to the census outcomes, as is the case 
in the Western Balkans (see also Chapter 4).  
The analysis of the variation in census-taking within the context of Euro-
peanisation provides more insights into the compliance behaviour of en-
largement countries using the example of one particular aspect of the ac-
quis communautaire. To achieve this, first the Europeanisation and the oper-
ationalisation of compliance with the EU census regulations has been out-
lined (see chapter 2). Several sub-questions have been investigated using 
the additional coverage mixed methods model (Morgan, 2014), which 
combined in-depth interviews and expert survey data (see Chapter 3). The 
first sub-question analysed whether in the absence of EU rules on collecting 
ethno-cultural data, it is possible to speak of the Europeanisation of census-
taking (Chapter 4). The second sub-question analysed the mechanisms of 
Europeanisation (conditionality and legitimacy) in order to assess their effec-
tiveness (Chapter 5) and the third sub-question compared the influence of 
structural aspects of state capacity with the influence of domestic and ex-
ternal agency (Chapter 6).  
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This conclusion will first elaborate the main findings of the overall thesis 
and its separate chapters. Second, it will put these findings together in order 
to answer the overall research question. Third, the contribution to the aca-
demic literature will be outlined in more detail, as well as the generalisability 
of the findings. Fourth, it will reflect on the limitations of this research and 
suggest further avenues of enquiry; finally, policy recommendations will be 
presented.  
7.2 Main findings 
The main findings of this thesis unfold in three steps. First, the analysis shows 
that especially if rights and proportional representation of power are con-
nected to the census outcomes, this can politicise and seriously hinder cen-
sus processes. Second, by accepting or disputing the EU census regulations, 
domestic actors can respectively either facilitate or obstruct the compliance 
with the EU census regulations. This is related to the first aspect, because the 
acceptance of the EU census regulations depends on the potential gain or 
loss of power based on the census outcomes for the domestic actors. Third, 
depending on the available rewards and direct pressure of the EU, the EU 
might be able to overcome domestic disputes and tip the balance in favour 
of compliance. These findings will now be elaborated within the frameworks 
of the separate sub-questions and chapters in more detail.  
Chapter 2 introduced the theoretical background of Europeanisation 
and in particular what needs to be taken into account when it comes to 
external Europeanisation, the influence of the EU on non-members of the EU, 
in this case enlargement countries. This chapter also outlined the EU census 
regulations and how compliance is assessed in this thesis.  
Chapter 3 described the overall research design which is based on a 
mixed methods approach. The data collection strategy of this thesis is inno-
vative and provides an excellent example of mixed methods research. It 
combines 28 in-depth interviews with an expert survey, collected among 75 
census experts in two rounds with a response rate of 69% and 50% respec-
tively. The use of the additional coverage mixed methods model as research 
design enabled the analysis of the phenomenon of census-taking from the 
broader perspective of ‘Europeanisation’, as well as from the local perspec-
tive of the case countries, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia.  
Chapter 4 addressed the fact that with regard to sensitive census ques-
tions on ethno-cultural data (ethnicity, language and religion), there is no 
coherent EU approach. This chapter answered the first sub-question of this 
thesis (Can we speak of Europeanisation of census-taking, in the absence of 
concrete rules on collecting ethno-cultural data?). Even though data on 
ethno-cultural characteristics is not required by the EU, all Western Balkan 
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countries asked for ethno-cultural data in their census questionnaires. Simon 
(2011) has shown that there is a wide variety of practices within Europe on 
how to collect identity data. That there is no direct agreement on how to 
collect data on ethnicity and cultural characteristics has been confirmed by 
the expert survey. The survey also demonstrated that there are different de-
grees in sensitivity in ethno-cultural data: ethnicity and religion are seen as 
most sensitive, whereas language and citizenship—data often used for poli-
cy-making—are regarded as less sensitive. A comparison of the three coun-
tries’ census questionnaires and methodologies showed that they have very 
different approaches on how to collect ethno-cultural data, not always in 
line with the international recommendations of the UNECE (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2006). Croatia’s census questionnaire was 
the least in line with the UNECE census recommendations, as the question-
naire provided answer categories, before an open-answer field, whereas the 
Bosnian census questionnaire was a bit more in line with the recommenda-
tions as it first presented an open-answer field and only afterwards provided 
answer categories. The Macedonian census questionnaire was in line with 
the UNECE census recommendations; however this is also the only census 
that failed due to domestic disputes on the census methodology.  
In addition, Chapter 4 highlighted the paradox of counting ethnic and 
cultural data. Population groups that are not acknowledged by data offi-
cially do not exist and do not get a voice. Defining groups and linking their 
categories to proportional representation can lead to the politicisation and 
delay (in the case of Bosnia) or even failure of census processes (in the case 
of Macedonia). In all of the case countries, census outcomes are not only 
linked to policy-making, but also to rights: in Croatia these are linked to mi-
nority rights; in Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement divided the political 
system among the three constituent ethnic groups (‘Bosniak’, ‘Croat’ and 
‘Serb’) based on the 1991 census; and in Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement outlines that ethnic groups making up more than 20% of the 
population are granted language and minority rights. In Croatia and Bosnia 
there seems to be a preference for the national ‘ethnic’ packages.34 Col-
lecting data on ethno-cultural characteristics is thus very problematic. By 
making the census a condition for enlargement, the EU requires the countries 
to engage in the process of census-taking and its consequences. Chapter 4 
showed that there are no EU concrete rules (explicit compliance) and no 
agreement among census experts (implicit compliance) on how to collect 
ethno-cultural data, and therefore it is not possible to speak of Europeanisa-
tion with regard to this aspect. While Europeanisation in that chapter was 
assessed through the explicit and implicit compliance with the EU census 
                                                        
34 For Croatia, this is Croatian and in Bosnia these are the constituent ethnic groups of Bosniaks 
(formerly also known as ethnic Muslims (Đečević, Vuković-Ćalasan, & Knežević, 2017)), Bosnian 
Serbs and Bosnian Croats.  
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regulations, the following chapters (5 and 6) analysed Europeanisation as 
the direct influence of the EU on the census processes.  
Chapter 5 analysed the impact of the EU with regard to compliance with 
the EU census regulations in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. In order to do 
so, it looked at the effectiveness of two Europeanisation mechanisms (condi-
tionality and legitimacy) while analysing the compliance of the three case 
countries with the EU census regulations. This was assessed on the one hand 
via a rational-choice cost/benefit calculation, in which the EU rewards and 
pressure were weighed against the costs and potential losses of domestic 
actors, in the Europeanisation mechanism of conditionality. In counterpoint, 
this chapter also assessed the perceived legitimacy, the acceptance and/or 
the contestation behind compliance with the EU census regulations, in the 
Europeanisation mechanism of legitimacy. Congruence analysis (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012) was used to compare these two mechanisms. In Bosnia 
and Macedonia the domestic adoption costs were high. In Macedonia, 
where there were few EU rewards or pressure and very high domestic adop-
tion costs, the census failed. In Bosnia, however, the EU rewards and pressure 
through the recent membership application tipped the balance towards 
compliance with the EU census regulations and meeting the deadline for the 
publication of the census results. The mechanism of legitimacy had very little 
influence in Bosnia and Macedonia, but Croatia had a strong focus on fol-
lowing the EU census regulations. However, there the mechanism of condi-
tionality could not explain the compliance with the EU census regulations. 
Both mechanisms therefore are considered as important, which confirms 
that conditionality alone cannot fully explain the compliance with the EU 
regulations. However, the analysis also showed that in all cases the effec-
tiveness of the mechanisms differed and there is no one-size-fits-all model of 
Europeanisation that can explain compliance with the EU census regulations. 
Nonetheless these findings also highlight the importance of investigating the 
domestic aspects in more detail, which was then done in Chapter 6.  
This chapter analysed the structural aspect of state capacity, but also the 
agency of domestic and external actors in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia 
to assess the importance of these factors for the compliance with the EU 
census regulations. This chapter used four of the World Bank Governance 
Indicators to compare the state capacity of the case countries. As expected 
for an EU member state, Croatia had rather high scores for state capacity 
and fully met the EU requirements. However, although Macedonia had 
higher scores for state capacity than Bosnia, this census completely failed, 
while Bosnia in the end managed to publish its census data in line with the 
international regulations and within the deadline given by the EU. The analy-
sis showed that unlike what the literature (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a) sug-
gests, state capacity is not able to fully explain the variance in census out-
comes in the case countries, and in order to provide a fuller explanation of 
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the census processes, this chapter also analysed the agency of the domestic 
and external actors. Domestic agency is often a hidden and unrecognised 
factor in state-building processes—and as the analysis showed, is also un-
derestimated in census-taking processes. With the exception of Croatia, 
there was a high interest in the census process and results on the part of do-
mestic actors. In Macedonia, domestic actors even tried to circumvent the 
international census recommendations in order to increase the census results 
to their advantage. In Bosnia, the Statistical Institute of the Republika Srpska 
still does not accept the published census results (Republika Srpska Institute 
of Statistics, 2016). This chapter also analysed the influence of the EU as an 
external actor. This influence varied, depending on the carrots and sticks at 
the EU’s disposal. For Croatia, which at the time of the census already had a 
set date for its accession, there was little or no influence by the EU. In Mace-
donia, the EU did not have sufficient influence to guarantee reliable results 
nor to stop the census from failing. In Bosnia, however, the EU was able to 
push the long-delayed census process towards the publication of the census 
data by July 2016. The analysis thus showed the importance of domestic 
actors in facilitating or obstructing census processes. Not only the National 
Statistical Institutes, but also the local politicians can seriously hinder and/or 
prolong the census processes, as in Bosnia and Macedonia. In such instanc-
es the EU can intervene, which in the case of Bosnia led to delayed compli-
ance with the EU regulations, which considering timeliness is denoted as par-
tial compliance. In Macedonia, the EU rewards and pressure were not strong 
enough to counter the local contestations surrounding the census. These 
varying cases demonstrate that domestic actors should not be underesti-
mated and can be crucial in census-taking.  
Table 11: Relevant factors for census-taking in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia 
 Compliance 
with EU 
regulations 
Ethno-cultural 
characteristics 
Europeanisation 
mechanism 
State 
capacity 
Domestic 
actors 
EU as external 
actor 
Croatia Full 
compliance 
Yes Legitimacy Strong Little 
interest  
Little interest 
Bosnia Partial 
compliance 
Yes Conditionality  Very 
weak 
High 
interest 
High interest 
Macedonia Non- 
compliance 
Yes None of them 
strong enough  
Weak High 
interest 
Medium 
interest 
 
The findings of these empirical chapters reveal important insights into the 
factors that can influence census processes (see also Table 11). So what 
accounts for the variation in compliance with the EU census regulations?  
Croatia’s compliance with the EU census regulations can be best ex-
plained by the strong positive impact of the Europeanisation mechanism of 
legitimacy, and by the fact that the census was not much contested. There 
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was little pressure by the EU to complete this census, but Croatia’s scores for 
state capacity are even higher than the ones for EU member states Romania 
and Bulgaria, and compared to Bosnia and Macedonia, there was little in-
terest in the census outcomes on the part of domestic actors. Even though 
the collection of ethno-cultural characteristics was least in line with the inter-
national recommendations of the UNECE, Croatia did comply with the EU 
census regulations and its census is also part of the EU census hub, which 
collects the population data of all EU member states.  
The census processes in Bosnia and Macedonia were much more com-
plicated than the one in Croatia. In Bosnia the process was long delayed 
due to domestic disputes on first the census law and later the census meth-
odology. Although the country has very weak scores for state capacity, it 
managed to in the end publish the population data. This was however not 
possible without help from the EU. Besides financing a large part of the cen-
sus, the EU also put pressure on Bosnia’s authorities to advance the census 
process. This is why in Bosnia the Europeanisation mechanism of conditionali-
ty was able to outweigh the domestic adoption cost and the EU is an im-
portant external actor. However, the census results are still not fully accepted 
by all domestic actors in the country, which shows that the domestic circum-
stances, in this case the ethnic make-up of the population and the back-
ground of the Dayton Peace Agreement, as well as the interest in the census 
data by domestic actors, should not be underestimated in census processes.  
With better state capacity scores than Bosnia, Macedonia might be ex-
pected to have the capacity to successfully collect population data, how-
ever its 2011 census was aborted a couple of days after the enumeration 
started. Neither one of the two Europeanisation mechanisms was very strong, 
as the enlargement process of Macedonia is at a standstill. Domestic interest 
in the census results, however, was very high. Although most in line with the 
UNECE census recommendations on how to collect ethno-cultural data, the 
whole census process was highly politicised and could not guarantee a reli-
able population count. Linking census outcomes to proportional representa-
tion made the census an instrument of manipulation to potentially in-
crease/decrease political power.  
7.3 Contribution to the literature 
By analysing census-taking in the Western Balkans within EU enlargement, this 
thesis contributes to literature on census and categorisation practices, and 
the framework of Europeanisation. Chapter 2 of this thesis highlighted the 
difference between internal and external Europeanisation, the influence of 
the EU on members and non-members respectively and broadened the 
scope of Europeanisation research by analysing compliance of enlargement 
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countries with the specific requirements of the acquis communautaire. By 
using different angles of Europeanisation this thesis shows the explicit compli-
ance with the EU census regulations, but also the differences when it comes 
to implicit compliance, such as the collection of ethno-cultural data. By ana-
lysing the direct influence of the EU through the Europeanisation mechanisms 
of conditionality and legitimacy it builds on the literature of for example 
Noutcheva (2012); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), but by analysing 
compliance with one particular aspect of the acquis, this thesis opens up a 
new research arena for Europeanisation research. In addition, research on 
Europeanisation has neglected the influence of domestic processes 
(Elbasani, 2013a; Mastenbroek, 2005). By analysing the domestic factors this 
thesis brings the domestic perspective back into Europeanisation research.  
Chapter 3 is an example of how mixed methods research, in particular 
the additional coverage model of Morgan (2014), can be applied as re-
search design. This chapter showed how in-depth interview data can be 
combined with data collected via a two-round expert survey.  
By building on the existing literature on the construction of categories 
(Hacking, 2007; Kertzer & Arel, 2002b; Nobles, 2000; Ruppert, 2011; Yanow, 
2003), Chapter 4 highlighted the paradox of collecting ethno-cultural data, 
which addresses the need and complications that can occur when collect-
ing this sensitive data. All case countries collected data on ethno-cultural 
characteristics, which are not required by the EU; however as minority and 
language rights are linked to the proportional representation of the popula-
tion, the collection of this data becomes a necessity. This chapter adds to 
recent research on censuses in the Western Balkans which focuses on the 
construction of national identity through the census categories (Bieber, 
2015), the aspect of ethnicity (Daskalovski, 2013; Visoka & Gjevori, 2013) as 
well as the politics behind the population count (Daskalovski, 2013; Keil & 
Perry, 2015). Such politics are also relevant in other geographical contexts 
(Leibler & Breslau, 2005; Urla, 1993), and confirm the importance of the do-
mestic context in census processes.  
In addition, the analysis in Chapter 4 shows that census processes are 
never purely technical, but highly political. Nonetheless the census is part of 
the seemingly technical requirements for EU enlargement, the acquis com-
munautaire. EU enlargement is embedded within the academic literature on 
Europeanisation. This strand of literature has so far focused on models for 
how to analyse the transformative power of the EU (Grabbe, 2006; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004) and general compliance behaviour 
(Noutcheva, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2005), or has looked into the political 
criteria for EU accession (Glüpker, 2013; Mendelski, 2013). By analysing cen-
sus-taking, one specific aspect of the acquis, this research provides insights 
into the compliance behaviour of accession countries with the seemingly 
technical conditions for membership. The analysis in Chapter 5 strengthens 
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previous Europeanisation research, which states that with regard to the 
mechanisms of Europeanisation, the rational-choice model of conditionality 
alone cannot fully explain the compliance behaviour of accession countries 
and that the perceived legitimacy of the EU rules is also an important factor 
(Noutcheva, 2009). In addition, it shows that there is no one-size-fits-all Euro-
peanisation model, as the effectiveness of conditionality and legitimacy 
varies in each case.  
Chapter 6 builds on the literature on Europeanisation, but also on the im-
portance of the domestic factors in EU enlargement processes (Elbasani, 
2013b). By analysing the influence of domestic and external actors, this 
chapter contributes to the debate on whether institutional factors or the 
agency of actors matters in Europeanisation processes. Unlike what other 
scholars (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a) have suggested, the analysis showed 
that the institutional aspect of state capacity was not sufficient in explaining 
the difference in census outcomes; the influence of actors, however, and 
especially the domestic ones, was very strong in Bosnia and Macedonia. 
Depending on the strength of the EU pressure and rewards, the EU as an 
external actor can potentially also influence the compliance with the census 
regulations. The analysis, especially in the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia, 
has shown that the importance of the domestic actors should not be under-
estimated in Europeanisation research.  
7.4 Generalisability of the findings 
The variations in census outcomes show that, especially because the domes-
tic circumstances are so significant to the census outcomes, it is not possible 
to generalise directly from the findings with regard to the Europeanisation 
mechanisms. The findings of this research are very context-specific and only 
to some extent generalisable to other cases. However, there are some as-
pects that can be taken from this research. One of them is that the domestic 
circumstances and actors play an important role and should be taken into 
account in research assessing the mechanisms of Europeanisation.  
Another aspect this thesis has highlighted by analysing one specific as-
pect of the acquis is that even though the acquis is regarded as rather 
technical, the process of census-taking is highly political and is indirectly 
connected to the political criteria of EU membership, the Copenhagen Cri-
teria. This is an important aspect and can be taken as an example when 
studying other chapters of the acquis, for example Chapter 19 which focuses 
on social policy and employment, or the aspect of anti-discrimination, which 
is also connected to minority rights and therewith the Copenhagen Criteria.  
With regard to the broader context of census-taking, it has already been 
shown that the collection of ethno-cultural data does not only have serious 
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consequences in the Western Balkan countries, but for example also in Spain 
(Urla, 1993) and Israel/Palestine (Leibler & Breslau, 2005). The finding of this 
thesis that the domestic context (where, for example, rights are linked to 
census outcomes as is the case with the Ohrid agreement) and actors (here 
mainly ethnically based politicians) are important, is not only generalisable to 
research on Europeanisation, but also to research on censuses.  
Finally, also with regard to the methods used in this project, there is limited 
generalisability. The application of the two rounds of questions, the Delphi 
method, in the expert survey provided for interesting exploratory insights and 
the possibility for feedback which would not have been possible with only 
one questionnaire. In addition, the interviews provided crucial explanatory 
insights into the different cases. The use of the additional coverage mixed 
methods design of this study provides an example for researchers who would 
like to engage in mixed methods research by combining and collecting in-
depth interview and survey data. 
7.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This research project faced some limitations, mostly methodological but 
sometimes more practical considerations. 
The first limitation is related to access to interviewees, which is a practical 
consideration. Since census experts are a rather select group, it was not al-
ways possible to speak to the National Statistical Institutes, however in such 
cases former employees of these institutes and people from other interna-
tional organisations were interviewed. Nonetheless due to the finite number 
of census experts, there might be a potential bias of the people directly in-
volved in the census processes. In order to prevent this bias from affecting 
the results of this research, also people working in the EU institutions, for ex-
ample at the EU Delegations and Eurostat, were interviewed and official 
documents and reports as well as newspaper articles were consulted.  
The second limitation is also connected to the fact that there are not 
many census experts. The survey was administered to some of the same 
people who gave interviews, and instead of selecting a sample the whole 
population of census exerts was approached. The survey questions differed 
from the questions asked in the interview, but asking the same people for an 
in-depth interview and a two-round survey put considerable pressure on the 
respondents. Nonetheless a vast majority of the approached census experts 
were willing to fill in the first round of the survey questionnaire, and half of 
them also participated in the second round. Consequently the response rate 
was rather high with 69% in the first and 50% in the second round.  
Besides these limitations, there are also aspects which are worthy of fur-
ther investigation, such as how the different modes of data collection used in 
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census-taking affect the population data. The EU allows for different modes 
of collecting population data, such as the register-based census in the 
Netherlands, a mixed mode census in Germany and the traditional census 
which is applied in the Western Balkans. This has been researched from a 
methodological point of view in order to ensure the comparability of the 
findings, but it would be interesting to analyse whether and how these differ-
ent modes of data collection can for example influence the collection and 
harmonisation of sensitive data on ethnicity, language and religion or be 
used for a cross-country comparison of, for example, migration statistics.  
Another avenue for further research relates to the use of census data. The 
focus of this project was mostly on the difficulties of collecting population 
data; but it was not possible to further investigate how this data is actually 
used in the domestic, but also the EU context. It is known that the connection 
of rights to census outcomes leads to the politicisation of the census and can 
lead to domestic contestation; however less is known about the conse-
quences which derive from this. Not only is this relevant in the case countries, 
but also for example when looking at the censuses in Kosovo and Moldova, 
where due to territorial disputes and boycotts the census did not cover all of 
the municipalities. Research on the use and consequences of census data 
can be done qualitatively, but also by a mixed methods research design. For 
example the survey collected for this project could be adjusted into a longi-
tudinal panel design with multiple waves in order to investigate the dynamics 
on attitudes towards census-related issues and practices in the EU and the 
UNECE region. Such a survey could also include the Russian-speaking ex-
perts, in order to widen the scope of the research. 
The last suggestion for further research concerns the implications of cen-
sus data on policy processes, as well as the other way around: how policy-
making can potentially influence census processes. Examples of similar re-
search investigate the constructs of race and ethnicity in the United States 
(Yanow, 2003) and the nexus between the census, racial categories and 
citizenship (Nobles, 2000). Most of these empirical examples however focus 
on the United States or Brazil and only little research has been done in the 
European context or with regard to other census categories, for example 
country of origin. More research on these aspects is highly recommended.  
7.6 Policy recommendations 
Beyond the academic implications highlighted above, this research also 
raises interesting aspects for the 2020 census round35 and policy-making.  
Within the current EU enlargement policy there is a lack of attention given 
to the domestic context and actors. Identifying that ‘civil society and stake-
                                                        
35 This round includes all censuses from 2015 until 2024.  
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holders’ require a stronger role in the accession process in the enlargement 
strategy of 2016 (European Commission, 2016b) was a step in the right direc-
tion, however more can be done to take into account other domestic ac-
tors, besides the civil society and also the domestic context. This thesis has 
shown that the influence of domestic actors involved in the census processes 
should not be underestimated, as since the census data is connected to 
rights and numerical thresholds, political domestic actors can potentially 
gain or lose power. The direct influence of the EU on census processes de-
pends very much on the means at the EU’s disposal and the domestic will-
ingness to comply with the EU rules. This was especially visible in Bosnia and 
Macedonia, where there was strong influence of the domestic actors in the 
census processes. Within the enlargement strategy, the EU and Eurostat 
should pay even more attention to the domestic context and actors, espe-
cially when it comes to census-taking.  
If domestic contestation of the census is likely, there should be additional 
attention on the census law and the definitions in the census methodology 
and questionnaire. Not only has this been problematic in Macedonia, where 
there was no clear definition on ‘place of usual residence’, but also in Bos-
nia, where although there is a clear definition, the question on ‘place of usu-
al residence’ still seems to be an issue of debate. The census law and meth-
odology should contain exact definitions of the census questions and cate-
gories, but the domestic actors involved should also agree with these, in or-
der to prevent contestation and protest.  
The analysis has shown that better scores on state capacity or previous 
experience in census-taking cannot be taken as a guarantee for a good 
population count. This was highlighted by the case of Macedonia, where 
even though the country had experience with census-taking, politicians 
doubted the census results even before it had taken place. Therefore inter-
national observers and the EU need to pay more attention to the domestic 
developments and potential contestations of the census processes in the 
Western Balkans. 
In general, there should be more awareness that censuses are always po-
litical processes and can feed existing tensions. Since census data is used for 
policy-making ultimately some will profit and others will lose on the basis of 
the census data. There should also be more awareness of the political impli-
cations that are inherent to census-taking, especially if the census results are 
linked to peace agreements and minority rights. Especially if rights and pro-
portional representation are linked to the census outcomes, appropriate 
measures, for example additional supervision through monitoring missions 
and/or a clear agreement on the census regulations by all actors involved, 
should be taken in order to ensure a reliable census. This thesis has shown 
that, although the census is based on statistical procedures and regulations, 
it ultimately remains highly politicised.  
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Appendix 1: Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 9 July 2008 on Population and 
Housing Censuses 
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Appendix 2: List of interviews 
Interview 1: Croatian Bureau of Statistics official, September 2015, Zagreb 
Interview 2: OSCE official, October 2015, Skopje 
Interview 3: Eurostat official, March 2014, Luxembourg 
Interview 4: EU Delegation Sarajevo official, September 2015, Sarajevo 
Interview 5: DG NEAR official, June 2015, Brussels 
Interview 6: Statistical Agency official, September 2015, Sarajevo 
Interview 7: Eurostat official, March 2014, Luxembourg 
Interview 8: State Agency official, September 2015, Sarajevo 
Interview 9: International Census Consultant, April 2016, phone interview 
Interview 10: International Census Consultant, October 2015, Skopje 
Interview 11: EU Delegation Skopje official, November 2015, Brussels 
Interview 12: Eurostat official, March 2014, Luxembourg 
Interview 13: State Statistical Office official, October 2015, Skopje 
Interview 14: DG NEAR official, March 2016, phone interview 
Appendix 3: Topic guide for the interviews 
In March 2014 (Eurostat) 
• Factual knowledge, such as “Why is census-taking such an important is-
sue for the EU?” and “Which role has Eurostat next to the UNECE (rec-
ommendations) in regard to census-taking? What is the relationship be-
tween them?” 
• Questions asking for the EU incentives and pressure, rewards and threats 
of the EU (theory oriented)  
• Questions per case country, such as “What was your role during the latest 
census in …?”, “How compliant would you describe …?” and “Do you 
see the … state as capable of collecting the census?” 
• In September and October 2015 (in the case countries)  
• Timing and process of accession and the role of the census in this process, 
“How was the pressure of the EU perceived? How was the IMO per-
ceived?” 
• The capacities of the National Statistical Institutes (and with what organi-
zations they had to cooperate and how the cooperation went) 
• Census questionnaires, reactions to the sensitive questions on ethno-
cultural data  
• How was the census process in general and which problems were en-
countered? How was the atmosphere in the country? How did the do-
mestic actors react in the census process?  
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In January 2016 (Eurostat) 
• More background information on the factual knowledge, on for example 
the Technical Cooperation Groups 
• Update (on especially the developments in Bosnia) and additional infor-
mation regarding the case countries  
Appendix 4: Questionnaire first survey round 
Dear census expert, 
This survey has been designed to collect more detailed knowledge on how 
experts perceive census practices, as well as the regulations and recom-
mendations for the population and housing census. We would appreciate if 
you would answer from your personal experience, rather than following the 
official lines of the organisation you are working with (unless they are the 
same, of course).  
The answers to this survey will be treated completely confidential. We will 
make sure that your answers cannot be traced to your affiliation or name. 
Your participation is voluntary. The survey is divided in four parts. If you are 
not familiar with a topic, you can skip to the next one. The survey will allow 
you to skip forward and backward if you want to reconsider your answer. 
The results of the survey will provide us with better understanding of how 
census experts perceive the practices and regulations behind census-
taking. This may have implications for the design of for the design of cen-
sus questions and variables. This is an essential part of the PhD project ‘Eu-
ropeanization of census-taking in the Western Balkans’ at Maastricht Uni-
versity (The Netherlands). Should you have any questions or comments 
please contact Professor Hans Schmeets (h.schmeets@cbs.nl) and/or An-
na-Lena Hoh (anna-lena.hoh@maastrichtuniversity.nl). 
Thank you very much for participating! 
Anna-Lena Hoh 
PhD Candidate - Maastricht University 
This PhD project is supported by Pieter Everaers (Director Cooperation in the 
European Statistical System, International cooperation, resources –Eurostat) 
and Eric Schulte Nordholt (Senior Researcher- Project Leader of the Census- 
Statistics Netherlands). 
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1. Before starting the questionnaire we would like to know how much expe-
rience you have with the population and housing census. Could you 
please indicate how long you have been working with census issues?  
Please, click on the appropriate option below.  
  For 2 years, or less 
  For 3-5 years 
  For 6-10 years 
  For 11-15 years  
  For more than 16 years 
Part 1: UNECE census recommendations 
This is the first part of the questionnaire, focusing on the Conference of Euro-
pean Statisticians (CES) Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Popula-
tion and Housing (the UNECE population and housing recommendations). If 
you do not feel familiar with this part, you can indicate this in the following 
question and will then be automatically guided to the next part of the ques-
tionnaire. 
2. Would you consider yourself familiar with the Conference of European 
Statisticians (CES) Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population 
and Housing (the UNECE population and housing recommendations)? 
Please, click on the appropriate answer below.  
  Yes 
  Yes, to some extent  
  No, not at all 
3. Have you ever been present at or participated in the UNECE meetings on 
the population and housing census? 
  Yes, almost every year 
  Yes, a few times 
  Yes, once 
  No 
4. What, according to you, are in general the most difficult issues to agree 
on at the UNECE meetings on the population and housing census?  
Open question.  
The following questions are about your opinion on the Conference of Euro-
pean Statisticians (CES) Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Popula-
tion and Housing (the UNECE population and housing recommendations), the 
topics and methodology. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
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5. The UNECE census recommendations for the 2010 census round were a 
useful tool for helping design a census. 
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know 
6. The UNECE census recommendations for the 2010 census round ensured 
comparability between the census results of countries. 
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know 
7. Is there something you would have liked to have addressed differently 
with regard to the census topics in the UNECE population and housing 
census recommendations for the census round of 2010? 
  Yes, please specify… 
  No 
  Don’t know 
8. Is there something you would have liked to have addressed differently 
with regard to the methodology in the UNECE population and housing 
census recommendations for the census round of 2010?  
  Yes, please specify… 
  No 
  Don’t know 
According to the UNECE report on Practices of UNECE Countries in the 2010 
Round of Censuses (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2014, 
p. 159), 31 countries (out of 51 who responded to the survey) collect infor-
mation on ethnicity, language and religion. To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statement:  
9. The UNECE recommendations should be mandatory while designing the 
census questionnaires?  
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know 
10. The questions on ethno-cultural characteristics should be part of the core 
questions in the UNECE recommendations?  
Strongly agree          Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know 
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11. Ethnicity, language and religion are often considered as problematic 
topics in the population and housing census. Are there other aspects, 
apart from these three, which you consider as problematic (difficult to 
implement) with regard to the UNECE population and housing recom-
mendations?  
 Yes, please specify… 
 No 
 Don’t know 
Part 2: Census topics 
This is the second part of the questionnaire, focussing on the topics covered 
in the population and housing census. Please remember to answer from your 
personal perspective, rather than from the official practice of your organisa-
tion. 
According to the UNECE population and housing census recommendations 
ethnicity is defined very broadly as “based on a shared understanding of the 
history and territorial origins (regional, national) of an ethnic group or com-
munity as well as on particular cultural characteristics: language and/or 
religion and/or specific customs and ways of life”(United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 95).  
12. Do you agree with this definition?  
 Yes, completely 
 Yes, to a certain extent 
 No, not at all 
 Don’t know 
13. Regarding the definition on ethnicity mentioned above, if you do not to-
tally agree with the definition, what would you change about it?  
Open question.  
Another aspect of the ethno-cultural characteristics is religion, which the 
UNECE population and housing census recommendations is defined as 
“generally regarded as a set of beliefs and practices, usually involving ac-
knowledgment of a divine or higher being, power or principle, by which 
people order the conduct of their lives both practically and in a moral sense” 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 97).  
14. Do you agree with this definition?  
  Yes, completely 
  Yes, to a certain extent 
  No, not at all 
  Don’t know 
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15. Regarding the definition on religion mentioned above, if you do not totally 
agree with the definition, what would you change about it?  
Open question.  
Language is also one of the mentioned ethno-cultural characteristics of the 
UNECE population and housing census recommendations. This is divided in 
four categories:  
“a) “Mother tongue”, defined as the first language spoken in early childhood 
at home; 
b) Main language, defined as the language which the person commands 
best; 
c) Language(s) most currently spoken at home and/or work; 
d) Knowledge of language(s), defined as the ability to speak and/or write 
one or more designated languages.” (United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, 2006, p. 96) 
16. Are these the categories you would use when designing a census ques-
tionnaire?  
 Yes, completely 
 Yes, to a certain extent 
 No, not at all 
 Don’t know 
17. Regarding the categories mentioned above, if you would not use them for 
a census questionnaire, what categories would you use to collect data on 
language?  
Open question.  
To what extent do you consider the following aspects necessary/not neces-
sary for the successful implementation of a population and housing census?  
Please, indicate this in the list below.  
18. A strong and independent National Statistical Institute 
Very necessary                  Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
19. Political willingness of the parties in power  
Very necessary                  Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
20. Support from NGO’s  
Very necessary                  Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
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21. Support from Eurostat 
Very necessary             Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
22. Strong state institutions, such as the judicial system, army and police  
Very necessary             Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
23. Fairly high trust in institutions, such as the judicial system, army and police 
Very necessary             Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
24. Fairly high political trust, such as in politicians and political parties 
Very necessary             Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
25. Fairly high trust in the countries democracy 
Very necessary             Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
26. Other, please specify…  
Very necessary             Not at all necessary 
 Don’t know 
Most census topics should not be a problem while addressing the census 
population. Other topics might be sensitive for some people, and they might 
be reluctant to answer such questions. Based on the list in the below, how 
sensitive do you think the topics in the list below are?  
27. Sex 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
28. Age 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
29. Marital Status 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
30. Status in employment 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
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31. Income 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
32. Place of Birth 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
33. Country of citizenship/Citizenship 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
34. Relationship between Household Members  
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
35. Tenure status of housing 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
36. Toilet facilities 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
37. Place of usual residence 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
Don’t know 
38. Place of work 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
Don’t know 
39. Language 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
40. Religion 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
41. Ethnicity 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
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42. Nationality 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
43. Other, please specify…  
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
44. Please, could you elaborate on why in your opinion one or more of the 
above mentioned topics are sensitive or not sensitive?  
Open question.  
45. Do you think that in general sensitive questions should be part of a popu-
lation and housing census questionnaire?  
  Yes, certainly 
  Yes, but as optional question 
  Maybe, if it is important for the distribution of subsidies 
  No, never 
  Not applicable 
  Don’t know  
46. Could you please elaborate a bit more on your answer(s) above; why do 
you think so?  
Open question.  
Do you agree/disagree with including the following aspects in census ques-
tionnaires for all countries in the UNECE region?  
47. Citizenship 
Totally agree              Totally disagree 
 Don’t know  
48. Ethnicity 
Totally agree              Totally disagree 
 Don’t know 
49. Language 
Totally agree              Totally disagree 
 Don’t know 
50. Religion 
Totally agree              Totally disagree 
 Don’t know 
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51. Could you please elaborate on your answer(s) above; why did you 
choose these options?  
Open question.  
Part 3: EU census regulations 
This is the third part of the questionnaire, focusing on the EU population and 
housing census regulations. If you do not feel familiar with this part, you can 
indicate so in the following question and will then be guided to the next part 
of the questionnaire. 
52. Would you consider yourself familiar with the EU population and housing 
census regulations?  
  Yes 
  Yes, to some extent  
  No, not at all 
53. What are, according to you, the most important issues of the EU popula-
tion and housing census regulations?  
Open question. 
To what extent do you think that the EU census regulations are a good or a 
bad tool for national population and housing censuses with regard to the 
following aspects? 
54. The census law 
Very good tool                  Very bad tool 
 Not applicable                     Don’t know 
55. The census methodology 
Very good tool                  Very bad tool 
 Not applicable                     Don’t know 
56. The census questionnaire 
Very good tool                  Very bad tool   
 Not applicable                     Don’t know 
57. The enumeration process 
Very good tool                  Very bad tool 
 Not applicable                     Don’t know 
58. Other, please specify 
Very good tool                  Very bad tool 
 Not applicable                     Don’t know 
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59. Apart from the EU population and housing census regulations are there 
any other international organisations’ practices which, you think need to 
be considered while implementing a census? 
Could you please name them.  
Open question.  
To what extent do you think the EU should do more or less to ensure compa-
rability on the following aspects of the population and housing census?  
60. Census results 
EU should do more           EU should do less 
 Don’t know 
61. Census methodology 
EU should do more           EU should do less 
 Don’t know 
62. Census topics 
EU should do more           EU should do less 
 Don’t know 
63. Is there something you would have liked to have addressed differently in 
the census topics of the EU population and housing census regulations for 
the census round of 2010? 
  Yes, please specify…  
  No  
  Don’t know 
64. Is there something you would have liked to have addressed differently in 
the methodological approaches of the EU population and housing census 
regulations for the census round of 2010? 
  Yes, please specify…  
  No  
  Don’t know 
65. Unlike the UNECE population and housing recommendations, the EU does 
not include non-core census topics in the population and housing census 
regulations. Are there census topics within the EU (and maybe even the 
EU census regulations) that you would nonetheless identify as sensitive?  
  Yes, please specify…  
  No  
  Don’t know 
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Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following: The EU 
population and housing census regulations should contain more precise 
rules for census questions regarding... 
66. Citizenship 
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree  
 Don’t know 
67. Ethnicity 
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree  
 Don’t know 
68. Language 
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree  
 Don’t know 
69. Religion 
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree  
 Don’t know 
70. Have you been present at a meeting/meetings on the population and 
housing census organised by Eurostat since 2005, for example in Luxem-
bourg?  
  Yes, attended (almost) all  
  Yes, at least five  
  Yes, 2 - 4 
  Yes, 1 meeting 
  No  
  Don’t remember 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, 
keeping in mind that this question takes into account general meetings on 
the population and housing census at Eurostat:  
71. I have learnt new approaches at the meetings at Eurostat 
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree  
 Don’t know 
72. I am using the approaches I have learnt at the meetings in my own work 
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree  
 Don’t know 
73. These meetings are relevant for my work.  
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree  
 Don’t know 
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74. Can you give one example in which you started applying a new ap-
proach because of these meetings? 
Open question.  
To what extent are, according to you, the aspects discussed at the meetings 
at Eurostat implemented in the population and housing censuses with regard 
to: 
75. The census law 
Strong extent                   No extent 
 Not applicable                    Don’t know 
76. The census methodology 
Strong extent                   No extent 
 Don’t know 
77. The census questionnaire 
Strong extent                  No extent 
 Not applicable                  Don’t know  
78. The enumeration process 
Strong extent                  No extent 
 Don’t know  
79. Other, please specify 
Strong extent                  No extent 
 Don’t know 
80. Could you please elaborate on why you think this is the case?  
Open question.  
Part 4: Western Balkans 
This is the fourth and last part of the questionnaire, focusing on accession 
countries of the EU, in particular the region of the Western Balkans and cen-
sus-taking. If you do not feel familiar with this part, you can indicate so in the 
following question and will then be guided to end of the questionnaire. 
81. Would you consider yourself familiar with the political situation in the 
Western Balkans in general and the population and housing censuses in 
particular?  
  Yes 
  Yes, to some extent  
  No, not at all  
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
82. The countries in the Western Balkans need support with the population 
and housing census. 
Strongly agree           Strongly disagree 
Don’t know 
83. Could you please elaborate on the kind of support you have in mind and 
for which country/-ies this was/is applicable?  
Open question.  
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statement:  
84. The EU faces challenges in influencing the population and housing census 
in Western Balkan countries. 
Strongly agree           Strongly disagree 
Don’t know 
85. Can you remember one or more concrete example where the EU has had 
an impact on the population and housing census/-es in one or more 
Western Balkan countries? 
Open question.  
What is your opinion regarding the following: 
86. EU pre-accession incentives have been instrumental in securing compli-
ance behaviour with regard to the population and housing census in the 
2010 and 2020 census round in the Western Balkans. 
Highly useful           Not at all useful 
Don’t know 
87. Do you know of one or more concrete examples where the EU has used/is 
using pre-accession incentives for the conduct of the population and 
housing census in the Western Balkans? Please, also name the country/-
ies.  
Open question.  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
88. With regard to EU influence on the population and housing census, finan-
cial incentives are most important for accession countries.  
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know 
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89. With regard to EU influence on the population and housing census, sup-
port for the general census design (census law, methodology, question-
naires etc.) are most important for accession countries.  
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree 
 Don’t know 
90. Do you think that there are other stakeholders apart from the EU which 
influence the population and housing census in accession countries, such 
as the Western Balkans?  
  Yes, please specify which and where… 
  No 
  Don’t know 
91. In which direction can these stakeholders (see question above) influence 
the population and housing census in accession countries, such as the 
Western Balkans?  
Open question.  
92. With regard to census-taking, what would you consider as sensitive, diffi-
cult and/or problematic topics to include in the census questionnaire in 
the Western Balkans? 
Open question. 
93. How sensitive would you regard the issues in your answer above?  
Very sensitive           Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know  
94. To what extent do you think these sensitive issues can affect the popula-
tion and housing census?  
Open question.  
95. Could you please specify which country/countries you had in mind while 
answering the question(s) above? More than one answer is possible. 
  Albania 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  Croatia 
  Kosovo∗ 
  The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
  Montenegro 
  Serbia 
  Other, please specify…  
 
                                                        
∗ This designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244/99 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of 
independence. 
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the sensitivity of the following 
aspects in the Western Balkans?  
96. Citizenship 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
97. Ethnicity 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
98. Language  
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
99. Religion 
Highly sensitive             Not at all sensitive 
 Don’t know 
Do you think the countries in the Western Balkans are more interested in in-
cluding citizenship, ethnicity, language and religion in the census question-
naire than most other countries in Europe?  
100. Citizenship 
Yes, certainly             No, not at all 
 Don’t know 
101. Ethnicity 
Yes, certainly             No, not at all 
 Don’t know 
102. Language  
Yes, certainly             No, not at all 
 Don’t know 
103. Religion 
Yes, certainly             No, not at all 
 Don’t know 
104.Could you please elaborate more on your answer above; why do you 
think so?  
Open question.  
End of questionnaire 
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Thank you very much! 
 
This is the end of this questionnaire.  
105. If you have additional remarks, please leave them here: 
Open question.  
If you have documents which may be relevant for this project, please let us 
know (or send them to anna-lena.hoh@maastrichtuniversity.nl).  
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire second survey round 
Dear census expert,  
Thank you very much for your participation in the survey sent to you in June.  
Like last time, we would appreciate if you would answer from your personal 
experience, rather than following the official lines of the organisation you are 
working with (unless they are the same, of course). The answers to this survey 
will be treated completely confidential. We will make sure that your answers 
cannot be traced to your affiliation or name. Your participation is voluntary. 
The survey is divided in two parts. If you are not familiar with a topic, you can 
skip to the next one. The survey will allow you to skip forward and backward 
if you want to reconsider your answer.  
In order to have a better, more coherent insight in the answers from the first 
survey, we are now collecting more reflections and elaborations of how you 
and your colleagues perceive the topics, practices and regulations of cen-
sus-taking. The results of the surveys will provide us with better understanding 
of how census experts perceive the practices behind census-taking. This may 
have implications for the design of census questions and variables. Further-
more it is an essential part of the PhD project ‘Europeanization of census-
taking in the Western Balkans’ at Maastricht University (The Netherlands). 
Should you have any questions or comments please contact Professor Hans 
Schmeets (h.schmeets@cbs.nl) and/or Anna-Lena Hoh (anna-
lena.hoh@maastrichtuniversity.nl).  
Thank you very much for participating!  
Anna-Lena Hoh 
PhD Candidate - Maastricht University 
This PhD project is supported by Dr. Pieter Everaers (Director Cooperation in 
the European Statistical System, International cooperation, resources –
Eurostat) and Eric Schulte Nordholt (Senior Researcher- Project Leader of the 
Census- Statistics Netherlands). 
To what extent would you agree/disagree with the following statement: 
1. The population and housing census is a good indicator of a functioning 
state. 
Strongly agree           Strongly disagree 
Don’t know 
2. Please could you elaborate on why you think so?  
Open question.  
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To what extent would you agree/disagree with the following statement: 
3. The National Statistical Institutes who conduct censuses should act inde-
pendent from political influence by the political parties in power? 
Strongly agree             Strongly disagree 
Don’t know 
4. Please could you elaborate on why you think so?  
Open question.  
5. In the survey from June, all of the census experts agreed that with regard 
to the successful implementation of a census a strong and independent 
National Statistical Institute is either very necessary (80%) or at least nec-
essary (20%). Could you please elaborate on why you think that a strong 
and independent National Statistical Institute is that important when con-
ducting a census? 
Open question.  
6. The second important aspect for the successful implementation of a pop-
ulation and housing census according to the survey from June is the polit-
ical willingness of the parties in power. 80% of census experts find this as-
pect either very necessary or necessary. Could you please elaborate on 
why you think that the political willingness by the parties in power is re-
garded as important?  
If you do not agree with the general trend, please elaborate why. 
Open question.  
7. According to the survey from June, the third important aspect for the suc-
cessful implementation of a population and housing census is support 
from Eurostat. 70% of census experts find this aspect either very necessary 
or necessary. Could you please elaborate on why you think that support 
from Eurostat is that essential for the conduct of a successful population 
and housing census? 
If you do not agree with the general trend, please elaborate why. 
Open question.  
We would like to remind you to answer the following questions from your 
personal experience rather than following the official lines of the organisa-
tion you are working with (unless they are the same, of course).  
8. With regard to the successful implementation of a population and housing 
census, strong state institutions (such as the judicial system, army and po-
lice), fairly high trust in institutions and politicians and the political parties 
in general were regarded as either not and/or less necessary (see report 
page 12). Could you please elaborate on why you think that these as-
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pects are generally seen as less important than the aspects mentioned 
above for a successful census?  
If you do not agree with the general trend, please elaborate why. 
Open question.  
9. In the survey from June, a majority of census experts identified ethnicity 
as highly sensitive (72%) or sensitive (22%). Could you please elaborate 
on why you identify the aspect of ethnicity as highly sensitive/sensitive? 
If you do not agree with the general trend, please elaborate why.  
Open question.  
10. In addition religion was also identified as sensitive. Could you please 
elaborate on why you think so?  
Open question.  
11. Income was also identified as a sensitive aspect. Could you please elab-
orate on why you think so?  
Open question.  
12. Almost 50% of the census experts would include a few sensitive census 
topics in the population and housing census as optional questions. Which 
questions, if any, would you include and why? 
Open question.  
13. In the survey from June, when asking for agreement/disagreement with 
including citizenship, ethnicity, language and religion; the answers 
showed that 77% of the census experts agreed with collecting data of citi-
zenship and 46% also would include data of language in the census top-
ics for all UNECE countries. Why would you include/not include the aspect 
of citizenship and/or language in the census data collection?  
Open question.  
14. In contrast, most census experts would not include the aspects of ethnici-
ty and religion in the census topics. Could you explain why you would or 
would not include these census topics?  
Open question.  
15. Why do you think most of the census experts would include citizenship 
and language in the population and housing census topics, but not eth-
nicity and religion?  
Open question.  
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Considering that including questions on ethnicity, religion and language can 
threaten the data collection for the population and housing census; do you 
think that these should be excluded from the data collection in general? 
Please indicate what you think per aspect.  
16. Ethnicity 
  Yes, certainly 
  Yes, but as optional question 
  Maybe, if it is important for the distribution of subsidies 
  No, never 
  Not applicable 
  Don’t know  
17. Language 
  Yes, certainly 
  Yes, but as optional question 
  Maybe, if it is important for the distribution of subsidies 
  No, never 
  Not applicable 
  Don’t know  
18. Religion 
  Yes, certainly 
  Yes, but as optional question 
  Maybe, if it is important for the distribution of subsidies 
  No, never 
  Not applicable 
  Don’t know  
However, in the case that this data is crucial for policies such as to protect 
minorities, would you still exclude these topics from the population and hous-
ing census? Please indicate what you think per aspect. 
19. Ethnicity 
  Yes, they should not be part of the census topics  
  I would include them on a voluntary basis 
  No, they should definitely be included in the census topics 
  Not applicable 
  Don’t know  
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20. Language 
  Yes, they should not be part of the census topics  
  I would include them on a voluntary basis 
  No, they should definitely be included in the census topics 
  Not applicable 
  Don’t know 
21. Religion 
  Yes, they should not be part of the census topics  
  I would include them on a voluntary basis 
  No, they should definitely be included in the census topics 
  Not applicable 
  Don’t know 
22. Could you please elaborate on your answer(s) above?  
Open question.  
 
23. The UNECE population and housing recommendations are by definition 
not mandatory. However in the survey from June, a few experts (20%) 
were in favour of making the Conference of European Statisticians (CES) 
Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing (the 
UNECE population and housing recommendations) mandatory.  
Could you please elaborate on why you agreed/disagreed with the 
statement that the UNECE recommendations should be mandatory while 
designing the census questionnaire?  
Open question.  
24. In the survey of June, most experts agreed that the Conference of Euro-
pean Statisticians (CES) Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Popu-
lation and Housing (the UNECE population and housing recommenda-
tions) are a useful tool for the population and housing census (93%). As a 
follow up we would like to know how legitimate you perceive the CES 
recommendations. Please indicate your answer in the categories below. 
Very legitimate           Not at all legitimate 
 Don’t know 
25. Could you please elaborate on your answer above; why would you de-
scribe the Conference of European Statisticians (CES) Recommendations 
for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing (the UNECE population 
and housing recommendations) as legitimate/not legitimate?  
Open question.  
26. Considering that the EU census regulations have to be implemented with-
in the EU, but are also taken into account by accession countries, which 
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do not yet have the obligation to implement these. Within this perspec-
tive, to what extent would you describe the EU population and housing 
census regulations as legitimate for the population and housing censuses 
in enlargement countries?  
Very legitimate           Not at all legitimate 
 Don’t know 
27. Why would you describe the EU population and housing census regula-
tions for enlargement countries as legitimate/not legitimate?  
Open question.  
Part 2: Western Balkans 
This is the second and last part of the questionnaire, focusing on accession 
countries of the EU, in particular the region of the Western Balkans and cen-
sus-taking. If you do not feel familiar with this part, you can indicate so in the 
following question and will then be guided to end of the questionnaire. 
28. Would you consider yourself familiar with the political situation in the 
Western Balkans in general and the population and housing censuses in 
particular? 
  Yes 
  Yes, to some extent 
  No, not at all  
According to the survey from June a majority of census experts answered 
positively on the question whether the Western Balkan countries need sup-
port with the population and housing census. However, the open answer field 
showed a variation between those countries. Could you please indicate be-
low to what extent which Western Balkan country you think needs support 
with the population and housing census? 
29. Albania 
  No need for support 
  Need for support 
  Strong need for support 
  Don’t know 
30. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  No need for support 
  Need for support 
  Strong need for support 
  Don’t know 
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31. Croatia 
  No need for support 
  Need for support 
  Strong need for support 
  Don’t know 
32. Kosovo∗ 
  No need for support 
  Need for support 
  Strong need for support 
  Don’t know 
33. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
  No need for support 
  Need for support 
  Strong need for support 
  Don’t know 
34. Montenegro 
  No need for support 
  Need for support 
  Strong need for support 
  Don’t know 
35. Serbia 
  No need for support 
  Need for support 
  Strong need for support 
  Don’t know 
 
The EU may support a population and housing census in various manners, 
such as providing technical and legal support. Could you please indicate 
what kind of support you think each of these countries need most in order to 
conduct a successful population and housing census? More than one an-
swer is possible, but please keep in mind to focus on the most important as-
pect(s).  
  
                                                        
∗ This designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244/99 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of 
independence. 
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36. Albania 
  Technical support (e.g. IT expertise and software) 
  Methodological support (e.g. with the definitions of the census topics) 
  Support to strengthen the National Statistical Institute (e.g. against 
political influence) 
  Legal support (e.g. with the census law) 
  Financial support (e.g. fieldwork, payment of enumerators ) 
  Other support 
  No support needed 
  Don’t know 
37. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  Technical support (e.g. IT expertise and software) 
  Methodological support (e.g. with the definitions of the census topics) 
  Support to strengthen the National Statistical Institute (e.g. against 
political influence) 
  Legal support (e.g. with the census law) 
  Financial support (e.g. fieldwork, payment of enumerators ) 
  Other support 
  No support needed 
  Don’t know 
38. Croatia 
  Technical support (e.g. IT expertise and software) 
  Methodological support (e.g. with the definitions of the census topics) 
  Support to strengthen the National Statistical Institute (e.g. against 
political influence) 
  Legal support (e.g. with the census law) 
  Financial support (e.g. fieldwork, payment of enumerators ) 
  Other support 
  No support needed 
  Don’t know 
39. Kosovo∗ 
  Technical support (e.g. IT expertise and software) 
  Methodological support (e.g. with the definitions of the census topics) 
  Support to strengthen the National Statistical Institute (e.g. against 
political influence) 
  Legal support (e.g. with the census law) 
  Financial support (e.g. fieldwork, payment of enumerators ) 
                                                        
∗ This designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244/99 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of 
independence. 
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  Other support 
  No support needed 
  Don’t know 
40. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
  Technical support (e.g. IT expertise and software) 
  Methodological support (e.g. with the definitions of the census topics) 
  Support to strengthen the National Statistical Institute (e.g. against 
political influence) 
  Legal support (e.g. with the census law) 
  Financial support (e.g. fieldwork, payment of enumerators ) 
  Other support 
  No support needed 
  Don’t know 
41. Montenegro 
  Technical support (e.g. IT expertise and software) 
  Methodological support (e.g. with the definitions of the census topics) 
  Support to strengthen the National Statistical Institute (e.g. against 
political influence) 
  Legal support (e.g. with the census law) 
  Financial support (e.g. fieldwork, payment of enumerators ) 
  Other support 
  No support needed 
  Don’t know 
42. Serbia 
  Technical support (e.g. IT expertise and software) 
  Methodological support (e.g. with the definitions of the census topics) 
  Support to strengthen the National Statistical Institute (e.g. against 
political influence) 
  Legal support (e.g. with the census law) 
  Financial support (e.g. fieldwork, payment of enumerators ) 
  Other support 
  No support needed 
  Don’t know 
43. Could you please elaborate on your answer(s) above?  
Open question.  
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To what extent do you think that the level of advancement of a country with-
in the enlargement process towards European Union membership has influ-
ence on the successful performance of the population and housing censuses 
in the Western Balkan countries? Please, specify per country.  
44. Albania 
  Weak influence 
  No influence 
  Some influence 
  Strong influence 
  Don’t know 
45. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
  Weak influence 
  No influence 
  Some influence 
  Strong influence 
  Don’t know 
46. Croatia 
  Weak influence 
  No influence 
  Some influence 
  Strong influence 
  Don’t know 
47. Kosovo∗ 
  Weak influence 
  No influence 
  Some influence 
  Strong influence 
  Don’t know 
48. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
  Weak influence 
  No influence 
  Some influence 
  Strong influence 
  Don’t know 
 
                                                        
∗ This designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244/99 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of 
independence. 
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49. Montenegro 
  Weak influence 
  No influence 
  Some influence 
  Strong influence 
  Don’t know 
50. Serbia 
  Weak influence 
  No influence 
  Some influence 
  Strong influence 
  Don’t know 
51. Could you please elaborate on your answer(s) above?  
Open question.  
Thank you very much! This is the end of this questionnaire.  
52. If you have additional remarks, please leave them here:  
Open question.  
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Introduction 
It is commonly believed that censuses are a purely technical exercise. How-
ever, in reality the collection of population data is highly political, and many 
laypeople do not understand the implications and possible complications 
inherent in the collection of population data. As censuses in the Netherlands 
are conducted via registers, many Dutch citizens are unaware of the process 
of data collection. In Germany, where in 2011 the first census was taken 
since the 80’s, the topic of census-taking was long neglected.36 As census-
taking is already a complicated process in established democracies such as 
Germany, one might expect that in post-conflict countries with less stable 
institutions, there are even more obstacles when it comes to the population 
count. For example, the countries in the Western Balkans, which are except 
for Albania all countries that were part of former Yugoslavia, there is a wide 
variation in recent census outcomes. These countries are however also pro-
spective members of the European Union (EU) and since the census is part of 
the acquis communautaire, the full body of EU rules and norms, there is con-
siderable pressure on enlargement countries to comply with the EU census 
regulations.  
This thesis assesses the census processes in three of the Western Balkan 
countries Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, which are all (or in the case of 
Croatia were) part of EU enlargement and as such have to comply with the 
EU regulations, but show different outcomes when it comes to census-taking. 
Croatia’s 2011 census was successful, whereas Bosnia’s 2013 census was the 
first census after the wars (1992-1995) and long delayed. Macedonia’s 2011 
census was aborted after the enumeration started.  
The politics of numbers 
Censuses were already conducted in ancient Babylon 6000 years ago (Unit-
ed Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 9). Whereas in the 
beginning the data was purely used to count people, it currently also in-
cludes the collection of data on social and economic life (United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2006, p. 9). As the first tool to collect data 
on complete populations, the census can be seen as the mother of big da-
ta. Big data nowadays is a term ‘to mark a departure from conventional 
                                                        
36 Due to protests based on the fear of invasion of personal privacy, Germany stopped collecting 
census data after 1987 (in West Germany population numbers have been based on municipality 
registers, and in the former East Germany the last population data is from 1990). Population data 
was thus based on estimates until the 2011 census, which revealed that the total population was 
1.5 million less than expected, which in the end led to a decrease in subsidies for municipalities 
and cities where the number of inhabitants was lower than anticipated (Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, 2013). 
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forms of data and statistical knowledge’ (Ruppert, Isin, & Bigo, 2017, p. 2), 
but has different meanings and applications. It remains nonetheless crucial 
to study where such data derives from and how this data is collected, as this 
can have serious implications for its validity and reliability.  
Even more important is that the data may have a severe impact on the 
life of the people behind the numbers: the citizens. As census data is used to 
allocate resources, for example the distribution of funds and subsidies, ulti-
mately some profit more than others, which makes census processes highly 
political and even more so, when rights of minority and ethnic groups are 
connected to the census outcomes, as in the case countries. In Croatia mi-
nority rights are linked to the census results (Petričušić, 2002). In Bosnia the 
population data of 1991 is linked to the Dayton Peace Agreement, which 
divides the political system among the three constituent ethnic groups (Bos-
niak, Croat and Serb) (Armakolas & Maksimovic, 2014; Bieber, 2004). In Mac-
edonia, the census is linked to the Ohrid Framework Agreement which 
stopped the armed conflict between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians in 
2001, and according to which minorities making up more than 20% of the 
population receive language rights and proportional representation in the 
police and bureaucracy (Brunnbauer, 2002; Vasilev, 2013). In general these 
outcomes show that there should be more awareness of the fact that cen-
suses are always political processes and can feed existing tensions. Since 
census data is used for policy-making, ultimately some will gain and others 
will lose on the basis of the census data. There should also be more aware-
ness of the political implications that are inherent to census-taking, especially 
if the census results are linked to peace agreements and minority rights. 
These situations call for more additional measures, such as supervision 
through international monitoring missions and/or a clear agreement on the 
census regulations by all actors involved.  
When data is collected, people are quantified into categories with which 
they have to identify. Inclusion or exclusion based these categories is best 
described by the saying: ‘If you are not counted, you do not exist’. To gain 
attention and rights, people have to be visible, and counting is one way to 
be seen, as has been highlighted in chapter 4 of this research by addressing 
the paradox of collecting ethnic and cultural data. This paradox entails that 
if a minority group is not counted, it is also not recognised. However, if 
counted, that group can be affected by discrimination, either in a positive or 
a negative way. Especially after the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, issues of 
ethnicity and geographic belonging developed into tools for ethnic bargain-
ing over borders, rights and political representation (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, 
p. 6). Whereas until the dissolution of the country in 1991, identity questions in 
Yugoslavian censuses were common and based on self-identification 
(Bieber, 2015, p. 10), the census questionnaires in Croatia and Bosnia nowa-
days are a mix of closed and open answers favouring the most prominent 
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ethnic groups. When the census questionnaire includes questions on ethnic 
and cultural belonging, such as ethnicity, language and religion, it not only 
provides an overview of the demographic, social and economic character-
istics of a country’s population (Valente, 2010), but also creates an oppor-
tunity for individuals to identify as being part of this population (Ruppert, 
2007). As such the census can be used as a tool for state building, but poten-
tially also misused to (re)assure legitimacy and supremacy over others. 
The implications that can follow from this is not only restricted to census 
data and can for example be extended to the collection of data on migra-
tion (Broeders & Dijstelbloem, 2016). We have to be careful while categoris-
ing people into groups and the potential consequences that might follow. A 
typical example is Germany, where due to the abuse of the Sinti lists by the 
Nazi police it is not allowed to register minorities (Salentin & Schmeets, 2017, 
p. 7). There is no easy answer to the paradox of whether or not ethno-
cultural data should be collected; however, in the light of increasing num-
bers of refugees and minority groups, as well as more right wing and populist 
parties, awareness of this paradox and its potential implications is para-
mount.  
Counting to be counted – EU enlargement 
Not only is census data important for the national statistics, but also within 
the context of the European Union. As evidence-based decision making is 
becoming more important, the need for reliable and harmonised data is 
increasing. Therefore the EU has made it mandatory for its members to have 
a decennial population count. The census is included in the acquis commu-
nautaire and thus also important for the enlargement countries. They do not 
officially need to comply with the EU regulations as they are not yet mem-
bers, but it is highly recommended that they do so.   
This thesis addresses the puzzle of why, despite the EU conditions being 
the same for all three countries, there are differences in compliance with the 
EU census regulations in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. Whereas Croatia 
had a complete census with almost no complications, Bosnia’s census has 
significant delays and Macedonia’s census was aborted. The results of this 
research show that the influence of the EU, as well as domestic actors in the 
census processes is of high importance. In addition, this project also high-
lighted the political nature of the census processes, especially if the census 
includes questions on ethnic and cultural characteristics. The case analysis of 
chapter 5 and 6 showed that in Bosnia and Macedonia domestic actors 
hindered the census processes in order to favour the dominant population 
groups.  
Valorisation addendum 
189 
The analysis in chapter 5 has shown that Bosnia and Macedonia needed 
financial and/or technical assistance when conducting a census. One find-
ing from the Macedonian case was that a shorter and smaller operation is 
not necessary a viable solution. If there is assistance, it should be sufficient 
and tailored to the situation at hand. The tailoring to the situation at hand 
should also be relevant for the enlargement process in general. This thesis 
has shown that there is no one-size-fits-all process of enlargement into the EU. 
After Croatia became an EU member in 2013, enlargement currently seems 
to be on hold. Internal EU issues and Brexit seem to be more important than 
bringing the remaining Western Balkan countries into the Union. Enlarge-
ment, however, was conceived with the intention to spread peace and 
prosperity, and if taken serious by all actors involved, it is a powerful tool. In 
March 2017, the European Council reaffirmed its ‘unequivocal support for 
the European perspective of the Western Balkans’ (European Commission, 
2018). The prospect of the inclusion of the remaining Balkan countries and 
the, even though at times very slow, progress should be something that 
should not be nullified by taking away the prospect of ever becoming a 
member of the EU.  
Next to the willingness of the EU to accept new members, are of course 
the countries in the Western Balkans who have to step up and show that 
they are worthy of becoming EU members. This research has shown in chap-
ter 6 that the domestic context and actors should not be underestimated 
when it comes to census-taking, and this also holds for the enlargement pro-
cess in general. Recently, Macedonia has made enormous progress and the 
name dispute with Greece seems to be almost resolved, which could finally 
start the membership negotiations. How this will affect the future plans for a 
census remains to be seen, but this research has highlighted the ethno-
cultural sensitivities present in the country which need to be taken into ac-
count in any future census and enlargement plans. With regard to Bosnia, 
there is however less good news. Even though the census data has finally 
been published, the same issues as always seem to present themselves. Next 
to the publication of the census results, another step in the right direction 
would be to find a solution to the Sejdić-Finci case37 and to increase political 
equality. Once there is development in the Balkans towards the EU principles 
there might be hope for future enlargement.  
                                                        
37 Under the Dayton Peace Accord only members of the three main constituent groups can be 
elected for the House of Peoples or for the Presidency in Bosnia. Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci are 
Bosnian citizens, but respectively Roma and Jewish. However, to stand for the elections, they 
would have to be a member of one of the main constituent groups (Bosniak, Croat or Serb). The 
European Court of Human Rights found that this was discriminatory and Bosnia’s ‘constitution 
remains in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (European Commission, 2018).   
 190 
Dissemination of results 
The results of this research are important for the academic world, where re-
search on census-taking especially within the framework of Europeanisation 
is a novelty. Next to this, the results are of importance for the National Statis-
tical Institutes and the Directorate General European Statistics (DG ESTAT) of 
the European Commission (Eurostat) as they highlight the sensitivities, which 
need to be taken into account in census-taking processes. Furthermore, the 
results are interesting for international organisations, such as the United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).   
To answer the research question of this thesis, two different methods were 
used to gather the data. In-depth interviews were complemented with sur-
vey data that was collected in two different rounds. This data is not only of 
crucial value for this research, but could potentially be used for follow-up 
research and be of interest for the international census community. The sur-
vey results in particular could be used for example to review the Conference 
of European Statisticians census recommendations and potentially also the 
EU census regulations. The results from this thesis are thus not only of value for 
the academic world, but contribute to a better understanding of census-
taking in general and among European Statisticians and decision makers in 
particular.  
The results of this research may have a direct impact on the next census 
round, which includes all censuses from 2015 until 2024. Croatia, the case 
country which now is a member of the EU, will have to comply with EU cen-
sus regulations. The results of this research show that other enlargement 
countries, such as Bosnia and Macedonia, who had difficulties in their last 
censuses, will also require technical and financial assistance in the next cen-
sus round. As minority and linguistic rights are connected to the census out-
comes, the next censuses in these countries will also be highly political under-
takings. This research has demonstrated that in addition to support by the EU, 
the domestic context is crucially important, and that past experience and 
better scores on state capacity do not guarantee a good census, as was 
visible in Macedonia. When planning a census, domestic developments, 
especially when there is domestic contestation, need to be taken into ac-
count. This should be taken on board in the EU census regulations and em-
phasised in the Conference of European Statisticians recommendations by 
the UNECE. 
To disseminate the results, preliminary results were presented at several 
academic conferences, including the Association for the Study of Nationali-
ties World Convention at Columbia University in April 2014. This study was also 
supported by an external advisory board, which included members working 
at Eurostat and Statistics Netherlands. In addition, visits have been made to 
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the Conference of European Statisticians Recommendations on the popula-
tion census of the UNECE in Geneva in September 2013 and in Septem-
ber/October 2015. A short academic visit was made to the ARITHMUS project 
at Goldsmiths, University of London in November 2016. Next to this, some 
preliminary results were presented at the Fifth International Conference of 
Balkans Demography in in October 2015 in Ohrid, where not only people 
from Eurostat and the UNECE were present, but also all census experts from 
the National Statistical Offices of all the Western Balkan countries.  
In addition, two of the three chapters of this thesis have already been 
published as academic articles, and the third empirical chapter is currently 
being revised for resubmission. Another academic article has been pub-
lished during the time of this project, which however only analyses the 2011 
census in Croatia (Hoh, 2015) and therefore is not part of this thesis. Apart 
from these academic contributions a policy note discussing the challenges 
and controversies of census-taking in the Western Balkans was published with 
the Democratization Policy Council in 2016.  
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English summary 
This thesis analysed census-taking processes in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedo-
nia within the framework of EU enlargement. Although EU enlargement is 
currently suffering from enlargement fatigue, the European Commission re-
cently expressed its unequivocal support to the EU perspective of countries in 
the Western Balkan region (European Commission, 2018b). To become an EU 
member, countries need to fulfil certain conditions. These consist of the Co-
penhagen Criteria, the political criteria of the EU, and the 35 chapters of the 
acquis communautaire, which is the full body of EU rules and norms and 
tend to be seen as more technical (Anastasakis, 2008). Chapter 18 of the 
acquis outlines the statistical requirements and one of these aspects in this 
chapter is the population and housing census (hereafter census). Although 
(potential) EU candidate countries do not yet have a legal obligation to 
follow EU rules, they are strongly advised to do so, because it shows their 
level of preparedness for accession. 
Although sometimes seen as an outdated concept, a population census 
is crucial in modern society. Census data forms the backbone for vital na-
tional statistics such as GDP per capita, and provides the state with infor-
mation on its population and living standards. On average population cen-
suses are collected every ten years, and involve a census law and the prep-
aration of the enumeration, as well as the collection, processing, publication 
and dissemination of the population data. The collection of population data 
is very expensive and labour intensive (Schulte Nordholt, 2014, p. 9), but this 
data is needed to distribute subsidies and to make policy decisions. In the 
Western Balkans, after the Yugoslav wars, ethnicity and geographic belong-
ing were used as tools for ethnic bargaining over borders, rights and political 
representation (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 6). This led to the potential misuse 
of population data as a means to increase or decrease power and rights of 
certain population groups and as a result census-taking is highly political.  
There is a wide variation in census outcomes in the Western Balkans when 
we look at the most recent censuses. Whereas in Croatia, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro the census processes were not very problematic and have been 
described as only marginally contested,38 the Albanian census is partially 
contested by the ethnic minorities present in the country (Visoka & Gjevori, 
2013); in Kosovo the census was boycotted in some municipalities (Visoka & 
Gjevori, 2013); and in Bosnia it was postponed twice before being conduct-
ed in October 2013, and the results were not published until June 2016. Final-
                                                        
38 In Montenegro the census was marginally contested by the ethnic communities over lines of 
ethnic, religious and linguistic differences (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 13). In Serbia the complex 
relationship between the Serb majority and the Albanian and Bosniak minority led to minor con-
testations (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 16). In Croatia the census data has been accepted overall, 
but because of the wording of the questionnaires the results are marginally contested by the Serb 
minority (Pavelic, 2012).  
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ly, the census in Macedonia was aborted after a couple of days into the 
enumeration (Daskalovski, 2013). Based on the method of crucial cases 
(Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 176), this thesis has analysed the 2011 census in 
Croatia, the 2013 census in Bosnia and the 2011 census in Macedonia.  
This research analyses the variation in census-taking outcomes in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Macedonia to understand why even though they had the same 
EU conditions to comply with, their census processes were so different.  
Theoretical contribution and methodology 
In this thesis, the concept of Europeanisation is used for analysing EU en-
largement and census-taking in the Western Balkans. In order to do so, this 
thesis makes a distinction between internal and external Europeanisation, 
which respectively is the influence of the EU on its members and non-
members. Based on the definitions from Radaelli (2006) and Elbasani (2013), 
this thesis defines Europeanisation as the influence of the EU on its enlarge-
ment countries.  
Within the framework of Europeanisation there is scant research on cen-
sus-taking (Keil, 2015; Keil & Perry, 2015). Recently more attention has been 
paid to the censuses in the Western Balkan region, but this research focuses 
foremost on the construction of national identity through the census catego-
ries (Bieber, 2015) or on the aspect of ethnicity (Daskalovski, 2013; Visoka & 
Gjevori, 2013). The politics of numbers behind the population count have 
also been described as an important aspect (Daskalovski, 2013; Keil & Perry, 
2015) and, even though censuses form part of the ‘technical’ acquis, schol-
ars agree that they are not technical, but in fact highly political (Keil, 2015; 
Nobles, 2000; Perry, 2013; Vrgova, 2015). By analysing the censuses in Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Macedonia within the framework of EU enlargement this the-
sis contributes not only to research on census-taking and the politics of num-
bers, but also to the literature on Europeanisation by analysing compliance 
with a specific aspect of the acquis communautaire.  
The latter is described in detail in chapter 2. This chapter outlines the spe-
cific aspects countries need to comply with when it comes to census-taking, 
the EU census regulations. In addition, this chapter explains the three phases 
of compliance with the EU census regulations: non-compliance, partial 
compliance and full compliance. This chapter also displays how the different 
angles of Europeanisation—the explicit and implicit compliance with the EU 
census regulations, the direct influence of the EU and the influence of the 
domestic aspects—are used in this thesis to analyse the census processes of 
the three case countries (Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia).  
Chapter 3 of this thesis outlines the overall research design of this thesis. 
Using the additional coverage mixed methods model, data was collected 
via an expert survey in two rounds and in-depth interviews. The additional 
coverage mixed methods model (Morgan, 2014) was chosen as it contrib-
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utes to a more coherent understanding of the same phenomena by using 
qualitative as well as quantitative methods. To understand the census-taking 
processes in the case countries, in-depth interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) of the case coun-
tries, as well as the European Commission (for example at DG Estat (Eurostat) 
and DG NEAR) and International Census Consultants. In addition, official 
documents from the EU and (for example) the NSIs, as well as newspaper 
articles have been used for contextualisation. Finally, based on the Delphi 
method in which survey data is being collected in two rounds, 75 census 
experts were asked to fill in a questionnaire. The survey had a response rate 
of 69% [n=52] in the first round and 50% [n=38] in the second round. Collect-
ing the data in more than one round allowed for more interaction with and 
response from the census experts. The survey data provides important in-
sights into the census-taking processes in the EU and the regulations and 
recommendations for census-taking.  
Empirical contribution 
Chapter 4 highlights the paradox of collecting ethno-cultural data and the 
linkage of rights and numerical thresholds to the census outcomes which 
lead to domestic disputes and contestations. Although the Western Balkan 
region has a post-war history and the aspect of collecting data on ethno-
cultural data is regarded as sensitive, there is still a strong focus on these 
questions in the census (Bieber, 2015). In all case countries the census out-
comes are connected to minority and/or language rights, and as a result the 
census has to collect data on ethno-cultural characteristics. In Croatia, for 
example, minority rights are linked to the census results (Petričušić, 2002). In 
Bosnia the population data of 1991 is linked to the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment, which divides the political system among the three constituent ethnic 
groups (Bosniak, Croat and Serb) (Armakolas & Maksimovic, 2014; Bieber, 
2004). In Macedonia, the census is linked to the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
which stopped the armed conflict between ethnic Albanians and Macedo-
nians in 2001, and according to which minorities making up more than 20% 
of the population receive language rights and proportional representation in 
the police and bureaucracy (Brunnbauer, 2002; Vasilev, 2013). Consequent-
ly, some groups in the population tend to benefit from the census, whereas 
other groups tend to lose. Since the collection of data on ethno-cultural 
characteristics is not part of the EU requirements, this chapter analysed data 
from a survey conducted among census experts in order to assess the gen-
eral practice and implicit compliance of collecting ethno-cultural data. This 
chapter argues that censuses are always political processes and this is espe-
cially crucial if the domestic circumstances are as complex as in the Western 
Balkans.  
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The fifth chapter goes deeper into the analysis of the Europeanisation of 
census-taking. Earlier research on Europeanisation has looked into the nor-
mative and strategic dimensions of EU external power (Noutcheva, 2009, 
2012) and ‘EU member state building’, a concept used for the EU’s ap-
proach of building functional states while integrating them (Bieber, 2011; 
Denti, 2014; Keil, 2013a). As the EU has high stakes in the stability of the West-
ern Balkan region, it wants to develop reliable statistics in its potential mem-
ber states (Bieber, 2015, p. 11). All the Western Balkan countries were in the 
2010 census round either financially and/or technically supported by the 
European Commission, through for example Eurostat, the Directorate Gen-
eral European Statistics of the European Commission. The effects of Europe-
anisation on the census processes in the case countries are analysed by 
looking at the mechanisms of conditionality and legitimacy. Conditionality is 
based on the rational-choice calculation of the EU (dis-)incentives and legit-
imacy analyses whether the EU regulations are accepted or contested 
based on the perception of appropriateness. This chapter concludes that in 
Croatia legitimacy was more effective whereas in Bosnia the EU rewards and 
pressure were able to tip the balance in favour of compliance. In Macedo-
nia noncompliance can be explained either by conditionality—since there 
were no concrete EU rewards, the cost/benefit calculation could not out-
weigh the domestic adoption costs—or by legitimacy, since there was a 
strong contestation against the EU census regulations. Both mechanisms 
have been effective in the three case countries and by stating that condi-
tionality and legitimacy do matter, this chapter contributes to the general 
literature on Europeanisation.  
Besides the influence of the EU, domestic aspects are also important 
when looking at enlargement processes (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a). 
Chapter 6 therefore analyses the influence of domestic aspects, such as 
state capacity and domestic actors, but also external actors, on the census 
processes. Census-taking is closely connected to state institutions and is ‘an 
assertion of sovereign authority over people and social relations’ (Curtis, 
2001, p. 36). Also within the EU ‘good quality statistics are a part of the basic 
infrastructure’ (Everaers, 2015, p. 188) and therefore countries aiming to join 
the EU need to show that they can collect reliable population data. Earlier 
research (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a, p. 6) suggests that limited state-
hood—the lack of structures to constrain human action and execute EU 
rules—is one of the main obstacles for the Western Balkans’ compliance with 
EU regulations. In addition to the structural aspect of state capacity, which 
can potentially inhibit the compliance behaviour of accession countries, 
chapter 6 assesses the agency of domestic and external actors. The evi-
dence shows that when there are domestic disputes, as in the case of Bos-
nia, the influence of the EU as an external actor is important. However, if the 
EU has little leverage and there are domestic disputes, census processes can 
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also be hindered to the extent that they have to be aborted, as in Macedo-
nia. The case of Croatia shows that if there are almost no domestic disputes, 
the influence of external actors is not needed to be compliant with the EU 
census regulations. This also confirms the finding in Chapter 5, where for Cro-
atia the Europeanisation mechanism of legitimacy was most important and 
for Bosnia conditionality was able to tip the balance in favour of compli-
ance, but in the case of Macedonia the EU could not overcome the domes-
tic contestations. This chapter concludes that domestic agency should not 
be underestimated when it comes to census processes. 
The overall results of this research can be summarised in three main find-
ings. First, the analysis shows that especially if rights and proportional repre-
sentation of power are connected to the census outcomes, this can politi-
cise and seriously hinder census processes. Second, by accepting or disput-
ing the EU census regulations, domestic actors can respectively either facili-
tate or obstruct the compliance with the EU census regulations. This is related 
to the first aspect, because the acceptance of the EU census regulations 
depends on the potential gain or loss of power based on the census out-
comes for the domestic actors. Third, depending on the available rewards 
and direct pressure of the EU, the EU might be able to overcome domestic 
disputes and tip the balance in favour of compliance. The results of this re-
search lead to a better understanding of census-taking and show that alt-
hough the census is based on statistical procedures and regulations, it ulti-
mately remains highly politicised.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift analyseert volkstellingsprocessen in Kroatië, Bosnië en Mace-
donia in het perspectief van de uitbreiding van de Europese Unie (EU). On-
danks het feit dat de EU-uitbreiding sinds 2004 nog maar in een vertraagd 
tempo plaatsvindt,39 ook enlargement fatigue genoemd, heeft de Europese 
Commissie recentelijk nog haar steun uitgesproken voor de landen op de 
Westelijke Balkan, die als toekomstige EU-lidstaten zijn aangewezen 
(European Commission, 2018b). Om EU-lidstaat te worden, moeten deze 
landen aan bepaalde condities voldoen. Deze condities bestaan uit twee 
delen. Ten eerste de Copenhagen Criteria: de politieke criteria van de EU, 
zoals stabiele instituties die een democratie garanderen en mensenrechten. 
Ten tweede moeten landen aan de acquis communautaire voldoen. Dit zijn 
35 hoofdstukken die de volledige EU-regels en -normen beschrijven. Een van 
deze hoofdstukken, nummer 18, beschrijft de statistieken die landen moeten 
implementeren, en een onderdeel hiervan is de volkstelling. Als EU-
uitbreidingsland hoeven de Westelijke Balkanstaten volgens de wet nog niet 
aan de EU-regels te voldoen, maar het wordt sterk aangeraden, omdat ze 
hiermee laten zien dat ze bereid zijn om lidstaat te worden.  
Je zou kunnen zeggen dat een volkstelling een ouderwets concept is, 
maar ook in een moderne samenleving zijn de data die hierdoor verzameld 
worden cruciaal. Deze worden bijvoorbeeld gebruikt voor nationale statistie-
ken, zoals het bruto binnenlands product per hoofd van de bevolking en de 
distributie van subsidies. Ook geven ze een breed overzicht van de bevol-
king en de levensstandaard van een land. In het algemeen wordt een volks-
telling iedere tien jaar uitgevoerd, in verschillende stappen, beginnende met 
de wet over de volkstelling en de voorbereidingen zoals de vragenlijst 
waarmee de data worden verzameld. Dan volgen de dataverzameling en -
verwerking, met uiteindelijk de publicatie en disseminatie van de resultaten. 
Al met al is het een tijdrovend proces dat ook hoge kosten met zich mee-
brengt (Schulte Nordholt, 2014, p. 9). Data over de bevolking zijn echter 
nodig voor een goede politieke besluitvorming en het daarop toegesneden 
beleid.  
Ondanks dat alle EU-uitbreidingslanden aan dezelfde condities moeten 
voldoen, variëren de laatste volkstellingen sterk per land. Zo was de laatste 
volkstelling in Kroatië, Servië en Montenegro niet heel problematisch en werd 
deze weinig betwist.40 De Albanese volkstelling werd echter deels in twijfel 
                                                        
39 Sindsdien zijn alleen nog Roemenië en Bulgarije lid geworden in 2007 en Kroatië in 2013.  
40 In Montenegro waren er marginale betwistingen bij de etnische gemeenschappen (Visoka & 
Gjevori, 2013, p. 13). In Servië is er een complexe relatie tussen de Servische meerderheid en de 
Albanese en Bosnische minderheden en dit leidde tot kleine onenigheden (Visoka & Gjevori, 
2013, p. 16). In Kroatië zijn de data van de volkstellingen bijna overal geaccepteerd, er was 
vooral kritiek vooraf de volksteling door de Servische minderheid op formulering van de vragen in 
de vragenlijst. 
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getrokken door de etnische minderheden in het land (Visoka & Gjevori, 
2013) en in Kosovo werd de volkstelling geboycot in sommige gemeenten 
(Visoka & Gjevori, 2013). In Bosnië is de volkstelling twee keer vertraagd 
voordat deze uiteindelijk plaatsvond in oktober 2013, maar de resultaten zijn 
pas in juni 2016 gepubliceerd. De volkstelling in Macedonië ging van start in 
2011, maar werd na een paar dagen geannuleerd (Daskalovski, 2013). Na 
de gewelddadige oorlog in de jaren negentig, die leidde tot opsplitsing van 
Joegoslavië, wordt in de regio onder andere etniciteit gebruikt om meer 
macht, rechten en grondgebied te verkrijgen (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 6). 
De dataverzameling over de bevolkingsgroepen was een van de mogelijk-
heden om de macht van de eigen groep te vergroten en die van de ande-
re groep te decimeren. Hierdoor zijn volkstellingen gevoelige en politieke 
kwesties. In deze thesis is de methode van de cruciale casussen als basis 
gebruikt (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 176) voor het bestuderen van de 
volkstellingen in Kroatië van 2011, in Bosnië van 2013 en in Macedonië van 
2011. 
De onderzoeksvraag die in deze thesis is onderzocht, focust zich op de 
variaties in de uitvoering en processen rondom de volkstellingen in Kroatië, 
Bosnië en Macedonië die, ondanks dat ze aan dezelfde EU-regels moesten 
voldoen, erg verschillend zijn verlopen.  
Theoretische bijdrage en methoden 
Europeanisering wordt in deze thesis gebruikt om de EU-uitbreiding en de 
volkstellingen op de Westelijke Balkan te onderzoeken. Om dit te kunnen 
doen, wordt er in het theoretische hoofdstuk een verschil gemaakt tussen 
interne en externe europeanisering. Waar interne europeanisering de focus 
legt op de processen binnen de EU, kijkt externe europeanisering vooral 
naar de invloed van de EU op haar toekomstige lidstaten: de uitbreidings-
landen. Europeanisering in deze thesis wordt gedefinieerd als de invloed van 
de EU op haar uitbreidingslanden (Radaelli, 2006; Elbasani 2013).  
Binnen het kader van europeanisering is er weinig onderzoek gedaan 
naar het effect van EU-uitbreiding op volkstellingen (Keil, 2015; Keil & Perry, 
2015). Recentelijk is er meer over verschenen, maar dit onderzoek richt zich 
vooral op de constructie van nationale identiteiten (Bieber, 2015) en op et-
niciteit (Daskalovski, 2013; Visoka & Gjevori, 2013). Het politieke spel achter 
de cijfers wordt desondanks als uitermate belangrijk geacht (Daskalovski, 
2013; Keil & Perry, 2015).  
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan de literatuur over europeanisering door de 
effecten van EU-uitbreiding op de implementatie van een van de aspecten 
van de acquis communautaire te bestuderen. In hoofdstuk 2 van deze thesis 
worden onder andere de verschillende eisen voor EU-regelgeving gedetail-
leerd uitgelegd. Verder wordt beschreven hoe de drie implementatiefases 
van de regelgeving worden geanalyseerd: non-compliance, partial compli-
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ance en full compliance. In dit theoretische hoofdstuk worden ook de ver-
schillende kanten van europeanisering belicht: expliciete en impliciete 
compliance met de EU-regelgeving voor volkstellingen, de directe invloed 
van de EU en de invloed van lokale aspecten.  
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de overkoepelende methoden voor de dataver-
zameling en het analyseren van de gegevens van dit onderzoeksproject 
besproken. Door het gebruik van het additional coverage mixed methods 
model (Morgan, 2014) zijn in dit onderzoek data van een expertenquête (in 
twee rondes) gecombineerd met diepte-interviews. Door het toepassen van 
dit model ontstaat een coherenter beeld over de volkstellingsprocessen in 
de casuslanden. De diepte-interviews bij onder andere de nationale 
statistische bureaus, de Europese Commissie en Eurostat, werden gebruikt 
om, tegen de achtergrond van de volskstellingen in de drie landen, een 
beeld te schetsen van de politieke en maastschappelijke situatie in de deze 
landen. De aanvullende internet-enquête is gebaseerd op de Delphi-
methode en werd afgenomen onder 75 volkstellingsexperts. De enquête 
werd gebruikt om meer informatie te verkrijgen over onder andere de 
achtergronden van de EU-regelgeving over volkstellingen. Door de twee 
opeenvolgende enquêterondes (met een respons van 69% [n=52] in de eer-
ste ronde en 50% [n=38] in de tweede ronde) konden op basis van antwoor-
den in de eerste ronde, gerichte vervolgvragen gesteld worden.  
Empirische bijdrage 
Hoofdstuk 4 belicht de paradox van het verzamelen van etnische en culture-
le data en de verbinding met numerieke drempels die leiden tot lokale con-
flicten. Ondanks het feit dat de landen op de Westelijke Balkan een oorlogs-
verleden hebben en dat binnen deze oorlogen etniciteit een belangrijke rol 
speelde, verzamelen alle landen in de regio data over etniciteit, taal en 
religie. Wat dit nog problematischer maakt, is dat in de casuslanden de uit-
komsten van de volkstellingen gebruikt worden voor de bescherming van 
minderheden en om het recht toe te kennen bepaalde talen te gebruiken. 
In Kroatië zijn de rechten voor minderheden afhankelijk van het percentage 
van de minderheid in dat land. In Bosnië rust het hele politieke systeem sinds 
het Dayton Vredesakkoord op de machtsverdeling tussen de drie etnische 
groepen (de Bosniaken, de Kroaten en de Serviërs) (Armakolas & 
Maksimovic, 2014; Bieber, 2004). In Macedonië is in het Ohrid Vredesakkoord 
vastgelegd dat minderheden die meer dan twintig procent van de bevol-
king uitmaken meer rechten krijgen voor bijvoorbeeld het gebruik van hun 
eigen taal (Brunnbauer, 2002; Vasilev, 2013). Dit heeft geleid tot verschillen-
de conflictsituaties. Omdat het verzamelen van etnische en culturele data 
niet verplicht is binnen de EU, zijn voor dit onderzoek de enquêtedata ge-
bruikt om de praktijk rondom de implementatie van de etnisch en culturele 
kwesties in volkstellingen te onderzoeken. De conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is 
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dat volkstellingen altijd politiek zijn, in ieder geval in complexe samenlevin-
gen zoals op de Westelijke Balkan.  
Het vijfde hoofdstuk van deze thesis gaat dieper in op de analyse van de 
europeaniseringsprocessen van volkstellingen. In eerder onderzoek zijn de 
normatieve en strategische aspecten van de EU-dimensies als externe 
macht geanalyseerd (Noutcheva, 2009, 2012) en wordt het concept van ‘EU 
member state building’(Bieber, 2011; Denti, 2014; Keil, 2013a) gebruikt om 
het proces van staatsvorming, dat gepaard gaat met de voorbereiding op 
het EU-lidmaatschap, te beschrijven. Recentelijk wordt meer onderzoek ge-
daan naar de lokale factoren die een rol spelen in het EU-uitbreidingsproces, 
zoals de problematiek rond fragiele staten (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a). 
Omdat de EU veel gelegen is aan de stabiliteit van deze regio, wil ze graag 
dat de desbetreffende landen als onderdeel van de uitbreiding, goede en 
betrouwbare statistieken hebben (Bieber, 2015, p. 11). Alle landen op de 
Westelijke Balkan werden daarom financieel en/of technisch ondersteund bij 
hun laatste volkstelling, door bijvoorbeeld Eurostat. Om de europeanisering-
processen beter te begrijpen wordt in hoofdstuk 5 de werking van twee eu-
ropeaniseringsmechanismes getest: conditionality, dat zich baseert op een 
rationele kosten-batenberekening, en legitimacy, waar gekeken wordt in 
hoeverre de EU-regelgeving geaccepteerd wordt, omdat het als legitiem en 
toepasselijk wordt ervaren. Dit hoofdstuk concludeert dat in Kroatië het me-
chanisme van legitimacy een grote rol heeft gespeeld, terwijl in Bosnië en 
Macedonië de invloed van de EU, door financiële en politieke voordelen, 
belangrijker is. Beide mechanismes speelden dus een rol en hiermee draagt 
dit hoofdstuk bij aan de literatuur over europeanisering die deze mechanis-
mes als complementair beschouwt.  
Naast de invloed van de EU zijn ook de lokale aspecten erg belangrijk als 
het gaat om volkstellingen. In het zesde hoofdstuk wordt de invloed van de 
capaciteiten van de staat, maar ook de invloed van lokale en externe acto-
ren op de volkstellingen onderzocht. Volkstellingen zijn nauw verbonden met 
de instituties van de staat en worden ook gebruikt om autoriteit over de be-
volking en haar sociale relaties uit te oefenen (Curtis, 2001, p. 36). Binnen de 
EU worden statistieken van goede kwaliteit gezien als de ruggengraat van 
een nationale infrastructuur (Everaers, 2015, p. 188). Daarom moeten ook EU-
uitbreidingslanden laten zien dat ze hun statistieken op orde hebben. On-
derzoek (Börzel, 2013; Elbasani, 2013a, p. 6) suggereert dat fragiele staten 
een groot nadeel hebben als het gaat om het implementeren van de EU- 
regelgeving, simpelweg omdat ze de capaciteiten missen om deze in te 
voeren. Daarnaast wordt ook aangenomen dat actoren, lokaal en extern, 
een sterke invloed kunnen hebben op de implementatie van de EU-
regelgeving. De analyse laat zien dat vooral lokale actoren een cruciale rol 
spelen als het gaat om de implementatie van de EU-regelgeving voor volks-
tellingen. Maar de analyse laat ook zien, dat ondanks lokale conflicten de 
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volkstelling door de externe invloed van de EU alsnog kan slagen. Dit was te 
zien bij de volkstelling in Bosnië. De casus van Macedonië laat zien dat als de 
EU niet veel invloed heeft, het hele proces van de volkstelling moeilijk kan 
verlopen en zelfs kan worden geannuleerd. In Kroatië was de volkstelling 
redelijk rustig en er was er geen sprake van een lokaal conflict. Dit bevestigt 
de eerdere conclusie van hoofdstuk 5 over Kroatië, waar de EU-regelgeving 
voor de volkstellingen als goed toepasbaar werd ervaren. Al met al laten de 
bevindingen van hoofdstuk 6 over Bosnië en Macedonië zien dat de lokale 
context niet moet worden onderschat.  
De empirische bijdrage van deze thesis kan worden samengevat in drie 
hoofdbevindingen. Ten eerste wordt aangetoond dat als de verdeling van 
macht gerelateerd is aan de volkstelling, deze uitermate gepolitiseerd kan 
worden met als gevolg dat het implementatieproces aanzienlijk wordt ver-
traagd. Ten tweede komt naar voren dat lokale actoren, door het accepte-
ren of juist betwisten van de EU-regelgeving ten aanzien van volkstellingen, 
het proces van de implementatie respectievelijk kunnen versnellen of ver-
tragen. Ten derde kunnen hulpbronnen van de EU gepaard met het uitoe-
fenen van druk door de EU lokale twisten voorkomen en het tij keren, zodat 
EU-regelgeving voor volkstellingen geïmplementeerd kan worden. De resul-
taten van dit onderzoek leiden tot een beter begrip over de processen 
rondom volkstellingen en laten zien dat volkstellingen vooral politieke pro-
cessen zijn.  
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